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ARTICLE I.

EDWARDS' DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.

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Edwards' treatise on the Freedom of the Will was written in defense of the Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination and election, but it won for its author a conspicuous place in the history, not only of doctrines, but also of philosophy. Sir James Macintosh said of him: "This remarkable man, the metaphysician of America, was formed among the Calvinists when their stern doctrine retained its vigorous authority. His process of subtle argument, perhaps unequalled, certainly unsurpassed among men, was joined, as in some of the ancient mystics, with a character which raised his piety to fervor." Fichte, the younger, saw only a sketch of his theory of virtue, but was so impressed that he said: "This solitary thinker has risen to the deepest and loftiest ground which can underlie the principles of morals." Dugald Stewart regarded him as the equal in logical acuteness of any disputant bred in the Universities of Europe. He still holds this reputation in England. A recent writer in one of our best encyclopædias calls him "the greatest metaphysician and divine in America."

The fervor of his piety, to which Macintosh alludes, has impressed all the students of his life and works. Dr. Noah Porter says: "He was at once a scholastic and a mystic—a scholastic in the subtlety of his analysis and the sustained vigor of his reasoning, and a mystic in the sensitive delicacy of his emotive

tenderness and the idealistic elevation of his imaginative creations, which at times almost transfigured his Christian faith into the beatific vision." It was this combination of gifts that made him the greatest American preacher of the eighteenth century. His style was heavy and involved, his voice was without music, his manuscript was closely read, but his lofty thought and his intense spiritual life made his sermons highly instructive and impressive. He began the "Great Awakening," which swept over the American churches. His character was so pure that those who have criticised his theories have uniformly approached their task with feelings of reverence akin to awe. His religious nature was awakened in early childhood. The pious Puritan boy in the severe New England atmosphere of that day was forced to struggle with the sternest doctrines of the Calvinistic system. While yet a youth he had in one of his spiritual exercises a conception of God's absolute sovereignty that profoundly moved him. He surrendered himself to it, and that idea became the dominant principle of his subsequent thought and life. It gave vigor to his self-discipline, to his preaching, to his pastoral administration and even to his logic. It stimulated his philosophic genius to its greatest activity and summoned it to its greatest efforts. He believed in it with his whole heart and followed it boldly to its last logical consequences. It carried him dangerously near the doctrine of fatalism.

He was by training and habit, as well as by nature, a theologian. Born in a parsonage, 1703, he was prepared for college by his father and sisters. At thirteen he entered Yale College from which, four years afterwards, he was graduated. Here for a short time after graduation he was tutor. The college was as thoroughly imbued with the Calvinistic spirit as the home. Having entered the ministry he was the successor of his grandfather, Rev. James Stoddard, as pastor at Northhampton, Mass., where he remained for twenty-three years. He was then called to Stockbridge. During the six years of his ministry at this place he wrote most of his books. Twice elected president of Princeton College he at last accepted, but died two months after his inauguration. His life work was in the sphere of religion.

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He had philosophic talents of a very high order which revealed themselves by his precocious interest in Locke's "Human Understanding," and in his remarkable philosophic notes written at the age of sixteen. But his philosophic work was wholly subordinate. With him philosophy was merely the handmaid of theology to illustrate and defend the doctrines of revelation, but never a guide into saving truth. He was a philosophic thinker on religious themes rather than a philosopher. Having only a secondary interest in it, he never worked out a system of philosophy and for this reason, acute and profound as he was, he fell into inconsistencies in his discussions of philosophic subjects.

In his defense of Calvinistic doctrines he introduced ideas from his philosophic speculations that proved, in the hands of his successors, fruitful germs. He was the founder of that modified form of Calvinism known as the New England Theology. Dr. Hodge, in one place, minimizes the difference between this new type and the original system, but Dr. Fisher in his *History of Christian Doctrine* devotes a long chapter to it. It was characterized by its new method and new doctrines. Speculative forms gave a new setting to old beliefs and made them look at least like new dogmas. The way was opened for widely divergent tendencies, and in his school were found men as widely apart as Hopkins and Finney. Even Unitarianism found in it, if not its root, at least a most congenial soil. His philosophic works have a two-fold and a permanent interest. They challenge alike the careful student of philosophy and the student of theology.

His first regular study in philosophy was Locke's epoch-making book on the *Human Understanding*. He read it when he was thirteen with the avidity, as he says, with which a miser gathers up handfuls of silver and gold. Even at that early age he dissented from some of the positions taken by the author, but the effects of that system are seen in all his subsequent work. He got from Locke his idea of freedom, power and identity. Like Locke he was a utilitarian, or Hedonist. His reading in philosophy was not wide. He knew something of Reid. He

Locke's Philosophy

was acquainted with Berkeley's theory of perception. But he says he had not read Hobbes, and we may be sure that very little of the contemporary philosophical literature came into his western home. The fundamental principles of his philosophic theories were drawn from Locke and Berkeley. He combined elements of sensationalism and idealism. This is not, as it seems at first, impossible. Hobbes was a materialistic idealist, and so also more recently was Prof. Bain. Wendt, the greatest authority in physiological psychology, is in his philosophy an idealist. It was easy for Edwards, who had no system, to hold ideas that were ultimately irreconcilable. Here we have the primary source of the errors into which he fell.

His faulty philosophy permitted him to push both his philosophic and theological theories into extremes. He took Locke's doctrine of the will, but he carried it into necessitarianism. He gave it a far wider scope than Locke, and while the matter hesitated and modified, the pupil worked on without the slightest misgivings. He took Locke's doctrine of personal identity. He held with his master that it consisted in consciousness, or rather, memory, but carried it so far as to deny the necessity of identity of substance. He said that God could give an absolutely new creation the consciousness of one just annihilated, and thereby they would be identical. He maintained this not only as a possibility but also as the real fact. With Berkeley he held that spiritual beings are the only beings, but in his doctrine of causality he exposed himself to the charge of pantheism. In theology he started with Augustinianism as moulded by Calvin, but he went far beyond his predecessors. They held that Adam had in Eden the power of contrary choice, but that he lost it for himself and his posterity in religious things. They believed that there was a very great difference in the power of the will before and after the fall. Edwards denied that there was any essential difference. "His conception of the will admits of no such distinction. In the room of an acquired slavery he teaches a determinism belonging to its very nature. Freedom is as predicable of man now as before he sinned, of religious morality as of the affairs of worldly business, of man

as of God."* Every act of the will in civil affairs, in the commonest events of life, of saint and of sinner, is necessitated. In regard to predestination he was an extreme supralapsarian. In respect to creation he threw out suggestions which Dr. Emmons developed into the absurd idea of continuous creation. Hodge states it thus: "God creates everything at every moment."

Edwards brought to the discussion of the freedom of the will a defective psychology. It has been often noted by critics that he divides the mental faculties into the Understanding and the Will, or the cognitive and motive powers. Under the will he puts the feelings. This was the fault of the psychology of the age. Putting faculties so wide apart as appetite and affection on the one side and volition on the other under the head of will exposed him to confession of thought. He distinguished between desires and volitions in his formal definitions, but he confounds them in his discussion. Even while defining he has no clear conception of their difference. "I do not suppose that will and desire are words of precisely the same signification; will seems to be a word of more general signification extending to things present and absent; desire respects something absent."† The distinction is true. Desire is more general than will. We must desire at least two things in every act of choice. We may desire what we know is impossible, while we can will only what we believe to be possible. Both desire and will respect the absent. Desire includes actions and things, but the will is limited to one's own actions. He makes choice and volition identical. "The will is plainly that by which the mind chooses anything. An act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice." But choice is only one of the elements of will. It consists of choice, purpose and effort. That he is not clear in his conception of what the will is becomes further manifest from his fuller definition. He jumbles intellectual acts, feelings and volition together. "So that whatever names we call acts of will by—choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embrac-

*Fisher's *History of Christian Doctrine*.

†Freedom of the Will, pt. 1. sec. 1.

ing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining or being averse, being pleased or displeased with—may be reduced to this of choosing." Surely one to-day can approve the steadfast patriotism of Washington and severely disapprove the treachery of Conway, but his will can have nothing at all to do with either. We may like or dislike the production of a pupil without any choice in the matter. It comes under the will only when we choose to express or conceal our feelings, and in what form we will do it, if we decide to let him know our opinion of his effort. Edwards stumbled upon the threshold. He has no place for attention. He does not seem to have thought of any possible relation between the will and attention, while the direct power of the will over our own actions is through the attention. This is true of both mental and physical action. We can think of one thing or another by directing the attention. When there are two impulses, the one very strong and the other very weak, we may, by concentrating the attention upon the weaker, so strengthen it as entirely to suppress the other. He makes preception necessary. He overlooked the fact that the will by directing the attention or removing the sense affected can control the perceptions. They are not absolutely necessitated. These examples are sufficient to show the defects of his psychological analysis.

His metaphysics were fundamentally wrong. Over-awed by God's sovereignty he ruled out of existence secondary causes. He could not conceive the idea of a created substance as a centre of force. Spontaneity had for him no meaning. God is the direct causal agent in everything, and there can be no real being but God. The soul of man is not self-active, but is merely the channel through which God exerts his force. It is upon this false metaphysics that his doctrine of necessity and of election ultimately rests.

We may get a general estimate of a theory by seeing its logical consequences. Premises are wrong when the conclusions are false. Edwards' theory of the will leads to necessitarianism. Dr. Hodge protests against putting him in the same class with Hobbes, Hartley, Priestley, Belsham, Collins and the

French Encyclopædists. He thinks that Edwards was wrong chiefly in using the word necessity instead of certainty, and that this error made him use the language of Hobbes. The protest must be admitted, if we consider the grounds upon which they rested their argument. Hobbes was a materialist and Edwards was not. But from different starting points they reached the same result. Bain agrees with Hodge that Edwards has been misunderstood. He says: "His definition of cause is correct; his only error was in retaining the word necessity with its irrelevant and misleading associations." "He did not draw the obvious inference that the word necessity should be discarded from the controversy."* Edwards was aware of the various meanings of the word, and takes great pains to define it. At one place he regrets the necessity of using it. But if it did not express his idea better than any other, why does he so persistently employ it? It carries with it the idea of some form of irresistible force, and the main point of his argument is to adjust the ideas of such a force and responsibility. The choice is necessitated; it cannot be otherwise than it is, and yet because it is choice the individual is responsible. The charge of necessitarianism is maintained, not alone upon the word necessity, but upon the whole trend of the argument. Prof. Bain and John Stuart Mill regarded him as a champion of determinism. The necessitarians, not only of his own day, but in every age since, have numbered him among themselves. Dr. Bledsoe† of the University of Virginia in an acute review renews the charge from the camp of the Arminians. Dr. N. W. Taylor, from Edwards' own school, admits it and criticises the argument.‡ Dugald Stewart saw clearly the real meaning of the book and lamented its effects. "I am afraid Edwards' book (however well meant) has done much harm in England as it has secured a favorable hearing to the same doctrines which since the time of Charles have been generally ranked among the most dangerous errors of Hobbes and his disciples." A number of Calvinists like Dr. Fisher have given up the attempt to defend his system

*Mental Science, p. 419.

†Theodicy.

‡Moral Government.

and concede that he was a necessitarian. Almost all philosophic writers, who without any dogmatic prepossessions have given it a careful examination, so regard him. As evidence, we may take the *Ency. Brit.* The author of the article on Jonathan Edwards says: "He fell into not only determinism but necessitarianism

Edwards stoutly denies that he is a fatalist. At the end of his book he states the conclusions which, as he believed, followed from his doctrine of the will. "Hereby it becomes manifest that God's moral government over mankind * * * is not inconsistent with a determining disposal of all events of every kind and throughout the universe. Indeed such a universal determining providence infers some kind of necessity of all events, such a necessity as implies an infallible previous fixedness of the futurity of the event. Moral certainty does as much ascertain the futurity of the event as any other necessity." "As it has been demonstrated that the futurity of all future events is established by previous necessity, either natural or moral, so it is manifest that the Sovereign Director and Disposer of the world has ordered this necessity either in designedly acting or forbearing to act." "From whence it follows that as God designedly orders his own conduct and its connected consequences it must necessarily be that he designedly orders all things." "These things which have been said obviate the chief objection of Arminians against the Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity and corruption of man's nature." "They take off the main objections of Arminians against the doctrine of efficacious grace and at the same time prove the grace of God in a sinner's conversion to be efficacious, yea, and irresistible too, if by irresistible is meant that which is attended with a natural necessity." "God does decisively in his providence order all the volitions of moral agents either by positive influence on permission." "The things which have been said do likewise answer the chief objections against the doctrine of God's universal absolute decree, and afford infallible proof of this doctrine and of the doctrine of absolute eternal personal election in particular." He distinguishes between the positive efficiency of God and his permissive providence, but it is only a temporary concession.

The causes which are immediately operative in the permitted acts are ordered by God, and all comes back at last to positive efficiency. This is what he started out to prove and for these he is personally responsible. But his premises lead to far wider conclusions, and, when they are not accepted by him, these must be set down to the account of the system. Dr. Tappan, professor of philosophy in the University of New York and Chancellor of the University of Michigan, a Calvinist, wrote in the first half of the present century a searching review of the treatise on the will. With fairness he states Edwards' positions and then with relentless logic he follows them to their conclusions. These are the results: 1. An absolute, unconditional necessity both individual and general. 2. Every volition or event is necessary and necessarily the best possible in its place and relations. 3. If that which we call evil be evil in reality, then it must be both necessary evil, and evil having its origin in infinite wisdom. 4. The creature man cannot be blamable. 5. There can be nothing evil in itself. 6. The system of Edwards is a system of utilitarianism. 7. No individual can make an effort to change the habitual character of his volitions. 8. All exhortations and persuasions which call upon a man to better himself, to think, to plan, to act, are absurd. 9. Divine commands, warnings and rebukes, when obeyed and yielded to, are obeyed and yielded to by the necessary force which they possess in relation to the state of mind to which they are addressed. 10. The sense of guilt and shame and the fear of retribution cannot have a real and necessary connection with any volitions, but must be regarded as prejudices or errors of education from which philosophy will serve to relieve us. 11. Nature and spirit, as causes or agents, cannot be distinguished in their operations. 12. Sensations, emotions and acts of intelligence, both intuitive and ratiocinative, are acts for which we are as really responsible as for acts of volition. 13. The system of punishment is only an accommodation to the opinions of society. 14. There cannot really be any calamity. 15. There really can no more be folly in conduct or error in reasoning and belief than

there can be crime and calamity considered as evils in themselves. 16. The system is a system of fatalism. 17. It appears to me that Pantheism is a fair deduction from this system. These are the conclusions which Dr. Tappan drew from the premises of Edwards. Without stopping to examine the arguments by which he maintains his propositions, let us note the significance of the fact that with his theological bias he felt compelled to make them. If necessitarianism is not the real meaning of the system of Edwards, why is it that so many in every age and under such widely divergent influences—Necessitarians, Arminians and Calvinists, theologians and philosophers—have so understood it.

Edwards started with definitions, and, like a great many other philosophers who pursued the same method, found himself in company with necessitarians and fatalists. Kant put the freedom of the will among the antinomies. He demonstrated both the thesis and antithesis: There are free causes, and liberty is a mere illusion. He gave up the problem as insoluble by the speculative reason. With him a considerable number of metaphysicians agree and remand the question to psychology. But Prof. William James, who studied it from the inductive side, says in italics: "The fact is that the question of free will is insoluble on strictly psychological grounds."* McCosh seems to surrender the solution altogether. "We can produce the separate proofs of the two separate truths [freedom of the will and the universality of the law of cause and effect], and when looked at apart, these proofs are acknowledged to be irrefragable. Should it be demanded of us that we reconcile them, we assume that we are not bound to offer a positive reconciliation."† But whatever philosophers and inductive psychologists may decide about it, the world knows that the will is free. Kant assumed it as a fact given in consciousness and made it the basis of his argument for the existence of God. McCosh held that it is established by a proof so clear that the principle of causality could not overthrow it. Necessitarians assume it in practical life.

*Psychology. 1-456.

†Divine Government, p. 279.

Zeno, for example, was flogging a slave, who said: "Stop, it was fated to me to steal." But the fatalist, continuing the strokes, replied with more wit than conviction: "Yes, and it was fated to me to flog you." Philosophizing is an act of freedom, and without freedom of the will, philosophy would be impossible, and therefore every attempt to prove necessitarianism assumes as a fact its contradictory. Necessitarianism in all its forms is necessarily self-destructive. If we are not free we are nothing but machines endowed with consciousness. We cannot be responsible, conscience is a lie, and all life save the mere sensations of pleasure and pain is a delusion. There can be no true foundation for any kind of government or of ethics. If we know anything we know we are free. Edwards, in trying to confirm the doctrines of Calvinism, proved more than he intended and was driven into opposition to a universal primary conviction of mankind.

It is frequently said that while Edwards was wrong he made valuable contribution to the discussion of the will by exposing three great errors. One of these errors is the self-determination of the will. No one now will speak of the self-determining power of the will as an independent entity, as Calvin did, or as an independent faculty. The inter-dependence of the mental faculties is taught in our elementary psychologies. The representative is dependent upon the presentative, and the presentative is dependent upon the representative. The feelings are dependent upon cognition, and cognition is dependent upon the feelings. The will is dependent upon both feelings and cognitions, and both of them are in turn dependent upon the will. This is so well understood that it is absurd to speak, as men did some years ago, of an absolute self-determination of the will. But this is due more to a better psychology than to the argument of Edwards. This, however, was not the point of his assault. He says explicitly: "I take it for granted that when Arminians speak of the will as determiner, they mean the *soul* in the use of that power." He denies, therefore, that the mind has any power of self-determination. Here is a radical error. He compares the mind's control over its actions with its control over its own body. It determines its volitions, as it does the

movement of its limbs, by an antecedent volition. The mind chooses to walk and the feet necessarily move. It chooses to choose, and choice necessarily follows. But is there no difference between the mind and the body? Is the relation between the mind and will the same as that between the mind and body? If the mind by choice necessitates the movement of the body, which is non-ego and instrument, does it in the same way determine the activities of the will which is an integral part of itself? He says further: "If the will determines all its own free acts, then the soul determines the free acts of the will in the exercise of the power of willing, or choosing, or, which is the same thing, it determines them of choice, it determines its own acts by choosing its own acts." The soul or mind determines itself through its own will. The will is the power to choose; its only function is choice. If the will determines itself it must choose to choose before it can choose. The first choice necessitates the second choice, just as choosing to walk necessitates the movement of the legs. But that first choice had to be preceded by a prior choice which necessitated it, and that by still another. He claims to have driven the advocates of the self-determining power, not only of the will but also of the mind, to one or the other of two absurdities. They must admit an event without a cause or a series of choices *ad infinitum*. As we wade through the five sections of Part II. in which he forces us upon the horns of this dilemma, we cannot help thinking of Stilpo trying to prove that a wall cannot be torn down: "As long as it is a wall it is not torn down and when it is torn down it is not a wall." Even while Zeno, the Eleatic, was proving that an arrow could not fly through space his own pen was moving over the face of his parchment. But this argument is not so impregnable as Edwards believed. Admitting for the moment that one must choose to choose, it is not true that the anterior choice necessitates the whole fact in the subsequent choice. I decide to go either to New York or New Orleans. I must choose between the two places and I determine to do it at once. I choose to make the choice. But nothing in any of the previous choices necessitates my choosing, say, New Orleans. The choice be

tween the two alternatives is free. But, secondly, it is not true that the mind must choose to choose before it can exercise the power of choice. Circumstances either external or internal may necessitate *a* choice but not *the* choice between the alternatives. I am compelled to choose between going on or stopping this writing. Circumstances compel the mind to make the choice, but they do not compel me to choose continuing to write. A cause may awaken and even necessitate the activity, but the will determines itself in the particular line of that activity. Edwards confounded things psychologically distinguishable. He did not see the difference between the cause of volitional activity and the cause of the direction of it. The distinction is like that between thinking and thought. There can be no thinking without thought. When thinking ceases, thought is gone. But we distinguish between the mental activity in thinking and the thought. In thinking of any subject the thought is changing while the thinking goes on. The same distinction is found in consciousness. We cannot be conscious at all without being conscious of an object. If there is no object there is no consciousness. Continued consciousness requires a change of objects. An incessant roar ceases to be heard. We distinguish between the mental activity and the objects awakening it. The object may be purely subjective, as a memory or an imagination, and therefore have no existence outside of the mental modification, but the distinction between consciousness and object remains valid. It is not true, then, that what necessitates some act of choice necessitates the particular action chosen. If we apply Edwards' argument to the first act of self-consciousness, we find ourselves in a similar dilemma. We must know two objects before we can distinguish between them. If one does not know what are the marks of the genuine coin, he cannot distinguish it from the counterfeit. If one does not know self he can not know that he is not non-self. But in the first act of self-consciousness the ego distinguishes itself from non-ego. There must have been a previous act of self-recognition, but in that previous act there was the same difficulty and so on ad infinitum. If not, there was a first act of self-consciousness without a cause. But despite the logic, there was in every one

of us a *primum cognitum* in which we came by the same act to a consciousness both of self and the not-self.

Choice in its nature implies self-determination, and if it is necessitated or determined by anything outside of self it is not choice. If the cause is outside of self it must have a preceding cause, and that a cause, and thus on back until a fatal chain encircles all things. In determining itself between alternate actions, the cause is in the will. The event, limited if we will to the mere purpose, is neither one of an infinite series nor one without a cause. The mind is, within its sphere, an originating cause.

If the mind is in no degree nor in any sense a self-determining personality, not merely because it is a creature but primarily because it is mind, as Edwards held, then God is not self-determined. What can in no degree exist in the human mind simply because it is mind cannot exist in the Infinite Mind. An infinite expansion can not add an absolutely new element. God was compelled to choose between creating the world and not creating it. If his will was not self-determined in the act of choosing, God was fated. He was under an iron necessity to which he might consciously and even cheerfully submit, but still there was the necessity. God's will is a cause because it is will, or there is no cause but fate. Edwards' dilemma applies to God's will as well as to ours, and in overthrowing self-determination in human personality he overthrew the very doctrine of God's sovereignty which he started out to prove. In mowing down Whitby and Clarke he cut off his own legs.

His argument against the doctrine of indifference was more successful. He exposed the error by pointing out the consequences. If freedom consists in indifference we may as readily choose the wrong as the right, the evil as the good. Indifference in morals is itself sin. With the growth of moral preference there would be a decay of moral responsibility. Those confirmed in depravity and those established in virtue would be alike beyond the range of morality. Satan would no longer be wicked, and God would not be holy. Moreover, choice is impossible in absolute indifference. The difference may be exceedingly small, but if there is none at all, one could not

touch any spot upon the chess-board. Still further, character consists in fixed preferences. The saint is a saint because he is so in love with the holy that he abhors sin, and the demon is lost to virtue because he is habitually in love with the base and mean. The doctrine of indifference is absurd.

Dominant preferences, the habitual attitude of personality towards the moral universe, persistent inclinations are constituent elements of character. Moral judgments are based more upon character than upon transient motives that leap suddenly into power and carry one momentarily out of the usual circle. All theories of the will must reckon with character, under penalty of being incomplete and false. Affections and desires spring out of character, and will, therefore, is in some degree dependent upon it. The acts of the will are expressions of character and in some sense are determined but not constrained by it. The will is not necessitated by character, for we can, through the will, change the character. The character of Satan was holy, but by one supreme act of the will he became the Devil. The will maintains in some form an essential independence of character. Even when the character is fixed, as in the angels, and saints and God, the will is not necessitated. It is said that it is impossible for God to lie, but his holy character does not compel his holy will. He is under no constraint either external or internal. His will is perfectly free in its holiness, and it is holy because it is free. When we say that he is necessarily holy we use the word necessarily in its truest and most general sense, and when thus applied every trace of the idea of compulsion from any source whatever is wanting. Character, being devoid of constraining power, does not destroy responsibility. It does not diminish in any degree whatever the freedom of the will. This is so manifest that it is not easy to see how men like Clarke could, even under the stress of controversy, fall into language that conveys the idea that liberty of indifference is essential to freedom of the will.*

*Closely related to this subject is responsibility for inherited character. We can understand how we are responsible for the character we ourselves have formed, but how about the nature with which we are born? This is the real problem of Augustinianism. Its discussion falls under the subject of Original Sin.

The other theory which Edwards is said to have exposed is that of Contingence. But it was not a difficult task that he assumed. No one except Epicurus and a very small number of atheists ever thought of any event occurring without a ground or reason. The question is not about *a* cause, but *the* cause of volitions.

It is often very difficult to determine just what Edwards means. He uses language that is common to all our theology. There are a number of chapters to which an Augustinian of the Lutheran type may subscribe. As we read we think the word necessity is unfortunate, but we are willing to accept it as he defines it in many places. We are frequently tempted to think that he has been misunderstood. But we find, as we proceed, that these familiar words have a new setting and the old language of theology takes on a new meaning. Those chapters to which we had subscribed must be read again in the light of the whole book. There is a peculiar ambiguity running through the discussion. There is some unavoidable ambiguity in the terms necessarily employed in treating of the will, but in no other writer on the subject are there so many ambiguous expressions. This may seem a strange charge brought against one whose logical subtility and power of acute analysis has been so generally admitted and greatly admired. It is stranger still, when we recall the extraordinary pains he has taken to define, explain and illustrate the meaning of his terms. But if it is not true, why is it that men have differed so widely as to the real bearing of his theory? While his friends see little else than the old time Calvinism, is it mere perversity in others that finds necessitarianism and even fatalism? Why did Bledsoe, the profound professor of Mathematics, accustomed to acute logical analysis see in Edwards' freedom of choice nothing but freedom from external restraint, and Hodge the great professor of theology, find nothing worse than an unfortunate use of the word necessity in place of the word certainty? This charge is not new. It was brought very soon after the publication of the book. It is implied in Dugald Stewart's criticism. But the charge means more than a fault in style. Ambiguity in terms exposed him to

the use of the ambiguous middle, or the fallacy of four terms. Acute as he was, Edwards deluded himself by the double meaning of his terms. Will, cause, necessity, liberty, motive, etc., have one meaning in his major and another in his minor, and though nothing logically followed he proceeded to draw the conclusion of universal necessity.

The ambiguity of his definition of will has been noted by a great many students of his theory. We have already seen how he puts under the power of choice approving and disapproving, liking and disliking, being pleased and displeased with. Here is ample room for fallacy. He speaks of choice as the determination between actions, but in the end, as many have noted, he resolves choice into desire. A doctrine of necessity that might be true of desire is not true of choice.

The central point of the problem of will is in the nature of cause. When the word is applied to volition, what is its precise meaning? Edwards understood the importance of this question, and we should have expected a clear, precise definition. But instead of that we have one that is the most general possible. It is "the ground or reason" of an event. He admits that this meaning is more extensive than is sometimes used. "The word is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only that which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing or bring it to pass. But there are many things which have no such positive productive influence which yet are causes in that respect that they have truly the nature of a ground or reason why some things are rather than others, or why they are as they are rather than otherwise." "A cause is *any antecedent* either *natural or moral, positive or negative*, on which an event, either a *thing* or the manner and *circumstance of a thing*, so depends that it is the ground and reason either *in whole or in part* why it is rather than not." He distinguishes in a general way between natural and moral causes, but adds that "moral causes may have as real an influence as any cause whatever." Here he draws his line around a very wide field and includes a great many things which have nothing in common except that they

are grounds and reasons for other things. There is a very great difference between physical causes and moral motives, between gravitation and a moral inclination, except that they are grounds and reasons for consequents they differ *toto coelo*. When a man begins a long argument on a subject so abstruse as the will with definitions as vogue as this, he is in great danger of "trading terms" without detecting it. The change of terms may occur even in a short syllogism. Here is an example taken from an able treatise on psychology :

Whatever is caused is necessitated,
A volition is caused,
Therefore, A volition is necessitated.

The major is true of physical causes. A volition has a moral cause. If this is not the meaning of the premises they beg the question. If we write out fully the terms the fallacy is apparent.

Whatever is physically caused is necessitated,
A volition is morally caused
Therefore—————

The danger is increased manifold when the argument runs out over more than one hundred and fifty pages. We read of the cause of volition and we are perplexed to know whether the influence is at bottom like a physical force or not. We are still more puzzled when we try to determine whether it is positive or negative. Does the volition come because the positive force has been withdrawn, as the withdrawal of the sun is the cause of frost? Is the moral motive the cause of the whole volition or only a part? Can a mere negative be a real cause? Hundreds died annually from smallpox before the times of Venner. That vaccination was unknown may be said in a general way to be the reason of their deaths. But can it be said that this was the cause? Can the non-existent be a cause even though its non-existence be a ground or reason of something why it is and not otherwise? In the end of his argument Edwards' conclusion rests upon the idea of positive power as the characteristic element of causality. If not, how could he get as one of the consequences the doctrine of *irresistible* grace? Somewhere and somehow the ground and reason of choice has been transformed into a force that strictly necessitates the volition. The

constraint may be outside of consciousness, but still it is nothing but constraint, a rigid necessity.

He distinguishes between necessity in the popular sense and metaphysical necessity, and between natural necessity and moral necessity. In the popular sense "a thing is said to be necessary when we cannot help it, let us do what we will." Philosophic necessity, as he defines it, is, certainly, the fixed connection between the subject and predicate of a true proposition. He reduces natural and moral necessity to the same thing when he says that they differ only in the nature of the terms. "The difference does not lie in the nature of the connection but in the terms connected." In natural necessity the terms are of natural things and in moral necessity they are of moral things. But necessity does not consist primarily in the way we think about the things, but in the relation of the things themselves. Are moral things bound together by precisely the same kind of ties of necessity as physical things? He does not tell us this anywhere as he proceeds with his argument, and we find at last that he means that they are. The distinction was only formal and tentative, and not real. He distinguishes between natural and moral inability. Dr. Emmons and others thought this was an important discovery in theological science. Edwards said a sinner has the natural ability to be a Christian, but not the moral ability, and his natural ability makes him responsible. We can understand how a man has the natural ability to abstain from external acts of sin and perform the outward acts of worship. He may use the words of prayer, but that is not praying. Natural and moral ability in the inner and essential nature of both morality and religion are the same. Without moral ability one has no ability at all to love God. "Him that cometh unto me I will in no wise cast out." But coming to Christ is precisely the thing a man without moral ability has no ability whatever to do. This fallacy is a weak justification of God's justice when in the exercise of his absolute sovereignty he damns the sinner for not doing what it was absolutely impossible for him to do. God withholds his grace, and he is the cause of the man's being eternally miserable.

The special case he takes to define necessity does not cover up what was his real conception. If he meant nothing more than certainty, we ask again why did he not take the clearer and better word? Then we would have to distinguish only between objective and subjective certainty, or between the reality of the fact and our personal conviction. But besides these two meanings of certainty, which he has confused, we have in addition all the ambiguity of the word necessity. We are thinking only of certainty, but we are haunted by the shadow of that dreadful word. He often leaves us uncertain whether he is talking about philosophic or popular necessity. He has used necessity instead of certainty because it better expresses his idea that God is such an absolute cause that there can be no place left for secondary causes. God can be absolutely sovereign only when he knows infallibly the future. He cannot know what will be unless he knows the entire range of causes. He cannot know the causes unless he decrees them. When he decrees he becomes himself the efficient agent. In this we find the reason for the charm that the word necessity had over him. Certainty as the equivalent is quietly dropped, and we end in the grasp of grim, horrible necessity.

He says that the will is determined by the strongest motive. The ambiguity of that expression has been repeatedly pointed out, but the word motive is ambiguous. Mackenzie says it is not less ambiguous than intention, and that under intention we include immediate and remote, outer and inner, direct and indirect, conscious and unconscious, and formal and material purposes. Even after we have clearly discriminated between motive and intention, we are left still to make the distinction between that which impels and that which induces. A motive is an idea of something to be accomplished. That end does not exist. It is not therefore a cause exerting a power or influence of any kind. The idea has no objective existence. It is merely a subjective reality dependent upon the mind and even upon the will for its existence. No power or influence can pass over from it to determine the choice. But Edwards somehow confounds the future objective fact called motive with the real motive in the

mind, and speaks of it as determining the choice as light does vision.

It is universally conceded that Edwards' philosophic defense of Calvinism is the ablest that has yet been made. But it failed, Calvinists themselves being judges. No purely philosophic ground for the Calvinistic system has been found. Many who believe the theology say that the doctrines of God's sovereignty and man's free agency are, with our present light, irreconcilable and that they hold both as matters of faith. We accept their confession as to their own inability, and agree with them that their conception of God's sovereignty is irreconcilable with any true doctrine of man's responsibility. We know both by reason and Scripture that man is responsible and we give up the doctrine that contradicts it. We believe with our whole heart in God's sovereignty, but our view of it does not compel us to receive a doctrine of election such as Calvin taught. We believe that God can govern the universe, because he knows infallibly past, present, and future events, but that for an infallible foreknowledge by his infinite intuition it is not necessary that he should be the efficient cause of everything. Even in total depravity, such as exists in the finally lost, the will has all the freedom necessary to responsibility. God punishes the sinner because of what he does in the exercise of his own will, and not, as Edwards taught, for what God does, through the instrumentality of the sinner's will.

ARTICLE II.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE HALLE PIETISM IN THE PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

BY JULIUS FRIEDRICH SACHSE.

No phase in the religious history of the Germans in the American colonies has received less merited attention from the student and investigator, than the influence exercised by that religious movement of the eighteenth century known as "Halle Pietism," and by the institutions which make the saline city on the Saale so famous, the chief factor in which was the Rev. August Hermann Francke.

How widespread and salutary the benign influence of German Pietism was in the Province of Penn and in the adjoining colonies, especially after it had been divorced from all visionary extravagances and had been reduced again to a basis of evangelical moderation, has never been written.

As Pennsylvania was the great objective point for almost all German emigrants, so the Province also became the centre of religious activity, whence emanated almost every religious movement, both orthodox and sectarian, of the Germans during the colonial period, and thence spread to every colony in which Germans had settled. It was chiefly due to the actions and teachings of the Halle institutions and the leaders there, that the tide of Sectarianism was checked in the western world, and that regularly ordained clergymen of the Lutheran Church were sent here to organize congregations, and to minister to the Germans and their offspring, who on account of the lack of such teachers were fast verging towards rationalism. How great were the results achieved, is shown at the present day by the flourishing Lutheran congregations and churches in almost every city, town and hamlet, where there are any number of descendants of the German settlers of the eighteenth century.

The influence of German Pietism of the Halle school in the western world dates from the day when Magister Johannes Kelpius and his band of forty followers landed upon these shores on St. John's day, June 24th, 1694, and established themselves upon the banks of the romantic Wissahickon. Prominent among whom was Daniel Falckner, Heinrich Bernhard Köster and, last but not least, Johann Gottfried Selig, the secretary of the celebrated father of German Pietism, Phillip Jacob Spener. This community although somewhat imbued with chiliastical and mystical notions was still sound in the orthodox Lutheran faith.

The labors of Köster and, later, of the Falckner brothers to establish the regular orthodox worship as founded upon the unaltered Augsburg Confession are matters of record. Among the evidences left to us is a little book, issued by Kelpius, "*Kurtzer Begriff oder leichtes mittel zu beten.*" This was printed on the Jansen press toward the close of the seventeenth century. It was intended for the use of German families as a means of urging them on to inward prayer. This was the first High German prayer book that is known to have been printed in America. A unique copy of the second edition of this book is in the library of the writer. It was afterwards translated into English by the celebrated Doctor Christopher Witt, the last survivor of the community, under the title: "*A Short, Easy and Comprehensive Method of Prayer. Translated from the German, and published for a farther Promotion, Knowledge and Benefit of Inward Prayer. By a Lover of Internal Devotion.*" This version also went through several editions by different printers, and spread its benign influence far and wide among both German and English, even being received as a text-book by the Quakers.

Then we have also the Devotional book by Justus Falckner, printed in low Dutch; "*Grondlycke Onderricht Van Sekere Voornamen Hoofd-stucken, der Waren, Loutern, Saligmakenden, Christelycken Leere.*" This was printed by William Bradford in New York in 1708.

During the first three decades of the eighteenth century many appeals were sent to Halle, as the chief orthodox centre

in Germany, for aid and assistance, as well for Ministers as for Bibles and devotional literature. Some of the latter found their way to Pennsylvania, and were eagerly sought for at high prices by the Germans. This was especially true about the Halle Bibles, which with the devoutly inclined were looked upon as the standard version.

The repeated and urgent appeals sent to the "Fathers in Halle" for regularly ordained clergymen were for some reasons not answered as promptly as were those for Bibles and Testaments and Luther's Catechisms. The congregations at Philadelphia, Providence and elsewhere, all applied to Halle for assistance; but it was not until after the fourth decade of the century had begun that the prayers from America were answered, and a young pastor was sent to Pennsylvania. The selection was a providential one, and for all ages to come the name of Heinrich Melchoir Mühlenberg will stand out prominently as the patriarch of the Lutheran Church in the western world.

With the advent of Pastor Mühlenberg the connection with the Halle institutions became close and intimate. It cemented the bond between the Germans in Pennsylvania and the Fathers in Halle, as the leaders there were called. How this intercourse was kept up and accentuated by the arrivals of the Reverends Handschuh, Brunholtz, Heintzelman, Schaum, Kurtz, later by the grand Kunze, so rich in spirit and mind, Schmidt the earnest seeker after truth, and so down to the venerable Helmuth, is well known, and how the influence and teachings of these men sent out by the Francke institution—call it Halle Pietism if you will—spread far and wide and exercised its benign influence in these western wilds, is all a matter of history.

Other proofs of the great influence of the Halle institutions among the Germans in America are to be found in the fact that when Christopher Sauer and his sectarian associates in Germantown proposed to publish an American version of the Holy Writ in the German tongue, their prospectus distinctly stated that it would be an exact reprint of the 34th edition of the Halle version.

Then again we have the tribute to the memory of the elder

Francke printed by the Ephrata Community in 1750: "*Das Gedächtniß des Gerechten August Hermann Francke Seliges Absterben.*" No greater evidence of the widespread recognition of the Halle Pietism and its influence could be presented than this acknowledgement from the chief centre of sectarianism in the province.

It was not alone in religious spheres that the Halle influences made themselves felt, but it was in the domestic life also. The "Medicamente" of the *Franckische Apotheke* were as well known to almost every German family in the province as were the Bibles and Catechisms. Large and regular consignments of these remedies were sent in care of the clergymen laboring in America, and upon their arrival were quickly disposed of to the settlers, who placed great faith in their virtues.

The books and pamphlets published by the Halle Institution treating of the bodily health and its preservation became household authorities of almost equal importance to the settler as was his Bible and catechism. There were but few German families in Pennsylvania, orthodox or sectarian, during the latter half of the eighteenth century whose homes did not contain, and who did not depend upon some of these publications for help and reference in times of sickness. These issues ranged all the way from a single leaflet, "*Abgekuerzte Beschreibung,*" setting forth the virtues of their universal panacea, the *Essentia Dulcis*, to the "*Hoechst Noethige Erkenntniss des Menschen,*" a book of over 1300 pages, with a preface upon the "divine solicitude in the discovery of different powerful medicines, and how it also occasioned the editing of this tractate."

Scarcely less than the religious influence of the Halle institutions, were the political ones, during our transition from colonial vassalage to sovereign independence. If the writer mistakes not, every clergyman sent out by Halle was loyal to the patriots, and espoused their cause during the revolutionary period. A claim that cannot be made by either the Episcopalian or German Reformed churches.

How even the military arm felt more or less of the Hallenser

influence will be apparent when we recall the fact that General Peter Mühlenberg finished his education at the Francke Pedagogium. Then after the independence of the colonies was gained and a stable form of government assured, by the adoption of the federal constitution with George Washington as the first president, it was another graduate of the Francke orphanage, Frederick Augustus Mühlenberg, who became the first Speaker of the Federal House of Representatives. How much his rulings and political career were influenced by his early education at Halle can now well be surmised. Certain it is that the chief training for his famous life and career as statesman and pastor were the results of the teachings of the younger Francke and his successor.

To show how the Halle influences even spread into the field of science and philology, it is but necessary to refer to the name of another, Henry Ernst Mühlenberg, who also was a graduate of the Francke Institution.

In closing this paper the writer will call attention to a political incident in our country's history, at a time when the federal government of the United States was on trial. It will be recalled that shortly after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, in fact during the first decade that it became operative, three revolutionary movements arose in the country that caused a serious concern to the friends of republican institutions.

These outbreaks are what are known in history as "Shay's Rebellion" in Massachusetts, 1786; the Whiskey Insurrection in Pennsylvania, 1794; and lastly the so-called "Fries Rebellion" in the north-eastern counties of Pennsylvania, 1798-9.

The last named uprising was confined chiefly to the Germans in Bucks and Northampton Counties. It was during the administration of President Adams. Preparations were made for a war with France—among which were several obnoxious measures, as the "Alien and Sedition Act," and another, laying a direct tax to be assessed and collected by agents appointed by the Federal Government.

It was the enforcement of this act that brought about the opposition of the Germans to the Federal Government.

So strong was this opposition that the Federal Marshals and their deputies were powerless to collect the tax, and preparation was made by the citizens to resist the law, the first overt act being the capture of the assessors. This resulted in judicial action by Judge William Henry; and later, warrants were issued made returnable to the United States District Court. Arrests were now made by the Federal Marshal. The prisoners, however, were rescued at Bethlehem, and the armed opposition to the United States government spread rapidly. There was now no saying what proportions this rebellion would assume; and it was feared that if it should extend to all of the German counties, it might result seriously for the Adams Administration and the Constitution.

To check the growing discontent President Adams issued a proclamation, March 12, 1799, as a mild means to induce the so-called insurgents to return to their duty and homes. This proclamation created much excitement, without, however, having any effect upon the people, who felt they were being unjustly taxed. On March 14th a proclamation by Governor Thomas Mifflin followed. Finally the troops were called out, and we have more proclamations and general orders.

Matters were now assuming a crisis. The United States troops invaded the peaceful glades and valleys of Bucks and Northampton, preceeded by a proclamation by General William Macpherson. Civil war with its horrors and blood-shed seemed imminent. At the crucial moment a new factor enters upon the scene and almost as with a magician's wand the rebellion melted away into thin air, and the soldiers returned to Philadelphia, without the firing of a gun. The constitution and the government were sustained and upheld without oppression or blood-shed.

The reader will evidently wonder what brought about this sudden change. It was a proclamation issued in German, after those of President, Governor and Major General, had all failed. The name signed to it was neither a great civil dignitary nor military hero. It was a plain unassuming clergyman, originally educated and sent to Pennsylvania by the Francke Institution at

Halle—Justus Heinrich Christian Helmuth, the last of the Halle Pietists.

In this proclamation he sets forth the dire consequences of rebellion, asks the Germans to read their bibles and reflect upon their conduct. Then he recites the dreadful consequences of their continued opposition. It closes with an admonition of how his heart bleeds for them, and tells them how his affection for them and the impulse of conscience have compelled him to write to them, and asks them to follow his counsels. This proclamation is dated, Philadelphia, March 28, 1799, and signed with his full name.

Thus it will be seen how another graduate of Halle exercised his influence for the support of the stability of this government at one of the most critical periods in our history prior to the Civil War of 1861-5. This is but another evidence of the influence of Halle Pietism in our National history.

It has been the good fortune of the writer to find a single copy of the above proclamation. It was among the Helmuth papers at the Evangelical Lutheran Seminary at Mt. Airy. Perhaps at some future day a reprint may be made together with a translation.

It has been suggested that probably Gen. Peter Mühlenberg and his brother Hon. Fred. Aug. Mühlenberg inspired the publication of this document. However, even if this were so, it would not affect our argument, as they were both graduates of the Halle Pedagogium.

The above notes by no means exhaust this interesting but neglected subject of the influences of the Halle Pietism in our religious, civil and political history.

ARTICLE III.

GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD.

BY REV. J. T. GLADHILL, A. M.

The ways of God are worth finding out. He has revealed himself in the Holy Scriptures. With the aid of the Scriptures we can find out his ways and his government of the world. The Scriptures testify of God. They show the divine purpose concerning the world, and how God proposes to bring about his will. God governs according to a distinct plan. He has not hidden that plan, but shown it plainly in the Scriptures.

In searching the Scriptures we often take the opinions of men, and their conceptions of divine things, rather than the revealed word of God. The Scriptures contain the revelation of God. They also contain some erroneous interpretations of God's dealings with the world. We must be able to discriminate between God's word and the opinions of men.

Our study of God's relation to the world shall be founded upon God's words rather than upon the words of men, though they be inspired to write the word of God. There are some theological doctrines that need a restatement, but speculation must not displace the plain word of God.

I. How does God govern this world? Is the divine government an absolute autocracy? or is it a representative government using agencies or means to and end? The answer to these questions will throw much light on many dark questions of theology. With many the ideal rulers are Pharaoh, Nebuchadnezzar, Alexander, Caesar; and the modern representatives are the Kaiser of Germany and the Czar of the Russias. The thought of to-day would not regard these as ideals, especially, such as to be copies of the divine government. God's is the ideal government. He has taken man into that government, and conferred authority upon him. This appointment is not confined to kings and officials. All men are designed to bring about the divine purpose.

That God made this world for man, seems to be clearly set forth in the Scriptures. "Even as he chose us in him before the foundation of the world" Eph. 1 : 4. Since we were chosen in Christ in eternity, it was looking forward to the world, as the place where we are to carry out the purpose of that choice. Our Lord says: "The Sabbath was made for man." It was God's rest day and then designated and sanctified as man's day of rest. The earth was made for man. God gave it to him to be his, and to rule therein.

The creation of the world was by steps to the consummation—man. He was created in the likeness and image of God, *i. e.*, made after the pattern of God, made to occupy the place of God, made to exercise God's authority and power in the world. Then God gave him the first commandment: "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." Gen. 1 : 28. The plain declaration of this commandment is: God has given the earth to men. He has given them authority to rule, control, develope, and use all the physical and moral forces of the earth. Neither is there any limitation to the exercise of that power. Men understand that commandment, and are developing science, art and mechanics for the enlargement of their power beyond the help given by the animal creation. This command also includes all the moral forces, and those touching the relations between man and man.

A second commandment has been given to man in the last words of our Lord: "All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth. Go ye therefore and disciple all the nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you al ways, even unto the end of the world." Matt. 28 : 18-20. This plainly indicates that all spiritual forces and results are put into men's hands. They are to conquer the whole world for God and consecrate it to God.

These two commandments are as broad and far-reaching as

the government of God concerning this world. Whatever God wants or designs of this earth, he has commissioned man to bring to pass. He has not abdicated the throne of this world, but enthroned men, and commanded them to exercise dominion over the whole earth. Man is the divinely commissioned ruler of the earth. The whole tenor of Scripture is to develop this truth, and to show man clearly how to accomplish this work in its particulars.

II. We note God's attitude towards man as the ruler of this earth. The declaration, "Lo, I am with you alway, even to the end of the world," answers much questioning. It tells where God is, and what his relations to men are. It is not his province to spy out the deficiencies, or sins of men, but to render them all the help that they may desire.

God recognizes human responsibility. That responsibility implies freedom, *i. e.*, moral choice. Good and evil are before men. There is no coercion to determine their choice. Yet God uses persuasion, and presents the highest motives to influence their choices. Men are free to choose or refuse God's law and rule of life. If there were a divine coercion, men would not be free, and if not free, they cannot be held responsible. Man being in the divine image is free, as God is free. Therefore the government of this world is founded upon the principles of freedom.

God speaks of himself as having *come to man*. He stands by men, ready to give any aid they may desire. His attitude is that of Helper, and not to usurp any place he assigned to men. He has come to help, to make efficient, and endow them with power for larger results. The whole tenor of Scripture represents God as near. He knows men, their weakness, their wants, and their need of help. But he does not force this help upon them. He grants just as much as men will ask and will use. Hence the development of knowledge, and of human powers. Man's failure is not God's failure. It is the failure to apply to the source of infinite supplies.

The people who call upon God are the leaders of modern progress and civilization. This progress we call divine providence. It is more than human. It is supernatural power in the affairs

of the world. The miracles of Jesus were the works of the God man. The miracles of the apostles and prophets were the works of God through the human agent. They were willing agents in the divine hands. Modern civilization, with all its acquirements in art, sciences, mechanics, and religious education, is but the hand of God in human affairs. Through these God is said to rule the world. It is a divine government, while the divine hand is hidden. Only human power and wisdom are seen.

Note the use of the word "come" in the Scriptures. If God's rule were direct, he would command man to "go." But he says: "Come unto me; * * * and I will make an everlasting covenant with you." Come to God for wisdom and understanding, for help and strength, for all the elements which make a superior manhood. Divine revelation is designed to assure man that God is near, that he may be used ~~for~~ the perfecting of humanity, *i. e.*, to communicate divine power to men.

God comes to men to persuade them to accept divine help. God advances with his power and shows it to the human understanding. Revelation advances by steps. Each step shows a nearer approach of God, and gives a clearer view of his nature, his character, and his helpful power. God has come in the person of his Son, and in the power of the Holy Ghost.

In revelation he thrusts himself upon human attention. He does not wait on our approach to him, but tells in most forcible language of his nearness, and his readiness to help. He argues, persuades, and declares his purpose to command all his Almighty forces, not for deliverance only, but for helpfulness in the accomplishment of our divine calling. Men did not seek God, but God sought them, and proffered divine power. God saw human need and showed the divine hand which could help, and declared it to be theirs without constraint or limit.

God offers a divine alliance with men for the rule of this world. He will be with us in evangelizing and teaching the nations. We are co-workers together with him in reconciling sinners to God. He gives grace sufficient to overcome the powers of sin, to reform the world, and to present it to God perfect in Christ. This union must be accepted by man. Christ could

do no miracles when hindered by unbelief. God can neither lead nor instruct any people who are not in harmony with him, and who refuse his overtures. "All things are possible to him that believeth." How delicate the union! How wonderful the power that hangs upon faith! Without it, man is only man—the individual—and all his powers and influences drift away from God, and downward to anarchy and destruction.

The mission of the Holy Spirit is to persuade men to take God into their confidence. Man is selfish and distrustful. The Spirit shows him that he needs divine grace for the fulfilment of his task. He shows the divine willingness to aid his creatures in everything. He leads men to faith in God. Then they will sit at the feet of God, and learn wisdom. They there learn the true idea of government. They accept the divine purpose and plan of this world as better, and as having higher ends in view than anything the human mind had conceived. They recognize the process of the divine government, viz., that man's life should be identified with God. In this union man can rule the spiritual, the moral, and the physical world.

III. The government of this world is a divine-human co-partnership. It was God's suggestion and offer. Man accepts it. This is the Christian idea of the government of this world. It is the teaching of the New Testament. The Old Testament prefigured the same doctrine.

The Old Testament Theocracy was through men, the Judges. The people were to follow the leaders. The Judges, or leaders were instructed by the Lord. When affairs in the nation went well men lost sight of God, and men's selfish inclinations became apparent. They thought their own wisdom had done this. God was forgotten, and was set aside. The enemies of the nation took advantage of their fault and weakness, and invaded the land and oppressed the people. Then they again called upon the Lord. He was not afar off, but waiting to be called in to help. He raised up a leader, with whom he co-operated and restored quiet and prosperity to the land.

The story of the kings and the prophets is the same. But

the alliance of God with the prophets was a step forward. They were God's spokesmen. It was the reign of the prophet rather than of the king. It was divine instruction rather than autocratic power. While the prophet spake and acted by the authority of God he was recognized as God's ambassador. Whatever was accomplished was accomplished through the agency of the man. The divine will was shown to the people through the man of God.

The government of Israel as set forth in the Old Testament was a representative government. God's man was co-operating with God, and was teaching the people. This was prefiguring the larger government of the whole world wherein all peoples were not only to be governed, but were to govern the world. This is the New Testament idea of the Church and of the government of the world.

In the government of the world God's relation is mediate. God rules where man will take up that rule. The genius of the divine government through human agency is fully set forth in Christianity. The God-Man is the Divine-human King, yet he keeps himself in the background, and rules the spiritual world through his followers. In so far as they fulfil the divine command, the Gospel becomes the power of God unto salvation. When they become disobedient and neglectful of the commands of their Master, the Gospel is not preached, and the kingdom of God is not extended, and divinity is not seen in the affairs of men. The largest spiritual influence is exerted when each and all men receive the Lord and use him, and are used by him in accordance with this co-partnership government of the world. Spiritual power is ideal power. It is where man gives the supremacy to God, and becomes the worker under divine guidance. All achievements and victories in the spiritual world are through men.

God credits to man all that is done in this co-partnership government. Every deed performed in God's name God will reward. God's help and guidance are not taken into the account so as to detract from man's credit. God is not seeking honor and glory, but is giving freely so that man can accom-

plish the most as ruler and developer of the forces of this world. God will sit in judgment and shall credit to man all that has been done, though it has all been accomplished under divine grace. This clearly recognizes that man is free and responsible, and will be so held. If God is the first cause of the good or evil in the world, the responsibility for the same will be his, and he must bear the consequences. But since God holds man responsible, the cause and the action must both be his, as well as the reward or consequence of his conduct. God stands in the place of a helper, and is not responsible when he has not been called for, and his proffered power has been refused. If God were the first cause or actor in the government of this world, the reward would be his. But he is the Rewarder of the actors in this world's affairs.

Divine concurrence with the actions of man is not a correct conclusion of the divine method in the government of this world. It would imply the changeableness of the divine mind, and that God would be helpless before human rebellion. If God has given man dominion over this world and its affairs, that dominion is no longer God's, but man's. God has placed himself where he may be accessible to man, offering a co partnership, or helpfulness, but never usurping the first place, and displacing man, and then holding him responsible for all mistakes and failures. There are no mistakes and failures in God's government. The mistakes, failures and blunders as seen in history and government are positive proofs of human headship.

We should not ask God to concur with our works, but ask him to help, to direct and to lead us, so that we may do that which is pleasing in his sight. The doctrine of *concursum* is a misnomer, and misrepresents the divine relation to the world and to man. God does not concur in good actions and disapprove the bad. He helps in the performance of the good. The bad deeds are done by men because they have excluded God from their counsels.

God administers special providences through man. If it is true that God has given the world to man, and commanded him to have dominion, and rule over it, and will hold him responsible

for the results, special providences shall also come through man. Special providences are divine interferences in the affairs of the world. As far as these are revealed in the Bible, they have all been ministered through man. There may have been special providences which are not mentioned in the divine word. But where are the witnesses who can testify of them? There have been many events and circumstances that are called providences, but they do not bear the marks of the Lord our God. When we see a result we inquire after the cause. If that cause conforms to the character that God has revealed of himself we may infer that it was divine. Otherwise, we are justified in denying that God was the cause of an ungodly act.

May we not do evil that good may come? St. Paul says he was slanderously reported as teaching such doctrine, Rom. 3 : 8. If St. Paul thought it slander for one to say he glorified the truth of God with a lie, how much more slanderous shall it be to declare that God inflicts an evil providence on the world, or on any of his creatures, though it be to do them good!

The doctrines of grace and special providences are not always distinguishable from each other. Grace is the special favor of God to an individual, and is administered through means. Providence is a special care and provision for an individual, and (as far as revealed) is also administered through means. The opposite of special providence, such as accidents and evils of all kinds, are always through means or causes. It is our conclusion that special providences are from God, and ministered through his usual agencies, men. God and man are co-workers for the welfare of man, and the development of the powers of the world.

This theory of the divine-human government of the world gives a clear understanding of the nature of prayer, and its place in the divine economy. If God holds an absolute control over the affairs of this world, prayer is an injunction without a reason for its exercise, or a hope of results, or as some maintain, it is but a healthful exercise in godliness, and thus a means of grace. When we know where God is, and know his relation and attitude towards man, we are assured that he may be ap-

proached and will help us. There is no exercise of the Christian life more explicitly enjoined or encouraged. There should be some sufficient reason that would appeal to man to pray, and that he may know why he comes to God. The petitions of the Lord's Prayer are direct and encouraging. "Thy kingdom come" is significant. God has that kingdom to give. We are instructed to ask for it. It is asking for the possession of divine power and will on earth. The answer is to be a reality to this world. Unless we so pray we have no assurance that it will come, yea, we are assured that some things can only be obtained through prayer.

God holds position by man's side. He is accessible to all his creatures. He has told them to call upon him. He will answer their prayer. Therein God and man co-operate. God adds his power to man. Man is reassured as he faces the problems of human life, and the destinies he is called upon to bring to pass.

God designed this divine-human association. We see it in the garden of Eden and in all his manifestations to man when revealing himself.

History confirms the truth we are maintaining. The non-Christian world has no evidences of a divine government, or providence. It is the Christian who carries such knowledge to others. The famine relief is an unknown feature in India's civilization. Man was taught this sympathy by God. Such thought of mercy and sympathy was not conceived in the human mind. The suggestion of such sympathy is often confronted with protests.

The nations who know not God have not shown advances in civilization. They have lived without the vitalizing association of the divine Head. They have made little progress in civilization, education, arts, sciences or development of the material resources of the earth. We find little evidence of the divine hand in their history and in their life. They do not call upon him. Paley's watch is not taken to the divine Maker that they may learn its uses. The world was given to man. Only

when man takes God into partnership will he find the wonders that are in his hands.

The nations who once knew God and have forsaken him have gone backward, and have lost the evidences of a divine government and providence.

The people who have taken God at his word, and submitted to his teachings, and lived in harmony with him, have been showing that there is a wisdom and progress which not only surpass the non-Christian nations, but surpass the most progressive past. They are not limited in any sphere of progress. The evidences are clear that God who knows the world and what is in it is taken into the confidence of man whom he has set to have dominion over all the earth's forces, spiritual, moral and physical,

ARTICLE IV.

LUTHER'S RELATION TO DOGMATIC TRADITION.

Translated from Seeberg's *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, Vol. II., pp. 283-293.*

BY REV. ADAM STUMP, A. M.

So far as they come into consideration for the History of Dogma, we have, in the preceding paragraphs, become acquainted with the fundamental principles of Luther's doctrine. One may say that here everything is new. As no man has done since

*Dr. Reinhold Seeberg was born in Liveland, in 1859. He studied theology at Dorpat and Erlangen. From 1884 to 1889 he taught as *Privat-docent* at Dorpat. In 1889 he became Professor of Theology in Erlangen. After the death of Dr. Frank he taught *Dogmatik*. In 1898 he followed a call to Berlin, where he is Professor of Theology in the University at that place. Besides many articles in various periodicals, he has edited Graul's *Distinctive Doctrines*; and in 1889 he published a second edition, with many original additions, of Thomasius' *History of Doctrines*. In 1895 he published Vol. I. of his *Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, and in 1898, Vol. II., from which this translation is made. His standpoint is that of confessional Lutheranism, but he has a mind open to the conclusions of science on all theological questions.

In the references and citations, "E" means Erlangen Edition, "W" Weimar Edition, of Luther's Works.

the days of Paul, Luther understood how to exhibit the Gospel in its entire height and depth. One best understands its origin from this new conception of faith. Faith is not the maintenance of the truth of a dogma, not the theoretic conviction of the correctness of a formula, but the heart's experience of the omnipotence of the love which is revealed to us in Christ.

This experience makes of me a new man, bears me up with the powers and impulses of another world. But this experience also contains within itself the certainty that I am in favor with God, although sinful instincts are still active within me. Then a new life, which is completed by a true evangelical repentance, bursts forth. The dominion of the sacrament of repentance is annulled by repentance itself. In the closest connection with this, by means of the works of the divine calling or the introduction of a new ideal of life, stands the compensation for the works which took place in consequence of the sacrament of repentance. But one may say still more. While Luther thoroughly understands Christianity with its facts and doctrines of faith, all his declarations retain the immediate direction of religious experience. (*There is only one article and rule in theology; he who does not possess and know this, namely, true faith or trust in Christ, is no theologian. Into and out of this article at once flow all the others, and without this one the others are nothing, as Gal. 1 : 3*).

He told what these things wrought in the believing heart, and how the heart perceived them by their effect. In this way he obtained more simple, but also more profound formulae, than those which tradition abundantly offered. He remained in the doctrine of Augustine concerning original sin, or, to speak more accurately, he renewed it; but with him the essence of sin no longer lay in sensuous desire, but in unbelief. He often reproduced the theological and christological formulae of the Ancient Church; but the God whom he found by experience was not the eternal "Substance," but the omnipotent will of love (*Liebeswille*). He spoke of grace, and of its gifts within us; yea, of infused grace, but by it he was not thinking of an added quality, but of the active power of love, which transforms us from within.

The re-discovered Gospel concealed within itself also impulses toward new theological formulae. How carelessly and with what a lavish hand did he sketch such! But the reformation of theology, which he strove to obtain, was not accompanied by the purpose of revising the entire dogmatic tradition. Luther was minded to protect the newly acquired views of the religious life—(faith, justification, grace, works, enslaved will, gospel, law). He never became weary of impressing them upon his hearers and readers. From out of this focus he transformed doctrine. What was contrary at this point was thrust off. Thus fell medieval Semipelagianism, its doctrine of grace, its whole doctrine concerning the sacraments, the hierarchy, the doctrine of works and of merit. But in like manner, under the pressure of the Reformation's thought basis, fell also the fanatical ideas of an immediate operation of the Spirit. On the contrary, Luther conserved that which did not collide with his religious principle. If he would have had to furnish the doctrine of the Trinity or Christology, then he would surely have framed formulae different from those of Nice or Chalcedon. Herein one must not descry connivance, nor entirely calculation, or also only inconsistency. For the sake of the content which they contained, Luther, with genuine historical taste, allowed the formulae to continue. At this point a new question arises: Luther's attitude toward dogma.

However, before we enter upon that, another matter must be made clear. We have just seen that, on account of his reformatory principle, Luther, driven by inner necessity was compelled to annul the medieval doctrines and to replace them with new ones. Faith with its own certainty, its "feeling" and "experience" (Erl. 13, 185, 183) here became both the critical and the organizing principle. But in the decisive hour at Worms, Luther did not appeal only to his religious experience, but also to the authority of Holy Scripture. Thereby a broader canon of doctrine was established for the Reformation. Over against his opponents, one feels that Luther generally appealed to this (canon), and that it also inwardly guided him. (E 28,350: *At first I proceeded very softly, gently, and nicely, with the accursed*

abomination (indulgence) and would very gladly have allowed and helped the papacy to be something; only I desired Scripture clear, pure, and sure; did not yet know that it (papacy) was against Scripture, but only held that it was without Scripture, like any other secular power elevated by men.

Its significance dawned upon him at the Leipzig Disputation. Only divine law, or Holy Scripture, dare rule in the Church: *quod sine scripturis asseritur aut revelatione probata opinari licet, credi non est necesse* (W. 6, 508; 2, 297, 279, 309, 315). Into this wine no water dare be poured (W. 8, 141f, 143f); no lantern dare be held up against this sunlight (ib. 235). God's word, not human doctrine; Christ, not philosophy, shall govern God's people (ib. 144, 146 etc); the servants of Christ shall teach nothing but his word (E. 7, 82). The word itself shall be taught; it shall not be fettered by Romish interpretation (W. 2, 339, E. 11, 31); nor, by ignoring the context, shall its meaning be destroyed (W. 2, 361, 425, 8, 348). When the need for an authoritative norm began to prevail among his adherents, then Luther's view became established. Thus iconoclasts and fanatics were attacked, and from thenceforth the order of evangelical church-affairs took its type. Henceforth it is said: *Thou must lay thy foundation upon a clear, plain, strong passage of Scripture, on which thou mayest then stand fast* (E. 28, 223). From this standpoint one understands his insistence on the *est* of the words of the Lord's Supper.

But this entire method of contemplation, in and for itself, does not yet contain anything evangelical, for it already prevailed in the Middle Ages. Just so is the strict conception of inspiration, which Luther now and then presupposes (*scriptura Spiritus sancti, eigen Schrift des Geistes*, op. ex. 7, 313, 1, 4, E. 27, 244 etc), current in the later Middle Ages. But in Luther's estimation Scripture nevertheless is something other than inspired divine law, as Occam and Biel possibly also thought.

This is proved by a series of observations which lead to another view of Scripture. The end of the Middle Ages places the natural law of the reason on a par with the divine law of

Scripture Since Luther denies this (E. 11, 30, 19, 266), in his opinion revelation is not on a par with the universal content of reason, but has a special positive content. This content is Christ and his revelation. *If I know what I believe, then I know what is contained in Scripture, because Scripture does not contain more than Christ and Christian faith* (W. 8, 236). In so far as the Holy Spirit was active in the authors of the New Testament, he only finished what Christ had said. *As John the Evangelist has written much more than Christ spoke, nevertheless he remains true to one point, in that he thoroughly treats the article of the person, office, and kingdom of Christ, of which Christ himself also speaks* (E. 12, 135f. 138, 141). Hereby, in Luther's regard, the specific content of all the Holy Scriptures is determined. That which is valuable in them as defining their essence, is their relation to Christ. *This also is the true touchstone by which to test all books, whether or not they lay stress on Christ*, (Rom. 3 : 21), *and St Paul will know nothing but Christ* (1 Cor. 2 : 2). *That which does not teach Christ is not yet apostolic, even if St. Peter or St. Paul were to teach it. Again, that which preaches Christ would be apostolic, even if Judas, Annas, Pilate and Herod were to preach it* (E. 63, 157).

In this connection Luther's critical judgments concerning Scripture are very significant. For instance, the prophetic text often falls into confusion; it is probable that the discourses were first arranged by later redactors (63, 57, 74). Often also did the prophets fail, when they were prophesying of secular occurrences (E. 8, 23). By whom Genesis was written is a matter of indifference (57, 35). The book of Esther would better not be in the canon (op. ex., 7, 195; E. 62, 131); that Solomon composed Ecclesiastes is doubted (E. 62, 128). The Epistle of Jude is an extract from the second Epistle of Peter (63, 158). The Epistle to the Hebrews is in error, because it denies a second repentance (ib. 155); it is likely that it was composed of many parts. James wrote a really strawy epistle "(ein recht strohern Epistle)," for it at least possesses no evangelical quality whatever (ib. 115), that is, he teaches nothing of Christ, and ascribes righteousness to works (156f); yea, James is off the track (*Jacobus*

delirat, op. ex. 4, 338; W. 2, 425). Originally Luther did not consider the Apocalypse to be a prophetic or apostolic book, *because Christ is neither known nor recognized in it* (63, 169f). With reference to its author, he remained doubtful also to a later period (159).

He laid much stress upon the testimony of the Ancient Church. In his prefaces (in 1522) Hebrews, James, Jude and Apocalypse, are separated from "the truly certain chief books" (63, 154). But still more weighty with him is the inner canon. The Gospel of John, the Epistles of Paul, especially Romans and 1 Peter, *are the true kernel and marrow of all books. For in these you do not find a description of many works and miracles of Christ; but you find, in a masterful way, depicted, how faith in Christ conquers sin, death and hell, and gives life, righteousness and salvation. This is the true quality of a gospel* (63, 114f; 51, 372). Consistent with this view, the historical mistakes and errors disturbed Luther but little (*e. g.*, E. 14, 319; 46, 174; 50, 308f; 62, 132; also Walch Luth. W. W., XIV., 1208, 1293f). One understands this, when one has grasped his fundamental conception. It also accurately corresponds with the latter, when Luther bases the recognition of the authority of Scripture, not upon its ecclesiastical recognition, but upon the experience of its truth; *therefore each one must only believe that it is God's word, and must experience in the soul that it is the truth* (E. 28, 340; 47, 356)—a reality, and not a mere notion (48, 29).

The ideas which are presented above lead to another conception of Holy Scripture than the medieval formulae, of which Luther made use, permit us to anticipate. Namely, one must guard himself against considering those ideas as the result of the hastiness of a tremendous vigor, from which one magnanimously absolves the Reformer. The fact that they for the most part are expressed in a place much too exposed (in Prefaces to Scripture) is against this suspicion, but, above all, the fact, that they stand in the closest connection with the reformed idea of faith. But then there results a new conception of the authority of Scripture and its inspiration. Its specific content—in the

Old and in the New Testament—is Christ, his office and kingdom. It is this content which concerns faith and which faith verifies by means of inner experience. Upon this thus depends the success of Scripture. Hitherward accordingly must the special working of God, which gives Scripture its peculiar nature, be directed. That is, the testimony of the Holy Spirit in Scripture is the testimony concerning eternal welfare and redemption. Upon this turns its inspiration, and accordingly its religious authority. (Compare the exceedingly characteristic saying E. 11, 248 : *As if I were to take Moses, the Psalter, Isaiah and also the same Spirit and produce just as good a Testament as the Apostles have written; but because we do not have the Spirit in such wealth and power, we must learn from them and drink out of their springs*).

On this account it becomes the rule and touchstone, by which all ecclesiastical doctrine must verify itself as evangelical truth (e. g., E. 9, 207, 372; 12, 289, etc). The above quoted sentences concerning the authority of Holy Scripture thereby advance us into a new light. In Luther's opinion Scripture was absolute authority. But if in controversy he also set it as the divine law over against the ecclesiastical law, yet it was thus for him authority only as the primitive and original testimony of Christ and his salvation. Such it is in its essence and nature.

(The doctrine concerning Holy Scripture in dogmatics is to be joined to the above developed ideas of Luther. Moreover, with the captious remarks of Luther on individual ideas in the books of the Bible; with his acceptance of redactors, who arranged many books; with the acknowledgment of mistakes (see yet E. 30, 314, 331)—how could one imagine verbal inspiration?)

But Scripture, thus rated as a second principle of Protestantism, dare not be coördinated with justifying faith. The impelling fundamental idea is faith. And because only the believer understands Scripture, and since it exists only for faith, it (Scripture) is to be subordinated to this (faith) as the principle.

Now for the first time are we able to treat of Luther's attitude toward dogmatic tradition. We have already seen that he

abolished the medieval dogma concerning the sacraments as unbiblical, and that he denied the infallibility of the pope. But what was Luther's position toward the ancient dogma? (See especially his publication concerning Councils and Churches of 1539; in addition, the Three Symbols, 1538, and the other expositions of the symbols). So much is plain, that Luther acknowledged and frequently reproduced the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, as well as the Christology of Chalcedon. So also did he treat the symbols of the ancient Church with high distinction, especially the Apostles' Creed, which contained all the chief points of the faith (28, 413f, 346f, etc). (See E. 20, 155: *Here I have a little book, which is called Credo, this is my Bible, this has stood so long and has not yet been overthrown; by this I remain, by this I have also been baptized, upon this I live and die* E. 9, 29: *this symbol also has been composed as a nice short summary for children and simple Christians, from the books of the dear Prophets and Apostles, that is, from the entire Holy Scripture. So that we rightly call it the symbol or creed of the Apostles*). But this does not mean that he believes those symbols or councils, as such, or that he subjects himself to any earthly authority. His freedom already arises from his criticism of the old terminology. *Quod si odit anima mea vocem homoousion et nolim ea uti, non ero haereticus; quis enim me coget uti, modo rem teneam quae in concilio per scripturas definita est?* Just so did Luther take offense at the word "Trinity" ("Dreifaltigkeit"); it sounds cold ("es läutet kalt"), and was invented and discovered by men (E. 6, 230, 12, 378).

Nevertheless, later he himself acknowledged that it did not depend upon the fact whether or not the expression "original sin" occurred in Scripture (steht doch auch die "Erbsünde" nicht in der Schrift. E. 25, 291f; 28, 382; 29, 183f). And so in his book "On Councils, etc.," Luther, with masterly historical criticism, renounced every binding authority of the ancient councils also. The highest council is that of the apostles. That enjoined abstinence from blood. But no one any longer guides himself by that. *If we want to adhere to councils* ("concilisch sein") *then we must hold this council above all others, if*

not, then we may also not esteem any of the rest, and thus be free from all councils (25, 240). Just as little are all the decrees of Nice observed (244, 251f). And no council has presented the entire Christian doctrine (261). The decrees of councils are not true, on their own account, but because they repeat the old truth, which the Holy Spirit gave the apostles (266f, 295, 328, 331). Thus councils *have no power to supply new articles of faith, but they shall indeed suppress and condemn new articles of faith, according to Scripture and the old faith.*

Thus at Nice, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon, the new articles of Arius, Macedonius, Nestorius, and Eutyches, were rejected (333, 345). There Luther's idea is thus: Only in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is dogma true; in itself no authority attaches to it.

Now, however, is the truth of Scripture one which has been inwardly verified. Conformably thereto one can say, in Luther's sense, that the Holy Spirit produces in us the experience of the truth of a doctrine (of the Apostles' Creed) (E. 23, 249, 267; 20, 148), for we do not come to faith otherwise than when we are inwardly and practically subdued by that which is taught (20, 141, 136, 144f, 22, 15f). In itself the doctrine of the two natures is a matter of indifference to the Christian; he first learns to understand it from the work of Christ (35, 208). Hereby are recognized the rules and norms which Luther applied with the proof of religious evidence. Something is true when it becomes verified by faith and its experience, as well as by Scripture. Thereby the outward legal foundation of doctrine, with reference to dogma, has been removed; the old canon of Vincent of Lerins has been broken. But in principle the legal application of Scripture also has been annulled. Luther's attitude toward the Bible differs from that of Occam. The problems which, in this department, arise in all times by virtue of the progress of historical knowledge, may always be readjusted and solved according to Luther's principles. Let it be here only hinted that his praxis was not always uncontradictory and exemplary.

In conclusion, a question may at least be touched. Namely,

has not the peculiarly religious conception of Luther been hindered on account of his acknowledgement and acceptance of the trinitarian and christological dogma? He who reads his reflections on the knowledge of God in Christ, first of all gets the impression that if the Father was revealed in the words and works of Jesus, then a special divinity of the Son is not to be considered. But on the other hand, Luther has with the greatest vigor declared that even the divinity of the Son was revealed in the Son. He is true God and true man, two natures and one person (E. 7, 185f. 196). His human life and existence, with its deprivations, sufferings and conflicts, are vivaciously and vividly depicted. (E. 13, 307; 10, 131f. 299ff.). But this man was completely under the guidance of Deity. He was "personally present" in him, (7, 185); his humanity seeing and feeling only what Deity permits it to feel and know—hence Jesus is ignorant of the last day (ib.) Because the Spirit stirs his humanity more and more deeply and strongly, it becomes the instrument and house of Deity. During the time while he was suffering and dying, his divine nature lay hidden and inactive, and did not signalize or manifest itself (3, 302; 39, 47f); as Jesus, on the other hand, restrained, as it were, hid his omnipotence. The intimate union of his divinity and his humanity, as well as his vigorous accentuation of the reality and genuineness of the human life of Jesus, is in no way first a product of the controversy concerning the Lord's Supper, but forms an inherent part of Luther's most profound speculation: God is revealed in the words and works of Jesus. But in that first series of ideas one seemed compelled to think of the Father; here absolutely, of the Son (comp. 8, 156ff.; 40, 109). One can not solve the problem by supposing a modalistic theory of the Trinity, for Luther regularly reproduced the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity (e. g., Schmalk. Art. Müller, 299, 9, 2ff. etc). Of course, he had western feelings (theologically) on this point. He disliked the term "trinity" because God is the highest unity (die höchste Einigkeit); even triad ("Dreiheit") sounds too much like mockery. Comparison with three angels or men does not accord, for there are no three Gods. *There is indeed in the Godhead a*

threeness ("ein Gedrittes"), but this threeness are the Persons of the only Godhead (6, 230, Comp. Augustine's: *deus ter*, not *dei tres*, B. 1 : 195). But he had a vigorous consciousness of the absolute unity of God, and this allowed him to see the Godhead in each trinitarian person generally.

God is as completely revealed through Christ (30, 62; 45, 295) as through the Holy Spirit in his government of hearts (16, 214). Father and Son are of one essence, one will ("ein Wesen, ein Wille"), one heart and will ("ein Herz und Wille," 57, 305f.; 49, 144). Where one part is, "there certainly is the entire Godhead" (50, 94). In these declarations there is no contradiction of the consciousness of the Trinity, such as Luther had, and indeed by so much less, as Luther regarded the life of the Godhead not as a substance, but as the omnipotent will of Love. He understood how to unite in himself these ideas with the traditional material of the doctrine of God; he did not become conscious of the theoretical problems which are based on this intimate union.

ARTICLE IV.

A CENTURY OF BIBLICAL VERSIONS.

BY REV. B. PICK, PH. D., D. D.

When Christ appeared on earth, one version of the Bible (*i. e.*, of the Old Testament) already existed, namely the Alexandria translation or Bible of the Seventy, the Septuagint, which became the source of most of the ancient versions of the Old Testament. This translation originated in the 3rd century before Christ, and was no doubt prepared for the use of those Jews to whom the Greek language had become the vernacular. It also became the first missionary to spread monotheism among the Gentiles, thus preparing the gentile world for the reception of Christianity. This translation was likewise the Bible of the Apostolic Church, and men like Augustine believed in its inspiration. In controversies between Jews and Christians, the Septuagint was appealed to so largely that it was sternly banned by the Rabbis as the "Christian Bible," and the day on which this translation was made, was declared to be as a great calamity equal to that of the worship of the golden calf.*

*The late Dean Stanley accounts for the objection to the Septuagint in the following manner: "It needs but slight evidence to convince us that such a feeling more or less widely spread, must have existed. It is the same instinct which to this hour makes it a sin, if not an impossibility, in the eyes of a devout Mussulman, to translate the Koran; which in the Christian Church assailed Jerome with the coarsest vituperation for venturing on a Latin version which differed from the Greek; which at the Reformation regarded it as a heresy to translate the Latin Scriptures into the languages of modern Europe; and which, in England, has in our own days regarded it in the English Church as a dangerous innovation to revise the Authorized Version of the 17th century, or in the Roman Church to correct the barbarous dialect of the Douay translation of the Vulgate, or to admit of any errors in the text or in the rendering of the Vulgate itself. In one and all of these cases the reluctance has sprung from the same tenacious adherence to ancient and sacred forms—from the same unwillingness to admit of the dislodgment even of the most flagrant inaccuracies when once familiarized by established use. But in almost all these

To counteract the influence of the Septuagint* other translations† were undertaken, of which, however, only fragments are preserved.

The Christians at first adopted the Alexandrian version, but in the second century the Syrian Christians made the Syriac version, known as the Peshito, "the queen of (ancient) versions." Later the Latin Christians procured a Latin version‡ of the Septuagint, which at the close of the 4th century gave place to the Vulgate version of Jerome. This exerted upon Latin Christendom a similar influence to that which the Septuagint exerted upon Greek, and it is directly or indirectly the mother of most of the earlier versions in the European vernaculars.

The work of translation continued until at the time of the Reformation,

The *European* nations had the Bible in :

- | | |
|-----------------|---------------|
| 1. Anglo-Saxon. | 6. Bohemian. |
| 2. English. | 7. Provençal. |
| 3. Old Erse. | 8. Gothic. |
| 4. Flemish. | 9. Latin. |
| 5. German. | 10. Greek. |
| | 11. Slavonic. |

In *Asia* the Bible was read in :

- | | |
|---------------|--------------|
| 1. Hebrew. | 5. Armenian. |
| 2. Aramaic. | 6. Georgian. |
| 3. Samaritan. | 7. Arabic. |
| 4. Syriac. | 9. Persian. |

cases, except, perhaps, the Koran, this sentiment has been compelled to yield to the more generous desire of arriving at the hidden meaning of sacred truth, and of making that truth more widely known. So it was, in the most eminent degree, in the case of the Septuagint" (*Jewish Church* III, 286 *c. g.*). There is no doubt much truth in what the Dean said, but the objectionable feature arose after all from the use of the Septuagint in controversies.

*The importance of the Septuagint for textual criticism is increasingly recognized. The late Prof. Hitzig of Heidelberg (died 1875) is said to have always commenced his exegetical lectures by saying to his students : "Gentlemen, have you a Septuagint; if not, sell everything that you have and buy a Septuagint."

†*e. g.*, by Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion.

‡The so-called *Old Itala* or, as some would prefer the, *Old Latin*.

In *Africa* the Bible existed in :

1. Koptic (three dialects).
2. Ethiopic.

The Reformation, which encouraged the reading and study of the Bible, also promoted the work of translation, and at the beginning of the 19th century the Bible versions of the Post-Reformation period were as follows :

A. EUROPE.

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Basque. | 14. Italian. |
| 2. Dutch. | 15. Karniola or Sloven. |
| 3. Esthonian (Reval Dialect). | 16. Lapp. |
| 4. Erse. | 17. Lett. |
| 5. Finnish. | 18. Lithuanian. |
| 6. French. | 19. Maggyr. |
| 7. Gaelic. | 20. Manx. |
| 8. Nogai (Krim Dialect). | 21. Romansch. |
| 9. Norwego-Danish. | 22. Rouman. |
| 10. Old Norse or Irelandic. | 23. Russ. |
| 11. Osmanti-Turks. | 24. Spanish. |
| 12. Polish. | 25. Swedish. |
| 13. Portuguese. | 26. Welsh. |
| | 27. Wendish (two Dia.) |

B. ASIA.

- | | |
|-------------|-------------|
| 1. Formosa. | 3. Sinhali. |
| 2. Malay. | 4. Tamil. |

C. AMERICA.

1. New England.

These versions, namely, of the Pre-Reformation Period= 22

“ “ “ of the Post-Reformation Period= 32= 54, formed a stock to commence upon in the 19th century. The work of translation was resumed and continued, till the versions reached the number which forms the pride of the 19th century. Some of the old versions were not adopted; others were printed for use till something better could be provided; others, again, have been employed without material change up to the present time.

In the following list it will be noticed that 41 versions have not been numbered, because belonging to former centuries. Some which were published before the 19th century, we did number because they underwent an entire change. Altogether we mention 470 versions, 41 unnumbered and 429 numbered. The latter number shows the work of the nineteenth century. We mention 120 complete Bibles and 119 New Testaments.

But sooner or later the number of Bibles or of New Testaments will be increased. There are many versions which we marked with *p*, meaning in some cases a small portion, but in the majority of cases larger portions of the New Testament. In a great many instances the sign N. T. means only the New Testament complete, but this does not preclude the existence of translations of some of the Old Testament books. Considering all this the work of translation which has been carried on during the nineteenth century is really greater than we imagine. We must also consider another fact, namely that some versions exist in different recensions, *i. e.*, were prepared by different translators, *e. g.*, the French, Breton, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, German, Polish, Turkish, Persian, Hindustani, Bengali, the Hebrew New Testament, Chinese, etc. Each has its special merits as can be seen, *e. g.*, from a comparison of the authorized and Revised English Versions. But these different recensions we have not mentioned *seriatim*. Our main object was to bring before the reader those languages of the more than 2000 languages in the world, into which translations have been made or attempted. It is also noteworthy that in order for the Scriptures to be legible or intelligible to all classes and creeds there are no less than 50 languages which had to be printed in two or more different characters. Take, *e. g.*, the Irish, which is printed in the Erse and Latin characters; Polish in Latin and Gothic, Kazan-Turki in Arabic and Russ; Koi in Latin and Telegu; Sindhi in Arabic, Hindi and Gurmukhi; Hakka in Latin and Chinese; Eskimo in Latin and Syllabic characters, etc.

In conclusion we must state that our list of versions does not claim absolute completeness, but it is the most complete thus far published.

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF TRANSLATIONS.

B=BIBLE; N. T.=NEW TESTAMENT; P=PART ONLY.

<i>Language,</i>	<i>Part.</i>	<i>Where circulated, or for whom published.</i>
1. Abnaki	p	North America, Canada.
2. Acra or Gâ	B	East'n part of Gold Coast, W. Africa.
3. Aimara	p	Bolivia, S. A., (N. T. is translated).
4. Ainu	N. T.	Yezo, Japan.
5. Akkaway	p	S. America.
6. Akunakuna	p	Old Calabar, W. Africa.
7. Albanian-Gheg	N. T.	Northern Albania.
8. Albanian-Tosk	N. T.	Southern Albania.
9. Alfuor	p	Celebes, Malaisia.
10. Aliout	p	Arctic Coast, Alaska.
11. Amkarii	B	Abyssinia.
12. Amoy	B	Amoy and Island of Formosa.
13. Anam	p	Cochin, China.
14. Ancityum	B	Ancityum, New Hebrides.
15. Angami	p	Assam, British India.
16. Aniwa	N. T.	Aniwa, New Hebrides.
17. Api, Epi, or Baki	p	Western Epi, New Hebrides.
Arabic	B	Egypt, Syria.
Aramaic	O. T.	For students.
18. Arawak	p	S. America.
Armenian-Anci't.	B	{ For the Armenians of Constanti-
19. " Modern	B	{ nople, Calcutta, Etc.
20. Armenian-Ararat	B	Russian Province of the Caucasus.
21. Armeno-Turki	B	{ For Americans using the Turkish
		{ language with Armen'n character
22. Ashanti or Otshi	B	Gold Coast, W. Africa.
23. Assami	B	Assam, Central British India.
24. Azerbijani-Turki	B	Trans-Caucasia and N. W. Persia.
25. Badaga	p	{ For the Badga Tribe on the Nil-
		{ giri Hills, S. B. India (printed in
		{ Kanarese and in Tamil character).
26. Bati	p	Bati Islands.
27. Balolo	p	{ Equatorial tributaries of the Kon-
		{ go, W. Africa.

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| 28. Baluchi | N. T. | { Baluchistan and Frontier Districts of the Punjab. |
| 29. Bandalkhandi | N. T. | { District between the province of Bandalkhand, and the sources of the Nerbudda River. |
| 30. Bangi | p | Kongo Basin, W. Africa. |
| 31. Bashkir-Turki | p | Ufa, Russia. |
| 32. Basque-French
(Rabourdine) | { N. T. | { Departments of the Pyrenees and Navarre. |
| 33. Basque-French
(Souletin) | { p | { Departments of the Pyrenees and Navarre. |
| 34. Basque-Spanish | p | { Provinces of Biscay, Guipuscoa and Alava. |
| 35. " -Guipuscoan | p | { Provinces of Biscay, Guipuscoa and Alava. |
| 36. Bassa | p | Gold Coast, W. Africa. |
| 37. Batta-Angkola | p | Isle of Samatra. |
| 38. Batti-Mandailing | N. T. | S. Sumatra. |
| 39. Batta-Toba | B | For the Battas of N. Sumatra. |
| 40. Beaver | p | For the Indians on the Peace River. |
| 41. Benga | N. T. | Gabun, W. Africa. |
| 42. Bengali | B | Province of Bengal. |
| 43. " -Musalmani | p | " " " |
| 44. Berber | p | Algeria and Tunisia. |
| 45. Bhatniri or Virat | N. T. | Bhatnira, W. of Delhi. |
| 46. Bicol | p | Philippine Islands. |
| 47. Bierian | p | Epi, New Hebrides. |
| 48. Bikaniri | N. T. | Bikanar, N. of Marwar. |
| 49. Blackfoot | p | { For Indians on the East of the Rocky Mountains. |
| 50. Bogos or Bilin | p | For the Bilin Tribe in N. Abyssinia, |
| 51. Bogutu or Isabel | p | Solomon Islands, Melanesia. |
| Bohemian or Czech | B | For Czechs of Bohemia and Slavaks [of Hungary. |
| 52. Bolengi | p | Kongo Free State. |
| 53. Bondei | p | German East Africa. |
| 54. Breton | B | Province of Brittany. |
| 55. Bruj | N. T. | Province of Muttra. |

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| 56. Bugi | N. T. | Celebes, Malaisia. |
| 57. Bulgarian (W.) | B | Bulgaria, Rumalia and Macedonia. |
| 58. " (E.) | N. T. | " " " " |
| 59. Bullom | p | Sierra Leone. |
| 60. Bulu | p | Gabun, W. Africa. |
| 61. Burmese | B | Burmah. |
| 62. Cakchiquel | p | Guatemala, Central America. |
| 63. Cambodian | p | Cochin China. |
| 64. Canton or Punti | B | Canton and Neighborhood. |
| 65. Catalan | N. T. | Province of Catalonia. |
| 66. Chagga | p | South of Kilima Njars, E. Africa. |
| 67. Chamba | p | For a tribe of Rajputs in the
[Chamba State (Punjab). |
| 68. Cheremiss | N. T. | For a tribe on the Volga and Kama,
in the governments of Kazan and
Simbirsk. |
| 69. Cherokee | N. T. | For Cherokee Indians. |
| 70. Chipewyan | N. T. | Canada. |
| 71. Chitonga | p | East Central Africa. |
| 72. Choktaw | N. T. | For Choktaw Indians, N. America. |
| 73. Chunana or
[Sechuana | B | Bechuana and Matabele tribes. |
| 74. Chuvash | N. T. | For a tribe of the mountains in
Kazan, Nische-Novogorod and
Arenburg. |
| 75. Cree Eastern | B | Cree Indians, Hudson's Bay Terri-
tories. |
| 76. Cree Western | p | For Indians in Rupert's Land. |
| 77. Creolese | N. T. | Danish West India Islands. |
| 78. Crimea Turki | p | For Karaite Jews and Tartars of the
Crimea |
| 79. Curaçao | p | Spain, S. America. |
| 80. Dakhani | N. T. | For Mohammadans in Mastas
[Province. |
| 81. Dakota | B | For Dakota Indians. |
| 82. Danish | B | Denmark. |
| 83. Delaware | p | For Delaware Indians, U. S. |
| 84. Dieri | N. T. | Cooper's Creek, S. Australia. |

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| 85. Dikrele | p | In the region of the river Gabun,
[W. Africa. |
| 86. Dobu | p | British New Guinea. |
| 87. Dogri | N. T. | Northern Districts of Lahore. |
| 88. Dominica | p | Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada and
Trinidad. |
| 89. Dualld | B | Cameroons, W. Africa. |
| 90. Duke of York Is. | p | South of New Ireland, Oceania. |
| Dutch | B | Holland and Dutch Colonies, and S.
Africa Republics. |
| 91. Dyak | B | Borneo, Malaysia. |
| 92. Dyak Sea dialect | p | " " |
| 93. Ebon | N. T. | Marshall Island, Micronesia. |
| 94. Ffik | B | Old Calabar, W. Africa. |
| English | B | British Empire, Etc. |
| 95. Eromanga | N. T. | New Hebrides. |
| 96. Eskimo | B | Labrador. |
| 97. " Hudson's Bay | p | For the natives on Great and Little
Whale Rivers, Hudson's Bay. |
| 98. Esth-Dorpat | N. T. | Southern part of Esthonia. |
| Esth-Reval | B | Northern part of Esthonia. |
| Ethiopit | N. T. | Abyssinia. |
| 99. Ewc | N. T. | Western part of Gold Coast. |
| 100. Falaska-Kara | p | For Jews in the Kara district of
Abyssinia, about Metammeh. |
| 101. Fang | p | West Equatorial Africa. |
| 102. Fanti | N. T. | Fanti, in the neighborhood of Cape
Coast Castle. |
| 103. Fanting | p | New Hebrides. |
| 104. Faté Erakar | | |
| [dialect | p | Faté, New Hebrides. |
| 105. Faté Havan- | | |
| [nah dialect | N. T. | Faté, New Hebrides. |
| 106. Faroese | p | Faroe Island. |
| 107. Fernandian | p | Fernands Po., Africa. |
| 108. Fiji | B | Fiji Islands. |
| Finn | B | Finland |

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| Flemish | B | Belgium |
| 109. Florida | p | Florida, Solomon Islands. |
| Formosa | p | Formosa. |
| French | B | France |
| 110. Fris | p | Friesland. |
| 111. Fuh-Chow | B | Province of Fuhkien, China. |
| 112. Futuna | p | Futuna, New Hebrides. |
| Gaelic | B | Highlands of Scotland. |
| 113. Galla, Central | B | E. Africa. |
| 114. Galla, Ittu | p | Haras, N. E. Africa. |
| 115. Galla, Bararetta | | |
| [or Southern | p | E. Africa. |
| 116. Galwa | p | French Kongo, W. Africa. |
| 117. Ganda | B | Uganda, North of Victoria Nyanza,
East Equatorial Africa. |
| 118. Garo | N. T. | For a tribe in the province of Assam. |
| 119. Garhwali | N. T. | For a tribe in Himalayas, West of
Kumaon. |
| Georgian | B | Georgia, C. and W. Caucasua. |
| German | B | Germany, Austria, Etc, |
| 120. " in Hebrew | B | For German Jews. |
| 121. Gilbert | B | Micronesia. |
| 122. Giryama | p | Mombasa, E. Equatorial Africa. |
| 123. Gitano | p | For Spanish Gipsies. |
| 124. Gitong | p | East Equatorial Africa. |
| 125. Gogo | N. T. | For the Wagogo tribe in East
Equatorial Africa. |
| 126. Gond | p | For a hill tribe in Central India. |
| Gothic | p | For students. |
| 127. Grebo | p | Liberia, W. Africa. |
| Greek, Ancient | B | For Greek churches. |
| 128. Greek, Modern | B | For Modern Greeks. |
| 129. Greenland | N. T. | Greenland (whole Bible is translated) |
| 130. Guarani | p | Guarani of Paraguay, S. America. |
| 131. Gujarathi | B | Surat, and province of Gujarat. |
| 132. " Parsi | N. T. | For the Parsis in the Bombay Pre
sidency. |

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| 133. Gwamba | N. T. | Transvaal and E. of the Limpopo, South Africa. |
| 134. Haidah (Hydah) | p | Queen Charlotte Island, B. C. |
| 135. Hainan | p | Hainan, S. China. |
| 136. Hakka | N. T. | Province of Kwangtung, S. China. |
| 137. Hangchau | p | Province of Chekiang, China. |
| 138. Haranti | N. T. | Province W. of Bandalkhand, India. |
| 139. Hausa | N. T. | For Hausa tribe, and each side of the rivers Niger and Tschadda. |
| 140. Hawaii | B | Sandwich Islands. |
| Hebrew | B | |
| 141. Herero | N. T. | Damaraland, S. W. Africa. |
| 142. Hindi | B | Hidustan, or the upper provinces of the Bengal Presidency, (also published in the Nagari and Kaithi characters). |
| 143. Hindustani or | | |
| [Urdu | B | For the Mohammadans of India, (The same is also published in Roman type). |
| 144. Hinghua | p | Province of Fuhkien, China. |
| Hungarian | B | Maggars of Hungary and Transylvania. |
| 145. " Wend | N. T. | Wends in Hungary and Carniolia. |
| 146. Iaian (Uveah) | B | Uveah, Loyalty Islands. |
| 147. Ibibio or Qua-Ibo | p | Old Calabar District, W. Africa. |
| 148. Ibo-Isuama | p | Bonny, on the Lower Niger, W. A. |
| 149. Ibo-Niger | N. T. | A tribe on the Upper Niger, W. A. |
| Icelandic | B | Iceland. |
| 150. Idzo or Ijo | p | Brass, Guinea, in Niger Delta, W. A. |
| 151. Igbara | p | Mouths of Niger and Binué, W. A. |
| 152. Ilocana | p | Philippine Islands. |
| 153. Indo-Portuguese | N. T. | For Portuguese settlers and their descendants in Ceylon and various parts of the Indian Seas. |
| 154. Iowa | p | For Iowa Indians, N. America. |
| Irish or Erse | B | Ireland. |
| 155. Iroquois | p | For Indians in Provinces of Quebec and Ontario. |

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| 156. Isubu | p | Kamerun, W. Equatorial Africa. |
| Italian | B | Italy. |
| 157. Jagatai-Turki | p | The Uzbek and Turkish Tribes of Turkestan and Central Asia. |
| 158. Jaipuri | p | Jaipur, East of Marwar, and W. of Agra, India. |
| 159. Japanese | B | Japan (also in Roman character). |
| 160. " Colloquial | p | Japan. |
| 161. Jatki also Multani | N.T. | W. Panjab, between the Indus, Chenab and Ghara Rivers. |
| 162. Jaunsari | p | Dehra Dun, N. W. Provin's of India. |
| 163. Java | B | Java. |
| 164. Jolof | p | A tribe near Bathurst, Gambia, W. Africa. |
| 165. Judæo-Arabic | p | For Jews in Yemen, Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia. |
| 166. " German | B | For Jews in West Europe. |
| 167. " Persian | p | For Jews in Persia. |
| 168. " Polish | N. T. | For Jews in Poland, Roumania, Galicia and Southern Russia. |
| 169. " Spanish | B | For Spanish Jews in Turkey, Etc. |
| 170. " Syriac | N. T. | For Jews in the East. |
| 171. " Tunisian | p | For Jews of Tunis, Algeria and [Tripoli. |
| 172. Kabyli (Kabail) | p | Algeria and Tunisia. |
| 173. Kachin | p | Burma. |
| 174. Kafir or Xosa | B | Kafir Land, S. Africa. |
| 175. Kaguru | p | For a tribe of E. Equatorial Africa. |
| 176. Kamba | p | British E. Africa. |
| 177. Kanarese | B | Throughout the Mysore, also in the province of Kanara, and as far North as the Kistna River. |
| 178. Kanaui | N. T. | In the Duab of Ganges and Jumna. |
| 179. Karel | p | For a tribe in the government of Tver, Russia. |
| 180. Karen-Bghai | p | For the Bghai-Karens in Burma. |
| 181. " Paos | B | For the Paos-Karens. |
| 182. " Sgau | B | For the Sgau-Karens. |
| 183. Karib | p | Stann Creek, Brit. Honduras. |

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| 184. Kashgar-Turki | p | Chinese Turkestan. |
| 185. Kashmiri | B | Kashmir, N. Brit. India. |
| 186. Katchi | p | Province of Katch, between the Gulf of Katch and the Indus. |
| 187. Kausali | p | Western part of Oudh, India. |
| 188. Kazak-Turki | N. T. | For Tartars in the vicinity of Orenburg, Russia. |
| 189. Kazan-Turki | p | For a tribe in Kazan, Russia. |
| 190. Keapara or
[Kerepunu] | p | British New Guinea. |
| 191. Kele | p | French Kongo. |
| 192. Khasi | B | Khasia Hills, India. |
| 193. Khondi | p | For a tribe in the Vizagapatam and Ganjam Hills. |
| 194. Kien-Ning | N. T. | Province of Fuhkien, China. |
| 195. Kien-Yang | p | " " " " |
| 196. Kinh-Wha | p | Central China. |
| 197. Kirghiz-Turki
(Southern) | N. T. | Siberia and Turkestan, Russia. |
| 198. Kirghiz-Turki
(Northern) | p | In government of Tomsk, Russia. |
| 199. Koi | p | For a tribe in South India, on the Godavery River. |
| 200. Kondé | p | L. Nyása, Central Africa. |
| 201. Kongo | N. T. | Kongo Free State, W. Africa. |
| 202. Konkani | N. T. | S. British India. |
| Koptic | N. T. | Egypt. |
| 203. Koranko | p | Western Soudan. |
| 204. Korea | N. T. | Korea. |
| 205. Kortha | p | Province of Bengal, British India. |
| 206. Kroat or Serb | B | Servia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kroatia, Dalmatia, etc. |
| 207. Kuanyama | p | For a tribe in North Wambo Land, South Africa. |
| 268. Kumaoni | N. T. | District of Kumaon, W. of Palpa. |
| 209. Kumuk-Turki | p | N. and N. E. Daghestan. |
| 210. Kurd | N. T. | Kurdistan. |
| 211. Kurku | p | Central India. |

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| 212. Kuruk | p | Chota Nagpur, North India. |
| 213. Kusaic | N. T. | Caroline Island. |
| 214. Kwagutl | p | For Indians of Vancouver Island. |
| 215. Kwangtung | B | South China. |
| 216. Laos | p | Siam, Indo-China. |
| 217. Lapp, Quanian | B | Norway. |
| 218. " Russ | p | Russian Lapland. |
| 219. " Swedish | B | Sweden. |
| Latin | B | |
| 220. Lenakel | p | Tanna, New Hebrides. |
| 221. Leptha | p | The neighborhood of Darzëbing, India. |
| Lett | B | Livonia and Courland, Russia. |
| 222. Lifu | B | Loyalty Islands, Oceania. |
| Lithuanian | B | Province of Lithuania. |
| 223. Livonian | p | For Livonians who inhabit West Courland. |
| 224. Luchu | p | Luchu Island. |
| 225. Lushai | p | Province of Assam. |
| 226. Macassar | N. T. | Celebes Islands, Malaisia. |
| 227. Macedonian | | [bania, and Thessaly. |
| -Rouman | p | For Roumans in Macedonia, Al- |
| 228. Madura | p | Malay Archipelogo. |
| 229. Mafur | p | Melanesia. |
| 230. Maghad | N. T. | Province of S. Behar, India. |
| 231. Makua | p | Mazambique, E. Africa. |
| 232. Malagasi | B | Madagascar. |
| Malay | B | Malaisia. |
| 233. " Low or | | |
| Soerabagan | N. T. | Batavia. |
| 234. " Samarang | N. T. | Malaisia. |
| 235. Malayalam | B | Travancore and Malabar. |
| 236. Malisnet | p | For Indians in New Brunswick. |
| 237. Mallikolo—Aulua | p | S. E. coast, Malekula, N. Hebrides |
| 238. " Pankuma | p | " " " " " |
| 239. " Uripio | p | N. E. Malekula, New Hebrides. |
| 240. Malo | p | St. Bartholomew, New Hebrides. |

241. Maltese N. T. Malta.
242. Malto, or Pahari p For a tribe in the Rajmahal district of Bengal.
243. Mambwe p South of Lake Tanganyika, S. Afr.
244. Manchu N. T. Manchuria.
245. Mandarin, Peking, B China.
246. " Nanking N. T. "
247. " Shantung p "
248. Mandingo p Gambia and W. Soudan.
249. Manganjia p E. Equatorial Africa.
250. Manipuri N.T. Manipur, S. of Assam, Indo-China
251. Maori B New Zealand.
252. Marathi B Bombay Presidency.
253. Maré N. T. Loyalty Island.
254. Marquesas p Marquesas Is., Oceania.
255. Marwari N. T. Marwari, N. of Mewar, India.
256. Mashona p Mashona Land, S. Africa.
- Massachusetts B For Indians of New Eng. States.
257. Matabele or Tabelep Matabeleland, S. Africa.
258. Mauritius Creole p For Creoles in Mauritius, E. Africa.
259. Maya p Yucatan, Central America.
260. Mbunda (Kim-
[bundu). p Angola country, from Loanda to Melange, W. Africa.
261. Mendeé p Sierra Leona, W. Africa.
262. Mexican p Mexico.
263. Mic Mac N. T For Indians in Nova Scotia.
264. Mohawk N. T. For Indians W. of Falls of Niagara.
265. Mon or Pegu N. T. Province of Pegu, Indo-China.
266. Mondari or Kol N. T. For the Kole Tribe, Chote Nagpur,
267. Mongo p Equatorial Kongo, W. Africa.
268. Mongol, Literary B Mongolia.
269. " Buriat (N). p Russian Mongolia.
270. " Kalkhas(S). p Chinese Mongolia.
271. " Kalmuk(W) N.T. For Kalmuks of the Don and Volga, in Russia; and Elcuths, Kalmuks, and Soungars of Mongolia.

272. Moorish or
[Magrabi p Morocco.
273. Mord vin-Ersa N. T. { For a tribe on the Volga and Oka
274. " Moksha p { in the governments of Nische
Novogorod and Kazan.
275. Mortlock N. T. Caroline Island.
276. Moskito p Central America.
277. Mota N. T. New Hebrides.
278. Motu N. T. Port Moresby, New Guinea.
279. Mpongwe B Gabun, W. Africa.
280. Murray Island p Murray Island, New Guinea.
281. Muskoki N. T. Creek Indians, N. America.
282. Mwamba p Lake Nyasa, E. Africa.
282. Nahuatl p United States.
284. Nama or
[Khoikhoi N. T. Namaqualand, S. Africa.
285. Narrinyeri p For natives of South Australia.
286. Negro-English N. T. Surinam, Dutch Guinea.
287. Nepali N. T. Kingdom of Nepal, N. Brit. India.
288. Neshga N. T. Nishkah Indians on Naas River,
N. America.
289. New Britain p Bismarck Archipelago.
290. Nez Perces p U. S. N. America.
291. Nganga p R. Shiré, E. Africa.
292. Ngoni p L. Nyasa, E. Africa.
293. Nguna p New Hebrides.
294. Nias N. T. Malaisia.
295. Nicaragua p Central America.
296. Nicobar p Nicobar Islands, Malaisia.
297. Ningpo B Ningpo, Central China.
298. Niné B Savage Islands, Oceania.
299. Nkondi p Nyasaland, S. E. Africa.
300. Nogai N. T. For Tartars in Crimea and on the
lower Volga.
301. Norwegian B Norway.
302. Nsembe p Kongo, West Africa.
303. Nubian p For Mohammadans about Dongola,
N. E. Africa.

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| 304. Nupé | p | R. Niger, South Africa. |
| 305. Nyamesizi | p | German E. Africa. |
| 306. Nyanja | p | R. Shiré, E. Africa. |
| 307. Nyasa | p | L. Nyása, E. Africa. |
| 308. Nyika | p | For the Wanika tribes, E. Africa. |
| 309. Nyoro | p | Northwest of Uganda. |
| 310. Ojibwa | N. T. | For Chippeway or Saulteaux Indians, N. America. |
| 311. Omaha | p | For the Omahas, United States. |
| 312. Oojein (Ujaini) | N. T. | Province of Malwah, C. India. |
| 313. Osset | p | Central Regions of the Caucasus. |
| 314. Ostjak | p | In governments of Tobolsk and Tomsk. |
| 315. Ottawa | p | For Ottawa Indians, N. America. |
| 316. Ovambo or
[Ndonga | p | Ovamboland, S. W. Africa. |
| 317. Pahouin | p | French Kongo, W. Africa. |
| 318. Pali | N. T. | Sacred and learned language of the Buddhists in Ceylon, Burma, Siam, Lagos, Pegu Ava. |
| 319. Palityan | p | Hungary. |
| 320. Palpa | N. T. | Small States N. of Oude, below the Himalayas. |
| 321. Panaieti | p | British New Guinea. |
| 322. Pangasinan | p | Philippines. |
| 323. Panjab Standard | N. T. | North'n portion, province of Panjab. |
| 324. " Gurmukhi | N. T. | " " " " " |
| 325. " Urdu | p | " " " " " |
| 326. Pashtu or Afghan | B | Afghanistan and the Frontier Districts of the Panjab. |
| 327. Pedi or Sepedi | N. T. | North Transvaal, S. Africa. |
| 328. Pegu or Talaing | N. T. | Province of Pegu. |
| 329. Perm | p | Russia. |
| Persian | B | Persia, India, Etc. |
| 330. Piedmont | N. T. | Piedmont. |
| 331. Pokoma | p | R. Tana, E. Africa. |
| Polish | B | Poland, Etc. |
| 332. Ponape | N. T. | Mikronésia. |

333. Popo (Dahomi) N. T. Dahomey, W. Africa.
 334. Popo (Togoland) p Dahomey, W. Africa.
 335. Portuguese B Portugal and Colonies, and Brazil.
 336. Poto p Kongo.
 337. Provençal (Lang-
 [uedoc] p Southern France.
 338. Quiché p Central America.
 339. Quichua p Argentine Republic, S. America.
 340. Ranon p New Hebrides.
 341. Rarotonga B Hervey Islands, Oceania.
 342. Rifi p Morocco.
 343. Romansch Upper N. T. The Ergadine, Switzerland.
 344. " Lower B " " "
 345. " Oberland B Grisons.
 346. Ronga p S. Africa.
 347. Rotti p Rotti Islands, Malaysia.
 348. Rotuma N. T. Rotuma, Oceania.
 349. Rouman B Roumania and part of Transylvania
 350. Ruk p Caroline Island.
 Russ B Russia.
 351. Ruthen N. T. Little Russia.
 352. Sagalla p E. Central Africa.
 353. Saibai p British New Guinea.
 Samaritan p Samaria.
 354. Samoa B Navigator's Island.
 355. Samogit N. T. Government of Kovno, Russia.
 356. Sanguir N. T. Sanguir Island, Malaysia.
 357. Sanskrit B India.
 358. Santali N. T. For a tribe in N. W. Bengal.
 359. Sard p Sardinia.
 360. Sena p S. Africa, Mouth of the Zambesi.
 361. Seneca p For Seneca Indians, U. States.
 362. Servia (Servian) B Servia, Bosnia,, Herzegovina, Mon
 tenegro, Croatia, Etc.
 363. Serelong Chuana N. T. Bechuanaland, S. Africa.
 364. Shambala p German, E. Africa.

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| 365. Shan | B | Indo-China. |
| 366. Shanghai | N. T. | Shanghai and neighborhood. |
| 367. Shawanoe | p | Shawanoe Indians, N. America. |
| 368. Sheetswa | p | Zululand, S. Africa. |
| 369. Shimshi | p | Pacific Coast. |
| 370. Siam | B | Siam. |
| 371. Sindhi | N. T. | Sindh, N. British India. |
| Sinhali | B | Ceylon. |
| 372. Siryni or Zir | p | In the Government of Vologda, R. |
| Slavonic | B | For the Russian Church. |
| 373. Slovak | N. T. | N. W. of Hungary. |
| Sloven | N. T. | Slovenians in S. Austria, etc. |
| 374. Soga | p | E. Equatorial Africa. |
| Spanish | B | Spain, S. American Republic. |
| 375. Suau | p | British New Guinea. |
| 376. Suchau | N. T. | Central China. |
| 377. Sukuma | p | German E. Africa. |
| 378. Sunda | B | Malaisia. |
| 379. Sus | p | Morocco. |
| 380. Susu or Soso | N. T. | French Guinea. |
| 381. Suto | B | Basutoland, Cape Colony, and
[Orange Free State. |
| 382. Swahiti-Mombosa | p | E. Equatorial Africa. |
| 383. " Zanzibar | B | Zanzibar. |
| 384. Swatow | p | S. E. China. |
| Swedish | B | Sweden. |
| Syriac-Ancient | B | For Syrian Church. |
| 385. Syriac-Modern | B | For Nestorians in Persia and
[Turkey. |
| 386. Tagalog | p | Philippine Islands. |
| 387. Tahiti | B | Tahiti, Society Islands, Oceania. |
| 388. Taichow | N. T. | Taichow, China. |
| Tamil | B | The Karnatic and N. part of Ceylon |
| 389. Tanna | N. T. | Tanna, New Hebrides. |
| 390. Tasiko | p | S. E. of Epi, New Hebrides. |
| 391. Tavara | p | New Guinea. |
| 392. Taveta | p | East Equatorial Africa. |

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| 393. Teke | p | R. Kongo, W. Africa. |
| 394. Telugu | B | S. India. |
| 395. Temné | N. T. | Sierra Leone, W. Africa. |
| 396. Thonga | N. T. | Delagoa Bay, E. Africa. |
| 397. Tibet | N. T. | Tibet. |
| 398. Tigré | p | Eastern Abyssinia. |
| 399. Tigrinya | N. T. | N. Abyssinia. |
| 400. Tinné or Slavé | N. T. | For Indians on the MacKenzie
[River. |
| 401. Toaripi | p | New Guinea. |
| 402. Toda | p | Nilgiri Hills, India. |
| 403. Tonga | B | Friendly Islands, Oceania. |
| 404. Tonga | p | L. Nyasa, E. Africa. |
| 405. Toro | p | West of Uganda, Equatorial Afr. |
| 406. Torres | p | Torres Islands in the South West
Pacific. |
| 407. Tukudh | B | Pacific Coast, N. America. |
| 408. Tulu | N. T. | For a tribe W. of Mysore, India. |
| 409. Turkish (Osmanti) | B | Turkey. |
| 410. " -Greek | B | Greek Christians, using the Turkish
language in Greek characters. |
| 411. Udipuri | p | Province of Mewar, or Udiapur. |
| 412. Ujaina | N. T. | Province of Malwa, |
| 413. Ulawa | p. | Solomon Island, Oceania. |
| 414. Umon | p | Kalabar, W. Equatorial Africa. |
| 415. Uriya (Orissa) | B | Province of Orissa, India. |
| 416. Uzbek Turki | p | Turkestan. |
| 417. Vaudois | p | For the Vaudois, or Waldenses. |
| 418. Visayan | p | Philippine Islands. |
| 419. Wanda | p | Central Africa. |
| 420. Weasisi | p | Tanna, New Hebrides. |
| 421. Wedau | p | New Guinea. |
| Welsh | B | Wales. |
| 422. Wenchow | p | Wenchow, Middle China. |
| Wend-Upper | B | Saxon Lusatia, Germany. |
| " -Lower | B | Prussian Lusatia, Germany. |
| 423. Wert, Standard | B | China. |
| 424. " Easy | N. T. | " |

425. Wogul	p	Siberia.
426. Wotjak	p	Russia.
427. Yahgán	p	South America.
428. Yakut	p	North Siberia.
429. Yao	N. T.	Blantyre, East Africa.
430. Yamba	B	Yamba Land, West Africa.
431. Zimshi	p	British Columbia.
432. Zulu	B	South Africa.

ARTICLE VI.

DR. PARSON'S DE USU SACRAMENTORUM.

BY REV. S. GRING HEFELBOWER, A. M.

The Holman Lecture on Article XIII. of the Augsburg Confession, delivered by the Rev. W. E. Parson, D. D., and published in the LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, Vol. XXX. pp. 326 *et seqq.*, is a combination of diverse elements. Certain parts of it are well written, and cannot be otherwise than instructive to the reader. Facts are presented that all Lutherans should know. But it contains also weaknesses and inaccuracies that mar it greatly.

If the reader takes it up with the expectation of finding a full and clear statement of what our Church confesses in this article, he will be disappointed. And yet, it was just this that we were expecting from a lecturer, especially chosen for this service one year beforehand. Had the lecturer limited himself to one phase of the article considered, though it would have been against precedent, no one would have objected. But when we find the doctrinal content of the article treated so hastily and hazily that we can scarcely find out from the lecture what is really taught in the article discussed, and learn, instead, the author's opinions on a number of more or less remotely related themes, a feeling of disappointment is inevitable.

The author is right in saying on p. 328: "It is not a speculative but a practical study, on which we enter. The dogmatic teachings in connection with the Sacraments fall under the re-

spective articles treating of the Sacraments in detail." But a loose statement in the next sentence contradicts this, and the contents of the lecture do the same. The following digest gives the outline of the lecture, so far as we can reconstruct it.

Introduction: Statement of article and of points clearly contained in the same; assumption that they are all fundamental; function the Sacraments are to perform stated negatively and positively.

1. History of the Augustana.
2. Reason for order of articles 9 to 13.
3. Distinction between Sacrament and Sacrifice.
4. This article is fundamental as well as every other article of the Augustana.
5. The two views rejected in this article.
6. Relation between the Sacraments and the Word, and, incidentally, child-faith.
7. Zwinglian doctrine does not satisfy. Consubstantiation denied: Martineau's tribute to Luther.
8. "The true meaning of the bodily eating as related to the word." Quoted from Dr. Jacobs.
9. Relation of German Reformation to English Church, past and present: Present Lutheran tendencies in English Church: Brief summing up.

It will be noticed that some topics discussed here are somewhat foreign to the subject, and leave the impression of having been dragged in. It would seem, that in preparing this lecture, these topics, some closely, some remotely related to "The Use of the Sacraments," must have appeared so important to the author, that he felt he would be losing a great opportunity if he did not mention them. Accordingly, we hear about a number of things that we would never have expected in a discussion of this article. More than one-half of the lecture is devoted to these incidentals. In fact they occupy so much space, and are made so prominent, that the reader loses sight of what is really being considered, and the thirteenth article itself is made to appear as an excuse for introducing whatsoever other things the author wishes people to hear. The lecture has been read by

several intelligent men of other denominations, but they cannot make out from it what our Church teaches by this article. However, they received certain plain hints as to what the author thinks on a number of other subjects.

From among the many glaring inaccuracies we note the following:

Page 327, in stating the main points "clearly contained" in this article, we find that No. 6 reads as follows: "There is a much higher use which perfects the Sacraments." By "use," as found in this article, is meant beneficent result. Hence we are assured here that a "use," a beneficent result, has something to do with the perfecting of the Sacrament. What does this mean? Can a result have something to do with perfecting that which effected the result? We suspect he meant that there is a much higher use, without which, the doctrine of the Sacrament-mediated grace is imperfect.

Page 328, top of page, we read: "Here, there is gathered up in one brief statement and presented to us the chief use or place of the Sacraments in our Protestant system." This article does not deal with the place of the Sacraments in our Protestant system, but only with their use. Other articles treat of their place in the system, as the two sentences immediately preceding the one quoted, plainly acknowledge. And furthermore, the terms "Protestant" and "Lutheran" should not be confounded. This article deals with the use of the Sacraments in the Lutheran system, not in the Protestant system.

At the foot of the same page the author declares: "The Augsburg Confession, like the Scriptures from which it was drawn, with which it claims to be in perfect consistence throughout, is a mine of truth that cannot be exhausted." The A. C. is not a mine of truth that cannot be exhausted, except in a very limited sense, which is wholly different from that in which the Scripture is a mine of truth. It is a depository of truth which has been mined.

At the bottom of page 329, the A. C. is called, "the document of that century which made Protestantism." This is simply not true. The A. C. had little more to do with making

the German Reformation than an apple has to do with forming the tree on which it grew. Protestantism in Germany made the Confession. However, it had much to do with moulding Protestantism from 1530 on. But when the Confession was first read Protestantism was already a well defined movement, with such strength that Roman Catholic rulers hesitated to use force to restrain it. In fact it was so far advanced that it was able to produce a confession of such excellence, that some men of this late day regard it as fundamental in all its doctrinal statements.

The entire section that treats of the authorship and sources of the Augustana is misleading. It would have been accepted as true 40 years ago, but not now. Modern scholarship has led us to regard Melanchthon as much more than merely a highly cultured, thoroughly trained and obedient amanuensis in the service of Luther. But Dr. Parson disregards this utterly, and strives to leave the impression that the doctrinal content is wholly due to Luther, and that Melanchthon is responsible for the "matchless form" of the Confession and nothing more. The correspondence between Luther and Melanchthon during the days that immediately followed June 25th, when the Confession was read, makes it plain that Melanchthon, in the Confession, took some positions on his own responsibility, concerning which he did not ask Luther's opinion until after the Confession had been read, which Luther had not seen in its final form before it was read, which form differed from the original draft sent Luther May 11th, and to which, in its final form, Luther did not give an unqualified approval. (*Corpus Reformatorum*, 2, 141. DeWette, 4, 62.)

Page 340, top of page, we read concerning the Confession: "It was antagonized as a unit." One need but look into the Apology to see that this statement needs to be modified greatly. Some articles were accepted as a whole, some were rejected as a whole and others were approved in part.

The sixth section treats of the relation of the Word and Sacraments, as means of grace. Some statements here could

scarcely be improved on. But the following is very misleading, to say the least.

"If our Lutheran theology seems to exalt the Sacraments unduly at times, it must be remembered that in so doing we are exalting the Word. This is our conception of the Sacrament, and its relation to the Word. Here is the point of emphasis in our use of the Sacraments. Strictly speaking, there is but one means of grace—which is the Word. So we mean when we speak of the Word and Sacraments as means of grace. As there can be no Sacrament without the Word, we cannot speak of the Sacraments as means of grace in a sense different from that applied to the Word.

"With such definitions and limitations, we can say that the Sacrament is as necessary as the Word.

"With such definitions and limitations, how misleading is a sentence like this from a Reformed source: 'Tenfold more is said in Scripture of the necessity and the efficiency of the Word in the salvation of men, than is therein said or implied of the power of the Sacraments' (Hodge's *Systematic Theol.*, Vol. 3: 592). This is confusing things that should not be confounded. Whatever is said of the Sacrament is said of the Word, for the reason already given that there can be no Sacrament apart from the Word.

"Is it still objected that we in the Lutheran Church have laid too great emphasis on the Sacraments? In reply we say that our Confession has not introduced anything that is not authorized by the Word of God. It were better to err by overemphasis of the Word than to fall short by underestimating it."

Page 352, "It follows, therefore, that the more we exalt the subordinate thing the more we are at the same time exalting, what is the chief thing in the Sacrament, the Word of promise it contains."

From out this haze we think we can gather three things, which the author wishes to emphasize: (a). "As there can be no Sacrament without the Word, we cannot speak of the Sacraments as a means of grace in a sense different from that applied to the Word." (b). It is confusing to exalt the word above

the Sacraments. (c). By exalting the Sacraments we are exalting the Word also.

"Strictly speaking there is only one means of grace—which is the Word." From the days of the early Church Fathers, we have been accustomed to speak of the Sacraments as the "visible Word." But this designation is only of human origin. It is not found in the Scriptures. Therefore we must be careful how we use it. We dare not try to force scriptural conceptions to fit the human mould. It is not safe to lay it down as a basis for forming or defending doctrines.

This classification, along with the intimate relation that exists between the Word and Sacraments, seems to have led to serious misunderstandings of the means of grace. We are taught that there is, strictly speaking, only one means of grace, the Word; that the Sacraments and the Word communicate the same grace; that the Word is in every Sacrament, as the constitutive cause and that the Sacraments are the visible Word. It requires only a little stretch of the imagination to conclude that "we cannot speak of the Sacraments as a means of grace, in a sense different from that applied to the Word," that "with such definitions and limitations, we can say that the Sacrament is as necessary as the Word" and that by exalting the former we are also exalting the latter. But without the imagination we cannot arrive at these conclusions, for they are not justified by reason or revelation. Dr. Parson seems to admit this when he says on page 347: "Our Lutheran position at several points illustrates the dictum that it is better to believe too much than too little.

"If it could be shown, for example, that in the matter of infant faith, or in the interpretation of the Sacraments, our theology had now and then gone beyond what is justified by the letter of Scripture, yet we are on safer ground than those occupy who belittle Christ and the Word by an emptying process which deals stingily with what the Lord has given in large measure. To claim that the infant has faith may seem unreasonable, but the claim has some Scripture, many weighty reasons, and a long

array of brilliant theologians in its favor, with the added fact that it is dealing generously with both the divine Word and the divine grace."

It is true that this passage does not say anything about the imagination as a source of doctrine. But what else can these words mean, "it is better to believe too much than too little" when applied in the above connection, and "dealing generously with both the divine Word and the divine grace"? If they mean anything, as used here, they justify the holding of doctrines, or shades of doctrines, not found in Scripture.

In forming our systems of theology, we dare know only revelation as a source, with reason as a subordinate source for mixed articles, and not our imagination. We must use our reason, and in a limited sense, our imagination, as God-given instruments for grasping and stating revelation, and revelation only, not our fancies and theological dreams. Such a method as that indicated by Dr. Parson, is *exegetical* rather than *exegetical*. It is used by most errorists. To deal generously with Scripture is to be false with Scripture, as it manifestly is in this instance, and that of infant faith, though in the latter the author tries to hide behind the suggestively indefinite expression, "some Scripture, many weighty reasons, and a long array of brilliant theologians," which "long array of brilliant theologians" is likewise, to a great extent, a creature of the imagination.

The Bible knows the Word and the Sacraments as the means of grace. It knows nothing of the latter as the visible Word. But since the Word of promise constitutes, is always present in, and is the chief element of the Sacraments, speculative theology has designated the Sacraments *verbum visibile*, and the Word, *verbum vocale*. This expression of the distinction and the relation between the Word and Sacraments, though fully justified by the inter-relation of the doctrines concerning them, is of human origin. It is merely man's definition and his classification on the basis of his definition, for the purpose of more fully comprehending and expressing that particular part of God's revelation which concerns the means of grace.

According to this classification, the means of grace are em-

braced under two heads, *verbum visibile* and *verbum vocale*. *Verbum* is common to both. Both kinds of means of grace are Word. The difference is expressed in the descriptive words, *vocale* and *visibile*. They have something in common and yet they are different. Hence we have a genus, *verbum*, that contains two species, *verbum vocale* and *verbum visibile*. In this classification *verbum* is the means of grace. *Verbum vocale* is the Word, as commonly understood. *Verbum visibile* is the Sacrament.

Nothing can be said about the genus that is not common to every species of it. Many things can be said about the individual species that cannot be said about the genus, *i. e.*, about the other species. This is just what Dr. Parson disregards. He insists that we cannot speak about the second species as a means of grace in a sense different from that applied to the first species. He confounds the genus, *word*, and the species, *word*, and, as a result, makes false statements about their being means of grace in the same sense, about one being as necessary as the other and about exalting the Word, the first species, by exalting the Sacraments, the second species; and this confusion leads him to call a statement, made by Dr. Hodge, misleading, which is correct and is not misleading.

In ordinary use and throughout the Scriptures, "the word" is the species *vocale*. When this enters into relation to an element as the constitutive cause, informing a Sacrament, it is still "the Word." It has not surrendered any inherent qualities; but it has assumed a new form of presentation as is expressed in the dogmatic distinction between *vocale* and *visibile*. The word *visibile* expresses particular relations to the subject. When the species *vocale* enters into particular relations in the Sacrament, it is no longer species *vocale*. In this lecture Dr. Parson knows nothing of this distinction. He disregards this distinction entirely, and, as a result, makes very strange statements.

Only the word of grace, the word of promise, goes with the Sacrament. And yet the law is a part of God's Word, and is a means of grace, and as such has certain definite functions to perform. The Sacraments do not work contrition, they do not

convict of sin. Here is something very definite and important said about the "Word" as a means of grace that cannot be said about the Sacraments. If there was nothing else said in Scripture about the "Word" that cannot be said about the Sacraments as means of grace, and vice versa, this would suffice to demonstrate the falsity of the position advocated. In addition, we read that the Word is the power of God; it is spirit and life. It overcomes the world, regenerates, illumines. Faith cometh by hearing, etc.

Dr. Parson thinks that it is confusing to exalt the Word above the Sacraments. What else are we to do? The vocal word is the only source of our knowledge of God and redemption. Without that knowledge there can be no salvation. By it, and not by the Sacraments, the Holy Spirit works conviction and faith in men, through which faith the benefits of the Sacraments are apprehended. And the very Sacraments themselves are constituted by the *vocal* Word. If we want to speak of the Word and Sacraments as means of grace at all, we must speak of them in different senses. And since the "definitions and limitations" neither limit or define, we dare not say that one is as necessary as the other. The Word is an absolute necessity, *i. e.*, there can be no salvation without it. The Sacraments are an ordinary, a relative necessity, *i. e.*, if the individual, through no fault of his, should not be permitted to use them, he can be saved without them. Thus we see from the statements of this lecture that it is dangerously confusing not to exalt the Word above the Sacraments.

We are told that by exalting the Sacraments we are also exalting the Word. By exalting only the visible Word we do not exalt the vocal Word. We cannot exalt the higher species by exalting that which is lower, even though there is a constitutively causal relation existing between them. But we may get them out of the proper relation to each other so that our system will be false.

Dr. Parson's conception of the relation between the Word and the Sacraments seemed to rest exclusively on speculative grounds. His position has been examined from that stand-

point and found wanting. We subjoin the teaching of some *authorities* on the subject, whose orthodox Lutheranism cannot be questioned. A comparison will show that Dr. Parson and all those who share his views, are utterly out of harmony with them, fundamentally incorrect and not only non- but anti-Lutheran.

1. Luther: "Hence upon whom the preaching office is conferred, upon him is conferred the highest office in the Christian Church. He may also baptize, administer the Lord's Supper, and discharge all pastoral duties, or if he does not thus wish, he may abide in the preaching alone, and leave the others, baptism and other subordinate duties, as Christ did, and Paul and all the apostles" (Erl. Ed. 22,151). "Thus we see that more stress is laid on preaching than on the Lord's Supper" (Erl. Ed. 39,209).

2. Thomasius says of Luther's position: "To Luther is the Word the primary means of grace. It also conditions the nature and operation of the Sacraments, for without the Word they would be nothing but 'a mere hull,' 'like a body without a soul,' 'a letter without a Spirit,' 'a scabbard without a blade'" (*Person und Werk Christi*, 2 : 241).

3. Dr. Jacoby represents Luther as teaching that "the valuable, the indispensable, is the Word; the dispensable and subordinate is the Sacrament" (*Liturgik*, 1,180).

4. Bishop von Scheele: "The Word is the most essential and most proper means of grace, from which every other receives its particular character." (In Zoeckler's *Handbuch der Theologischen Wissenschaften*, 3rd. Ed. 2 : 757).

5. Luthardt: "The foremost means of grace in the Church is the word of preaching, which, through its witness of sin (law), and of grace (gospel), is fitted to work penitent obedience of faith, and to serve the Holy Ghost to that end, in so far as it is a true expression of the salvation of Christ, *i. e.*, Scriptural." "Preaching is the first activity of the newly founded Church, Acts, 2. It is more important than baptism, 1st Cor. 1, 17" (*Komp. der Dogmatik*, 9th, Ed., 335,336).

6. Frank: "Hereby is undoubtedly proved the fact which

we had sought to establish, namely, that in the first place the Word effects the human representation of God in Christ, the God-man, and if there should be any other means of grace, the latter will by no means restrict the supreme and comprehensive power of the Word." "By these acts, called Sacraments by the Church, the supreme position of the Word is by no means limited, for their character as means of grace is first stamped upon them by the Word, and the further fruitful unfolding of the gifts here mediated is essentially perfected by the aid of the Word." He calls the Word the primary means of grace, and says that it towers far above the others (*Wahrheit*, Sec. 38, 38).

7. Meusel's *Kirchliches Handlexikon*, article, *Gnadenmittel*: "In so far are our Lutheran dogmaticians right when they ascribe to the means of grace of the Word a certain prerogative over both means-of-grace acts, the Sacraments. But it is going too far when we conceive of the sacrament only as a *verbum visibile*, and do not note that the special conception under which it falls, is not *verbum*, but *actio*."

CONFESSIONAL SUBSCRIPTION.

In the fifties and sixties of the last century no apology was needed for articles on this theme. The stress of the times demanded them. Probably some will think that conditions have so changed that at present there is not only no need for a study of confessional subscription, but that any criticism of present conditions or tendencies must be regarded as unwelcome and harmful agitation, the only result of which will be to hinder true progress. But this is not agitation. On the contrary, it is called forth by an agitation on the part of certain men in the General Synod, who seem to have discovered only within the last ten years what they understand by our form of subscription.

They make no complaint against our present *form* as not sufficing to anchor the man using it firmly to the Lutheran System. The *form* seems to satisfy everybody. But when it comes to explaining this form, a new interpretation has been advanced, that assumes to be the only possible one that will

assure the man using it that he is a Lutheran, and which, by evident implication, teaches that all those who do not have the same understanding of our confessional obligation are, either not Lutheran at all, or very loosely Lutheran.

This movement has been called new because it is only of recent years that we have heard much about it. If its advocates have been among us for any great length of time, say since the year 1864, they have held their opinions in absolute silence. And yet it must be acknowledged that the prevalent understanding of the General Synod's form of confessional subscription has always been just as much opposed to their teaching on the subject as it is now, and in the late sixties and seventies, the prominence given it was much greater. This marked silence in regard to this interpretation of our form of subscription, which assumes to be the true, original and only rational interpretation, is all but absolute proof that it did not exist. For if any holding this extreme view had remained behind, after those who organized the General Council had gone into their voluntary confessional bondage, they abode with us in silence. But this silence has been broken, and now scarcely a week passes that we do not hear something about every article of the Augustana being fundamental. The subject is introduced in season and out of season. It appears in articles to whose general content it is utterly foreign. Every opportunity for mentioning it is improved, and new opportunities are not only sought, but are made, sometimes very awkwardly. It is dragged in on every occasion. It is paraded before us with the greatest possible prominence. It seems that what its advocates lack in strength they try to make up in zeal. In fact their ardor is so great that one cannot help thinking that it betrays the novelty of the position advocated. For if they did not think that the position they hold was new, and therefore needed defense, they would be very foolish to be continually parading it. As a rule that is not the way men defend an old institution that has been attacked. But on the contrary, continued agitation is the common means for introducing innovations. And there can be no denial of the fact, that in this matter the Gen-

eral Synod has been subjected to continued agitation in recent years. The purpose of the agitators seems to be to hold this subject up before the Church continually, so that we will forget that it is new, and will become less wary. For the first step in the adoption of any innovation, whether it be good or evil, is the passive toleration of it.

The history of this movement is brief and its beginnings hazy. It comes after the real or partial defeat of certain measures that are, perhaps, best described as retrogressive dogmatic evolutionism. The new Catechism was adopted only after its extreme features had been eliminated. And the new "Ministerial Acts" likewise surrendered its extreme features. It is evident that there are those among us who are not satisfied with the General Synod as it has been and is, and that they want to change it to something that they think is more desirable, more Lutheran. And it seems that having been defeated thus far in their attempt to raise the General Synod to what they think is a higher and nobler plane of denominational life, they have simply taken up their struggle at another place. This conclusion is confirmed by a comparison of the names of the most prominent advocates of those old measures with those associated with this new movement. They are the same with few exceptions. And this suggests that it is only a new manifestation of the same tendency by the same men.

The method pursued by those who advocate this new interpretation of our form of subscription is remarkable because of its presumption. They simply assume that it is the only interpretation. With very few exceptions, no attempt is made to argue the matter. No reasons are given. It is merely stated or hinted that every article of the Augustana is fundamental and that those who believe differently are wrong. This is not one of those universally accepted and self-evident truths, that need no defense. It is well known that many of our strongest teachers in the General Synod object to it. And some of those who object to it most vigorously remember very well the understanding of our form of subscription that prevailed at the time of its adoption. If there are any good reasons for this

innovation they ought to have been given. If a new problem is to confront us, the Church should know on what basis it rests, so that it could judge whether it is worthy of consideration or not. But this basis has not been given. We look in vain for some defense of the position advocated. We find only bald authoritative statements that prove nothing. Certainly the opponents of this new measure dare not be considered uncharitable if they conclude that no defense can be made, or that the best defense possible is weak.

Dr. Parson, in his lecture, takes occasion to devote several pages to this question. This is perhaps the most elaborate discussion that it has received. It certainly is the most important consideration that has been given it, for the fact that it was delivered as part of the lecture on the basis of our only endowed lectureship at Gettysburg, and published in the LUTHERAN QUARTERLY gives it a prominence that an article in a religious paper does not enjoy. And since Dr. Parson's utterances have been publicly and privately approved by a few persons, and, so far as we know, have received no condemnation from his fellow advocates of this new teaching, we are justified in criticizing it on the basis of his presentation. For if his position is only similar to and not the same as that held by others, they evidently consider the deviations of such minor importance as not to be worth mentioning. His position must therefore be regarded as fairly representative of this new teaching. We state his position in his own words, as found in the fourth division of his lecture.

However, Dr. Parson has changed greatly in this respect. He is altogether a different man from what he was. In fact having known him theologically ten years ago and meeting him now you would not recognize him at all. A person would be likely to conclude that there are two Drs. Parson in the General Synod. The anti confessional impulse had struck him, and for a while it looked as if he wanted to start a revision campaign in the General Synod. Reading a sermon that he preached before his congregation in Washington, in 1890, which was pub-

lished by request, one cannot help thinking of the days of the *Definite Platform*. The change of position as revealed by a comparison of the two productions is quite remarkable, LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, Vol. XXX., pp. 336 *et seq.*, and *The Perfect Doctrine*, pp. 6, 7).

DR. PARSON IN 1890.

"As to these human statements of doctrine, the feeling of the present day is against the rigidity of the older confessions. The Presbyterian Churches are discussing whether they shall revise the Westminster Confession, the general drift of opinion being in favor of revision.

"We might debate the same question: Shall we revise the Augsburg Confession? For it must be that in a statement formulated three hundred and fifty years ago, to suit the thought and necessities of that day, we shall find some incongruities, some things that do not tally with our present ideas.

"It would be a poor compliment to pay our religion to say we had not learned anything from it in three centuries.

"And yet would it not seem more reasonable to do in our century as they did in theirs—make our own statement? Let the old stand as a way-mark in the Church's development. Let us declare in our day our own understanding of the great fundamental principles of Christianity. I would no more take the venerable Augsburg Confession or the Westminster Confession as a basis on which to build up a new statement of doctrinal belief than I would take the more ancient Athanasian Creed for the purpose.

"The fact is, we can trust the

DR. PARSON IN 1900.

"If it should be suggested that this one article, or any other in the Confession, is not fundamental, in the sense that it is necessary to salvation, the reply must be made that it is at least fundamental to the scheme of doctrine held by our Church, since it finds a place in the original statement, re-affirmed by every Church entitled to the name Lutheran from that day to this.

"Our General Synod so declares in her doctrinal basis, receiving and holding the Word of God as the only infallible rule of faith and practice, and the Augsburg Confession as a correct exhibition of the fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word, and of the faith of our Church founded upon that word.

"The word fundamental is descriptive of the doctrines contained in the Confession. True, it stands before the phrase 'doctrines of the Divine Word;' but it follows the phrase 'correct exhibition.'

"Unless, therefore, we make the doctrines exhibited in the Augsburg Confession the equivalent of 'the fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word' and co-extensive therewith we are simply playing with words 'that palter with us in a double sense.'

"The General Synod so intends to declare by its recent action expressing its entire satisfaction with the

Christian consciousness in any age. The Spirit of God, the truth of God in the soul of the believing Church, will bring men into the expression suitable for the time.

"We need not legislate for other times, nor need we be bound by the legislation of others. 'The Word of God is not bound,'"

present form of doctrinal basis and confessional subscription, 'which is the Word of God, the infallible rule of faith and practice, and the unaltered Augsburg Confession as throughout in perfect consistence with it,' which is substantially the language used in the York repudiation resolutions by the General Synod in 1864. * * *

"Beside such a statement that the difference between the Holy Scripture and all other writings will be preserved, how exceedingly grotesque appear the vaporings of some of our modern recensionists, who declare, 'we accept the Augsburg Confession only as to fundamental doctrines.'"

We add also the following from the lecture in 1900 :

"In a recent debate, in the House of Representatives at Washington, on a constitutional question, one of the leaders of the House declared with emphasis—'The fathers of our country in building the Constitution did not build a trap,' adding—they ought to know what they meant, and it ought to mean now what it meant then.'

"The same principle holds in religious matters and in creed interpretation. Until some authorized change is made in our basis, no person in the Church can honestly subscribe our Confession *in part only*. He converts it into a trap with which to ensnare the unwary, when he erects a fictitious distinction between essential and non-essential doctrines, calling some fundamental and others non-fundamental."

The confessional leap made between 1890 and 1900 was gigantic. It was a complete confessional somersault. In 1890 Dr. Parson seemed to have an attack of symbolophobia. Fortunately for him and the Church, it did not last long. But unfortunately it changed to an attack of symbolomania. However, there are other men among the leaders of this agitation who

have made a similar change of position within the last dozen years, and are now condemning men and institutions for being too loosely Lutheran, that they formerly charged with being ultra-Lutheran.

In 1890 Dr. Parson seems to have been groping in uncertainty, trying to grasp two great truths, fundamental to Lutheranism, namely: In using the Confession we must always test it by Scripture, and we accept the faith, not the theology of the fathers. But he was only groping, for when he attempted a statement of his position in this sermon, the Augustana is made to appear as little more than a bit of ecclesiastical history. In 1900 an astonishing change has taken place. Pendulum-like, he has swung to the other extreme, and severely condemns the supposed loose Lutheranism of those who but a few years ago condemned, and rightly, his loose Lutheranism. When we read the sermon of 1890, we tremble lest we will have no Confession left. When we read the lecture of 1900 we tremble lest we shall hear a Protestant dogma of the infallibility of the Reformers.

Dr. Parson's present position, or rather, Dr. Parson's position last May, is, that "the entire Confession is the 'correct exhibition,' " that "we must make the doctrines exhibited in the Augsburg Confession the equivalent of the 'fundamental doctrines of the divine Word' and 'co-extensive therewith.' " If we do not do this, he says, "we are simply playing with words that palter with us in a double sense.' " The "fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word" and the Augsburg Confession are "co-extensive terms." This involves two things: (a). All the fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word are expressed in the Augsburg Confession, and (b). All of the Augsburg Confession is made up of the fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word, *i. e.*, all the doctrines of the Augsburg Confession are fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word. The first paragraph of the above quotation from Dr. Parson in 1900 may seem like a *quasi* contradiction of this, but not necessarily so, for we must acknowledge that there are doctrines fundamental to the Christian system that are not fundamental in the sense that a person

cannot be saved without believing them. Hence we are forced to the conclusion that the entire Augsburg Confession expresses the entire body of truth fundamental to the Christian system, no less and no more. Therefore every article of the Augsburg Confession is a fundamental doctrine of the Christian system of truth comprehended and expressed in the peculiar way which is known as Lutheran. Hence only those are Lutheran who accept every article of the Augsburg Confession as a fundamental doctrine of the Divine Word.

The correctness of this conclusion, viz., that in Dr. Parson's view every article of the Confession is a fundamental doctrine of the Divine Word, is plainly shown by his own words. On page 337 he writes: "We are reduced to this dilemma, respecting this article, or any article of the Confession—if the teaching in it is not the true doctrine derived from the Word of God, in perfect consistence with it throughout, then it is not a fundamental doctrine and ought to be eliminated from the list of fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word."

The logic of this position is no less startling. If every article of the Augsburg Confession is a fundamental article derived from the Divine Word, every doctrinal statement in each article is also fundamental. This is a necessary conclusion and it is what Dr. Parson teaches. On the second page of his lecture as printed, just following his analysis of the article considered, we read:

"Each one of the foregoing points is clearly contained in each article of the Confession. As the General Synod has twice declared (at York in 1864, and at Hagerstown in 1895), that the Augsburg Confession, properly interpreted, is throughout in perfect consistence with the Holy Scripture, we assume that every statement of this article is at the same time a doctrine of the Church, and one of the 'fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word,' on which our Confession is declared to be founded."

Dr. Parson states plainly that "every statement of this article is at the same time a doctrine of our Church and one of the fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word." And since he thinks that the other articles of the Confession should be re-

garded in the same light, he evidently believes that every doctrinal statement in every article of the Confession is fundamental. He knows nothing of fundamentals and non-fundamentals, essentials and non-essentials. "The fathers knew what they meant" in the Confession, "and it ought to mean now what it meant then."

Section 4 of the "Fundamental Principles" of the General Council reads as follows :

"That Confessions may be such a testimony of Unity and bond of Union, they must be accepted in every statement of doctrine, in their own true, native, original and only sense. Those who set them forth and subscribe them, must not only agree to use the same words, but must use and understand those words in one and the same sense."

The intimate relation between this and Dr. Parson's teaching is very striking, as is also the relation between the general contents of his entire lecture and the works of Drs. Krauth and Jacobs.

As already shown, this interpretation of our form of subscription would bind us to every article of the Augsburg Confession and to every doctrine stated in every article of the Confession. It recognizes no distinction between the faith of the Fathers and the theology of the Fathers. These brethern claim that in accepting the faith of the Fathers we must accept their theology as well. What else can Dr. Parson mean when he assumes that every statement of Article XIII. is a doctrine of the Church and at the same time a fundamental doctrine of the Divine Word?

But all confessions of faith have two elements, a "confession" element and a "faith" element. The faith is founded on the Word of God, and men confess it. When they formulate their Confession they have in their minds certain conditions that their faith must meet. Hence there is a temporal, a local, an individual coloring given their confession. But since the faith confessed is the work of God who is always in his Church working faith, there is something in the confession that is not temporal, or local, or individual, something that remains unchanged and

unchangeable, a faith-content clothed in a form. Dr. Parson and his fellows seem to know nothing of this distinction. They would bind themselves and us to the faith and to the forms of the Fathers. They would have us accept the theology of the Confession as well as the faith. The Augsburg Confession is itself not the faith of the Fathers, but an expression of the faith of the Fathers in the terms and scientific setting of their times.

Such an acceptance of the Confession, consistently and persistently followed out, would torture the true progressive life out of Lutheranism on the rack of a bald letter-orthodoxy. They would say to us: Enter into the theological palace of your Fathers. It is yours. You have inherited it from them—a treasure beyond all price. But you must use the same apartments they used. You must be satisfied with the same theological furnishings. You dare not discard anything, even though it be old and worn out. You dare not introduce anything, even though it be good and useful. In a word, you must live as a slave, and not as a child and as an heir in the house of your fathers. But with our greatest orthodox Lutheran theologian of the century just closed, Frank of Erlangen, "we know ourselves at home in our Church, not as slaves who are servilely bound to the letter of the confessions, much less to the theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but as free and worthy sons, who know the meaning of our fathers, and feel ourselves inwardly at one with them."

Now the real question that confronts us is not a mere matter of privilege, such as the holding of the other confessions of the Church. A man may accept the entire Book of Concord, and be a good General Synod Lutheran. But so soon as he insists that others must accept it in order to be good Lutherans, he forsakes General Synod principles. But this new position deals with a form adopted by the General Synod and insists that it means and can mean only one thing. And the only inference is that any other interpretation of the form is wrong. These brethren would change the entire confessional attitude of the General Synod by introducing this new interpretation.

By our formula of confessional subscription we "receive and

hold with the Evangelical Lutheran Church of our fathers, the Augsburg Confession to be a correct exhibition of the fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word, and of the faith of our Church founded upon that Word."

There are "fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word." The Augsburg Confession is a correct exhibition of them. That the Augsburg Confession is the equivalent of the "fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word and co-extensive therewith" is, perhaps, grammatically possible, but is not necessarily true. The Augsburg Confession may contain some things that are not "fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word," and as a matter of fact it does, as we shall see later. This the General Synod has always recognized. Its official history proves beyond all doubt that it recognized "non-essential features of the Augsburg Confession," and did not regard them as binding.

A striking fact which is at the same time very significant, is that the advocates of this new interpretation never mention the last clause of our form—"and of the faith of our Church founded upon that Word." The framers of this confessional obligation evidently had a purpose in adding this clause. If that which had preceded this had sufficed, they would have left this off. Evidently this clause, which speaks of "the faith of our Church," had some use in defining and could shed some useful light on something, and thus help us to grasp the true meaning of the obligation. The only thing on which it could shed light was that which preceded it. And there is only one interpretative light that it can shed on that which went before. The "faith of our Church" rested in the "fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word," and was correctly exhibited in the Augsburg Confession. We do not accept the Augsburg Confession for the sake of the "exhibition," *i. e.*, for the sake of the formulation of the doctrines, which was determined by the condition of the times, but for the sake of the "faith of our Church," which it correctly exhibits. It is not the outward form in itself to which we subscribe, and which binds; it is the inner doctrinal content. We do not accept the Augsburg Confession because it "contains" "the faith of our Church." This statement

would be true with one man and false with another. However, this is the form of subscription of the Wuerttemberg Church, which has always been regarded as thoroughly Lutheran. Nor do we accept the Augsburg Confession in so far as it agrees with Scripture, in order to be Lutherans. This would likewise be a dangerously indefinite assertion. But we accept the Augsburg Confession because it is a correct exhibition of the fundamental doctrines of the Divine Word as objectivized in the faith of our Church, *i. e.*, we accept the Augsburg Confession as our confession of faith (it calls itself a confession of faith), and not as a brief compendium of dogmatics, as some would have us do. In fact, our form of subscription, when analyzed, leads us to the inevitable conclusion, that the faith of the Church is to be distinguished from the theology of the Church, else why add "faith of our Church" as descriptive of the "correct exhibition of the fundamental doctrines"?

We shall test the two interpretations by example and by authorities. Is every article and doctrinal statement in the Augsburg Confession a fundamental doctrine of the Divine Word? If so, the new interpretation of our formula of subscription is correct; if not, it is wrong, and the prevailing interpretation is correct.

It says: That this new interpretation is false, is plain from the absurdities into which it leads us in the case of the 11th article. Every article is a correct exhibition of some fundamental doctrine of the Divine Word, and every statement clearly contained in an article is the same. But Article XXV. informs us "that confession is of human right only," to which the German adds, "is not commanded in Scripture, but has been instituted by the Church." Luther declared that he did not know where private confession was taught in the Bible (Weimar Ed., 3 : 98). Dr. Krauth classes it with "ceremonies or ecclesiastical rites, which are neither commanded nor forbidden in God's Word." That is, this article is not a doctrine of Scripture at all, to say nothing of fundamental. In the *Lutheran and Missionary*, Apr. 21, 1864, Dr. Krauth declares plainly that Article XI. is neither

doctrinal nor fundamental, and speaks of the 20 doctrinal articles of the Confession. And if it is fundamental to the Lutheran system, we are confronted with this condition—a human rite is among the things fundamental to the Lutheran system. And if it is one of the fundamentals of our system, no ecclesiastical body *calling* itself Lutheran, is *Lutheran*, for private confession is unknown in our Church to-day. This narrow ultra-Lutheran interpretation of our form of subscription breaks down utterly on the eleventh Article. In fact when strictly applied to it as Dr. Parson wants to apply it to Article XIII. it de-Lutheranizes every one of us, even those who advocate it.

Some one may raise the question that the "power of the keys" is plainly taught in Scripture. But this article does not concern the "power of the keys," except in connection with confession, of which absolution is most certainly the correlate. It may be objected further, that confession is taught in Scripture, and that since it and the "power of the keys" are to be found there, this Article must be regarded as a doctrine of the Bible. But Article XI. treats of confession only in a certain form, namely, private confession, and it is universally acknowledged that private confession is not based on Scripture, but is only a man-made rite.

This problem of the sense in which our Confession is binding, is by no means new. Theologians and ecclesiastical bodies have discussed it in every age. It is true that there have been many loose Lutherans in the land of the Augsburg Confession, but there are and have been those whose confessionalism has never been doubted, whom the Lutheran Church knows as authorities in matters of Lutheran orthodoxy. With the possible exceptions of Profs. Jacoby and Kahnis, the following quotations are from men of that class. By comparing these statements with the two interpretations of our form of subscription we can see which is the truly conservative Lutheran interpretation when judged at the bar of conservative Lutheran theologians, which is the only known test our Church can have. For confessional Lutheranism is not merely a fact of history, it

is one of the great elements that are making history. If we would know it we must know it by what it is as well as by what it has been. The confessions and dogmaticians of the early days can give us but a partial view, which can be made complete only by studying

THE CONFSSIONAL LUTHERANISM OF RECENT YEARS.

1. Kurtz classes Bengel as belonging to a school "in which Lutheran theology and learning were united with genuine piety and profound thinking, decided confessionalism with moderation and firmness." Dorner says that he is "a theologian of the first rank for the Evangelical Church in general and for that of Wuerttemberg in particular." In Dorner's *History of Protestant Theology*, Vol II., pp 228, 229, Bengel is quoted as saying: "We must not insist upon binding the ministers of the Church to all *particularibus in iis contentis, exegesi* etc. Nothing more is necessary than that the main theses—but not the details, the proofs, the exegesis—be believed, accepted and subscribed to. It is easy for those who are content to live on like the rest of the world to be orthodox. They believe what was believed before them and never trouble themselves with testing it. But when a soul is anxious about truth, and would deal with it as with a precious jewel, then things are not quite so easy. How wrong is it, then, to rush upon just such sensitive souls, to cross question and to gag and stun them, when we ought, on the contrary, to give them liberty of speech, that they may gain confidence and suffer themselves to be lead aright."

2. Kahnis may be cited here, in spite of his deviations on certain points, because he merely confirms what others say. He adds nothing new. He was recognized as one of Leipzig's great conservative trio, of which Delitzsch and Luthardt were the other two. He shows us what was understood by confessionalism at Leipzig when its faculty was considered the greatest stronghold of conservative Lutheranism in all Germany. *Luthersche Dogmatik*, etc, 2nd Ed., Vol. 1, p. 239, he writes: "The normative authority of the Confessions includes only the substance of faith of the same, not the theological setting."

3. Thomasius was leader of Erlangen confessional Lutheranism for a number of years. "Next to Philippi he published the most comprehensive text-book on dogmatics, and thereby won for himself great respect in the Lutheran Church. His *Person und Werk Christi* was born of the spirit of the Lutheran Church." Kahnis in his *Lutherische Dogmatik*, etc., 2nd Ed., Vol. 1., p. 90, quotes him as follows:

"It seems to me that nothing is more necessary for the edification of our Church in our times, than that we first come to an understanding again only in regard to the great ground-work and fundamental thoughts of her Confessions, and, if God so wills, to a harmonious conviction respecting them. However that I thereby mean no mere repetition of old church definitions and forms will be clear."

4. Dr. Seiss says of Dr. Sartorius, *Evan. Rev.*, Vol. 4, p. 10: "Doctor Sartorius is a living German divine, who occupies a high position in the Church. He is a man of profound mind, and a forcible thinker. He has a liberal heart, a conciliating temper, and a firm faith. He is a leading man in the Evangelical Church of Prussia, and a sound Lutheran. Though not exactly of the exclusive High-Church School of Hengstenberg, or Loehe, he is a decided opponent of Rationalism in all its forms. We take him to be a true churchman, but enlightened and moderate in his method of applying his principles. He is in no sense an ultraist, but a faithful student, and a true son of the Church. In a word, he is just such such a man as to deserve a hearing on such a subject as we here find him discussing." In a pamphlet *Ueber die Nothwendigkeit und Verbindlichkeit der kirchlichen Glaubensbekenntnisse* (p. 39, 40), Dr. Sartorius speaks as follows:

"Compared with the compendious brevity of the Oecumenical symbols, they indeed appear voluminous; because, unlike the ancient Confessions, they do not present the simple statements of creeds, but also give a doctrinal exposition, confirmation and defence of them, and point out and reject such teachings as may be opposed to them. Besides, they also have appended to them prefaces and postscripts, relating to historical matters which are

only of introductory or casual importance, without properly belonging to the symbols. The doctrinal, argumentative, apologetical and polemical parts, of course, belong to them, but without forming the essential obligatory substance of the symbols. Parts, again, consist of mere historical circumstances, or dogmatical deductions, which are of use in discovering the theology, and are even admirable in themselves, but not authoritative to such an extent as that they cannot be otherwise deduced or established. And other portions refer only to oppositions encountered in this form, belonging only to the time in which they sprang up, but which, in other form, must be overcome again. The confessional substance of the symbols in among the incidental circumscriptions is and remains the real *credo*, or *credimus*, or *confitemur*—the truths of faith—the *articuli fidei*."

5. Prof. Palmer of Tuebingen was one of the strongest and most influential teachers of practical theology of the last century. He was a strong confessional Lutheran who had lived through the period of confessional revival. Hence his opinion is that of a man of wide practical experience gained at a time when the definition of confessionalism was being formed. We quote from a translation from him in the LUTHERAN QUARTERLY, Vol. 2, p. 581. Speaking of the confessional obligation required of the clergy in Wuertemberg, he says:

"Since the year 1827, every minister at his first installation is called upon to pledge his word of honor, that 'in his sermons and religious instruction, he will hold fast to the Holy Scriptures, and that he will not permit himself to deviate from the Evangelical system of doctrines as contained in the Augsburg Confession.'

"Such a form of subscription will certainly never cramp anyone who is not fundamentally at variance with the Evangelical faith. And yet it is sufficiently comprehensive to effect the removal of such as may be in conflict with and give offence to the Church."

"But we must also remember, that it is of the highest importance to the spiritual life of the Evangelical Church, that a certain amount of liberty be accorded, and that therefore many

conflicting views be tolerated, so long as they do not give offence and impair the life of the Church itself. For the gain which this freedom brings to the spiritual life and its development, outweighs by far the injury occasioned by the extravagances of individual instances.

"Nevertheless a limit must be fixed to the exercise of this freedom; and hence the form of obligation must be drawn up in such a manner, that, where it is necessary to avoid disorder and scandal, the refractory individual may be removed from his office by virtue of the ecclesiastical law."

7. Dr. Jacoby of Koenigsberg is described as a positive theologian. For many years he has taught practical theology in the university of that city. In a letter to Dr. Richard, Gettysburg, Pa., dated, Aug. 15th, 1895, he writes:

"The object of subscription for the Evangelical Lutheran clergy in Germany is the preaching of the Gospel, the doctrine of the Divine Word as it is contained in Holy Scripture and witnessed in the Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. If then the symbols are designated as the norm for the official preaching of doctrine, they, nevertheless, even as such, have authority only in so far as they contain the doctrine of salvation and testify of faith, but not to the extent that their utterances fall in the realm of theology, *i. e.*, speculation. However, it is very difficult to determine which articles bear a religious and which a theological character, or which parts of one and the same article are religious and which theological. For the sake of this principle it must be added that each ecclesiastical body must determine this for itself. But such authoritative decisions are not at hand, and if they were, they would nevertheless be vulnerable for that which is considered as the content of faith at one time may, at another, be regarded as a theological formation. When in Article XVII. of the Augustana the *Apocatastasis* is rejected, as well as the theory of the final annihilation of the ungodly (I do not say whether rightly or wrongly), this, then, is theological speculation, not saving truth. When in Article XVIII. the ability of the natural man is restricted to *externa*, and all *interiores motus* are denied

him, as *caritas, patientia*, this is a verdict, which by the *ethos* of the Old Testament saints was also pronounced against noble heathen, and is a verdict of theological speculation. Consequently it is hard to determine where saving truth ends and where theological reflection begins. Yet it may be said that if in the course of a long period of time, a church in fact ignores doctrines of the symbolical books, she thereby declares that she has dropped them, as, for example, the greater part of the German Reformed Church has done in the case of the doctrine of predestination, in its original form. Thereby it is not said that the same Church may not later again accept the once cast-aside doctrines. Therefore it must be said that for the practical application of the difference between saving truth and theological reflection, the current opinion of individual church bodies at a particular time is authoritative. If the current opinion is undecided the clergy, as well as the representatives of the Church, must show discreet and mild reserve."

7. Prof. Philippi's liberality in the matter of confessional subscription will be more suggestive than that of any other German theologian of the nineteenth century. Not so much because of his high standing as a scholar and as a professor, but because of his extreme confessional tendency, as shown in his attempt to reproduce the old theology in his great work, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*. The other great theologians of the nineteenth century stood for living progress on the basis of the old, he stood for a reproduction of the old. One would naturally expect that he, of all men, would hold to the Confessions, as authoritative in every doctrinal statement, would hold to them "in their true, native, original, and only sense." In his *Symbolik*, p. 320, we read:

"When it is said that only actual material agreement with the doctrine of a particular Church, as the same is declared in its confessional writings, can be demanded of a preacher of that Church, it is already understood that least of all is such an agreement with the letter of the symbols to be demanded that also everything which belongs, not immediately to the doctrine itself, but only to its exegetical, historical or dogmatic ground-

ing, proof and determination, must be acknowledged as irrefutably correct. For instance, not every citation of Holy Scripture which is found in our symbolical books always proves that which it is designed to prove, but it is sufficient, if the doctrine, which is intended to be proved by it, is in general only in the Scripture, and has been proved, or can be proved by other citations." Again, p. 324, he says: "Moreover, that even of teachers only an honest and hearty agreement in all the fundamental articles of the Evangelical doctrine should be demanded, we have already remarked. Even these, in a time like our own when they are making progress, may be treated with hope by the church authorities, if they should express casual doubt about the less essential parts of the Church's Confession. They may decide in special cases to what extent the person offering himself for the ministry is actually in harmony with the essential ground of the Evangelical Confession. To decide this is the business of intelligent church authorities. Under such conditions the very promising and well qualified, in regard to whom according to human judgment and foresight there is any hope for further progress, will by no means be deterred from the ministry."

8. Dr. Zoeckler, of Greifswald University, is not only a professor, but also editor of a church paper that has a wide influence, and is the author of some very important theological works. His chief service in the field of theological literature is his well known *Handbuch der Wissenschaftlichen Theologie*, in which he brought together, in one great work, contributions on all branches of theology from conservative leaders. In it he urges upon the German Church a strictly confessional theology. His position is so strictly conservative that certain others, who are regarded as orthodox, consider him ultra-conservative. His conception of what the expression "confessional theology" means, can be got from the following quotation from his *Handbuch*, 3rd Ed., Vol. I, p. 15, 16:

"We demand a theology that is governed by the Confessions, or, more briefly, a symbolical theology. As a matter of course the standpoint thus designated does not exclude the right of free

movement and a critical attitude toward the church symbols. Neither does the confessional theologian of to-day need bind himself to the exegetical or historical method of proof, which the authors of these writings used according to the condition of learning in their time; nor do all the details of their dogmatic construction have binding authority for him; nor is he obliged to retain the harsh polemic tones, the anathemas, the 'damnamus' of those doctrinal testimonies of the sixteenth century toward those whose faith was different. The symbols themselves lay no claim to such absolute binding authority even to the letter. They attribute the authority of inspiration to Holy Scripture only."

The Formula of Concord distinguishes between the chief authority of Scripture, *norma normans*, and the derived authority of the symbols, *norma normata*. "And the new theological defenders of the just claim of the Symbols are of the same opinion. Even Dr. Ferd. Philippi [son of Prof. Philippi], in a pamphlet published on the three-hundredth anniversary of the completing of the Book of Concord (*Die Notwendigkeit und Verbindlichkeit des kirchlichen Bekenntnisse*), declares as binding and permanently normative in the confessional documents, not their external, exegetic, historic form, or the details of their lively discussions, but their doctrinal system. And he is not ready to consider this symbolical doctrinal system as beyond all possibility of improvement or development." Zoekler, p. 16.

9. Dr. Von Scheele, the Swedish Bishop and professor of the ology in Upsala, is recognized as a very conservative Lutheran. The fact that he was chosen to contribute the treatise on *Christian Symbolics* in Zoekler's *Handbuch* classes him at once with the pronounced conservative Lutheran scholars of the day. In Zoekler's *Handbuch der Wissenschaftlichen Theologie*, 3rd. Ed., Vol. 2, p. 699, we read:

"The Church has defined the authority of the Symbols as consisting in this: they have only *auctoritatem normatam*, while the Scriptures alone have *auctoritas normans*. This was intended to express that, though indeed the Symbols have direct-

ive authority for the ecclesiastical activity, Holy Scripture alone has authority to decide as supreme judge in matters of faith. The degree of binding power that the Symbols possess on the basis of this authority is expressed in the well-known sentence, *quia et quatenus cum scriptura sacra consentiunt*, by which is exhibited the conviction that there is essential harmony between the symbols and Holy Scripture as unreservedly as the relative difference that always exists between human and divine things, as we humbly recognize in this. The symbols have authority for the true Church only as *testimonia veritatis*, while Scripture only, as God's Word, remains *aeterna veritas*, the basis of faith. The normative authority of the symbols, which is throughout biblically conditioned, must also be limited by their relation to contemporary history. The symbols must be understood as belonging to their time, so that we must distinguish between their essential part and the form of their content. Only their actual content must be regarded as essential and lasting, while their form must be considered accidental and capable of improvement, and, perhaps in certain instances, needing improvement."

He speaks again on this subject in his *Theologische Symbolik*, Part II. pp., 80, 81. Dr. Zoekler wrote the preface to the German edition, in which he welcomes the book in its German dress and recommends it to students. He sees its great virtue in its "excellent combination of confessional definiteness with broad liberality toward those who believe differently." He says that "the author possesses a reverential holding to the traditional spirit of evangelical liberty and a conscientious preservation of the inheritance of the fathers."

Von Scheele says: "In the interpretation of Scripture, even the fathers are denied the right to interpret the Word of God according to their own understanding and caprice, which belongs to no man, since it needs the explanation of no one. For the Holy Scripture possesses ability to explain itself. The interpretation must, nevertheless, be made in harmony with the rule of faith, *i. e.*, in accordance with the content of the clear and most frequently occurring biblical declarations and the prevail-

ing doctrines of the Church of former times, in so far as they do not contradict the Bible. Even the Symbols, to a certain extent the flower and crown of church doctrine, dare by no means be treated as a legal binding fetter, and dare not be regarded as a new yoke that burdens conscience (*non imprimunt credenda*), but only as a free expression for the scriptural faith of the Church (*exprimunt credita*). But a Church that truly claims and wishes to continue to bear the name of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, must stand firmly by this, that its subscription to the doctrines laid down in the Church does not concern the letter, but only *the peculiar type of Christianity* therein expressed, and the reason for this is, we know and we are certain that this type is true and genuine in every essential, and therefore cannot be given up without at the same time giving up Christianity."

10. Bishop Martensen is regarded as the greatest theologian of the Danish Lutheran Church of the last century. He was primate for almost thirty years, and exercised a wide and important influence. Kurtz says that his *Christian Dogmatics* is of a thoroughly Lutheran type. Frank recognized him as a good Lutheran, in spite of certain Hegelian and mystic elements in his system. Luthardt classes him among those who represent revived confessional Lutheranism in the last century. Other leaders mentioned in this list are Sartorius, Philippi, Thomasius and Frank. In his *Christian Dogmatics*, pp. 54, 55, we find the following:

"If, now, we ask in what sense ecclesiastical symbols have a canonical character in relation to dogmatics, the answer is—they have it as being *normae normatae*, or *quia et quatenus cum sacra scriptura consentiunt*. By the first of these specifications (*quia*) we would indicate the essential oneness of church doctrines with biblical doctrines; by the second (*quatenus*) that there is nevertheless a relative difference between the ecclesiastical and the Christian, between the letter of the symbols and their spirit, between form and idea. Accordingly, in announcing that we intend to adhere not only to the oecumenical symbols, but also to the creed of the Lutheran Church, particularly as this is given

in the Augsburg Confession, we mean thereby that we intend to hold to that type of sound doctrine which is therein contained being convinced that we are in this way most sure of preserving our connection with the Apostolic Church. We do not regard the Lutheran Confession as a work of inspiration; yet no more do we regard it as a mere work of man, inasmuch as the age of the Reformation had a special vocation to bear testimony and put forth confessions, just as had those periods of the Church in which the earlier creeds were formed. We make a distinction between type and formula. By the type of Lutheranism, we mean its ground form, its inextinguishable, fundamental, and distinctive features. As we recognize in a man or in a people an inward peculiarity, an impress, which belongs to them from eternity, never appearing in perfect clearness in time, and yet recognizable even amidst temporal imperfections; so we can detect in the Christian Confessions a church individuality, a fundamental abiding form, which, amid change and growth, is constantly reproducing itself; whereas the theological formulae in which this form is expressed are more or less characterized by relativity and transitoriness. To wish to canonize formulae and the letters in the symbols, betrays a defective view of history; for the symbols originated in the midst of great movements of particular periods, and in various ways exhibit the traces of the peculiar theological culture, the peculiar needs and defects of those times. We know very well how scandalously the distinction between 'spirit and letter,' 'idea and form,' may be abused; but this abuse will not prevent its proper and necessary use. And a candid consideration will always lead to the conviction that the chief importance to be attached is not to the formulae, but to the fundamental conceptions of the Church.

"Therefore, while dogmatic science on the one hand holds to the church creeds a relation of dependence, it must, on the other hand, in this relation be free to pass critical judgments on the formulae of the Symbols, and also to exhibit the fundamental ideas contained in these Symbols in a fresh form, corresponding to the present stage of the development of the Church and of theology."

11. Frank of Erlangen was probably the ablest conservative Lutheran theologian of the century just closed. He was a thorough confessional Lutheran, but advocated progress on the basis of the old dogmatic theology. He sought "a new way to teach old truth." In him the conservative Erlangen school reached its zenith of excellence and power. His influence was felt over all Germany, and it was always in the interests of confessional Lutheranism. In a letter to Dr. Richard, Gettysburg, Pa., dated Jan. 9th, 1893, he writes:

"We know ourselves at home in our Church, not as slaves, who are servilely bound to the letter of the confessions, much less to the theology of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but as free and willing sons, who know the meaning of our fathers, and feel ourselves inwardly at one with them. Hence we know how to distinguish between the substance of the Confession, which is to be ascertained historically by reference to the antitheses, and the many accidental additions, which unavoidably attach themselves to it, and are not obligatory upon us. To these belong, for instance, the explanations of particular passages of Scripture, as Jas., 2., the lugging in of the Aristotelian categories in the article of original sin, and the false citations and the like."

In his *System der christlichen Sittlichkeit*, Sec. 29, thesis at beginning of Sec., we read: "When on the one hand, faith, and on the other, the realization of the blessing of salvation, which faith requires, determines the activity of the congregation, and consequently, of the clergy, there lies therein the necessity of a definite confession, which arises, from that internal moral activity of the congregation, and to which the clergy are morally bound. The manner in which the Confession is set forth is determined according to the requirements which are made of faith by the special condition and environment of the congregation. The measure of authority of such confessions, especially for the clergy, grows out of those premises." That is, since we must have a definite confession, for the reasons given above, it is binding, but since the form was due to the condition under which the faith was confessed, in other words,

since the Confession is the expression, not only of divinely wrought faith, but also, to a certain necessary degree, of the moral and theological environment of the confessors, we must recognize in it certain accidental elements, which cannot be regarded as binding. Frank devotes some pages to the necessity of a confession and its binding power for the Church; but he is careful to distinguish between "the outer form," "in which the unseen essence of faith clothes itself, and the faith confessed." He speaks of "human, individual, temporal limitations" of the Confessions, but adds that since the Confession sprung from a living faith, it has something in it that will last. On p. 46, in speaking of the moral binding power, under which the ministry is constituted and maintained, he says: "It is plain, that it is just as impossible on the one hand, that it be bound to fixed and lasting forms, as that, on the other hand, it dispense with its ground-work, from which the common moral activity in the congregation originates. For this thought substitutes a mechanism for an organism, a fiction for a reality, the dogmas of a man for the liberty that God intended."

And now that we may show that the views of the great theological leaders of Germany, are reflected in the official life of the Church there, we quote two representative forms of subscription, made by the clergy at their ordination.

Schleswig-Holstein. "I, the subscriber, affirm and promise before God and upon the Holy Gospel, that, by the Grace of God, in the office of teaching entrusted to me, I will faithfully abide by the true doctrine of the Divine Word as the same is derived from Holy Scripture and is summarized in the unaltered Augsburg Confession, and will preach and teach the same pure and uncorrupted, and with the utmost diligence will avoid all conflicting doctrines, and will administer the Holy Sacraments according to the divine appointment."

Saxony. This form was adopted when the great Leipzig trio, Luthardt, Delitzsch and Kahn, swayed the councils of the Church in Saxony.

"I promise before God to teach and preach purely, according to best knowledge and conscience, the Gospel of Christ as the

same is contained in the Holy Scriptures, and is witnessed in the first unaltered Augsburg Confession, and also in the other confessional writings of the Evangelical Lutheran Church."

There is no uncertain sound about these quotations. Lengthy explanations are superfluous. That which they say concerning the binding authority of the Confessions is very definite, and the agreement of these authorities with each other is almost absolute. The common teaching of these great confessional Lutheran theologians form a high court of appeal for testing this question. The verdict should be final for the generation in which they live. The teaching of these great men can be summed up best in their own words.

There are certain "details" in the confession that should not be binding on the ministry (Bengel). "The normative authority of the Confessions includes only the substance of faith of the same, not the theological setting" (Kahnis). We need "come to an understanding again only in regard to the great groundwork and fundamental thoughts of the Confessions" (Thomasius). There are elements in the symbols that form no part of the "essential obligatory substance;" "the truths of faith," "The *articuli fidei*," are the "confessional substance of the symbols in among the incidental circumscriptions" (Sartorius). In Wuertemberg it is deemed sufficient for a man to subscribe to "the Evangelical system of doctrine as contained in the Augsburg Confession." In the Confessions there are "utterances" in the "realm of theology" that have no authority (Jacoby). Only "actual material agreement with the doctrine of a particular Church * * * can be demanded of a preacher." "Even of teachers only an honest and hearty agreement in all the fundamental articles of the Evangelical doctrine, should be demanded" (Philippi). Only the "doctrinal system" of the Confessions is binding. "Their external, exegetic, historic form" is not "permanently normative" (Ferd. Philippi and Zoeckler). "We must distinguish between their essential part and the form of their content. Only their actual content must be regarded as essential and lasting, while their form must be considered accidental and capable of improvement, and perhaps in certain

instances, needing improvement." The Church that would bear the name Lutheran, must stand firmly by this, "that its subscription does not concern the letter but only the *peculiar type of Christianity* therein expressed." (Von Scheele). By adhering to the Augsburg Confession "we mean thereby that we intend to hold to that type of sound doctrine which is therein contained. We make a distinction between type and formula. By the type of Lutheranism we mean its ground form, its inextinguishable, fundamental and distinctive features" (Martensen). "We know how to distinguish between the substance of the Confession * * * and the many accidental additions that unavoidably attach themselves to it, and are not obligatory upon us." We must distinguish between the "outer form" "in which the essence of faith clothes itself" and the faith itself. To bind a man "to fixed and lasting forms" is substituting "the dogmas of man for the liberty that God intended" (Frank).

CONCLUSIONS.

From the matter presented we come to the following conclusions :

1. These conservative leaders of the Lutheran Church in Germany agree absolutely in recognizing two elements in the Confessions, that are best expressed by the terms "form" and "content." The confessors had faith before they made their confession, and that faith was called forth and sustained by the doctrines of the Divine Word—in fact it was the Divine Word chrystalized and objectivized in the heart-life and thought-life of the individual. But when they sought expression for the doctrines of the Divine Word thus wrought into faith, *i. e.*, when they confessed, they could not free themselves from the terms and science of their day, and from their religious and theological environment. Therefore every confession of faith, though correct, has, of necessity, certain features that must be regarded as mere accidentals, and not as forming a part of the faith-content of the confession.

2. They also show perfect agreement in regarding only the faith-content as binding the person subscribing to the Confes-

sion. This is the "essential" the "fundamental," the "real credo," the "*articuli fidei*." The non-essentials, the "external form," dare not be regarded as binding. They are only the covering for the real essence of faith within. We are to be bound by the faith, of course in the present statement, so long as we do not have a better one, but not by the form. Lutherans of to-day should accept the faith of the fathers, but not necessarily their theology in all its details. In the Augsburg Confession there are essentials and non-essentials, fundamentals and non-fundamentals. In order to be in the Church of the Reformation we must accept the former, but we are not bound by the latter

3. Between this view of confessional obligation and the view advanced in Dr. Parson's article there is a contrast so marked that it is nothing short of an absolute contradiction. These Lutheran authorities say: We accept the Augsburg Confession only as to "the substance of faith," "the essence of faith," "fundamental thoughts," "the fundamental articles," or in language borrowed from the confessional life of the General Synod, They accepted the Augsburg Confession as a correct exhibition, etc. Dr. Parson says: "Beside such a statement that the difference between the Holy Scripture and all other writings will be preserved, how exceedingly grotesque appear the vaporings of some of our modern recensionists, who declare: 'We accept the Augsburg Confession only as a fundamental doctrines.'" It is absolutely impossible that both of these positions be correct. If Dr. Parson be right, our German authorities are wrong. But if these great Lutheran authorities, than whom no greater can be named in the 19th century, are right, Dr. Parson is wrong, fundamentally wrong, absolutely wrong. In fact he must be so far wrong that his position if wrought into the life of the Church, would substitute for the depth and breadth of the noble denominational life of the great Lutheran Church a shallow and narrow sectarianism, that would make twentieth century church life the slave of sixteenth century theology, so fettered in confessional forms that the faith of the fathers, instead of having a

life of progress toward greater things, would be forced into a living death.

4. The General Council's position on confessional subscription is just as much out of harmony with the position of these great men. And there is no possible way of harmonizing these positions. Each position flatly contradicts the other. The General Council has gone beyond the position of any recognized authority in Germany, and stands for a narrow Lutheranism sectarianized on the basis of the seventeenth century orthodoxism. Theoretically it is well acquainted with the Lutheran confessional revival of the last century; but practically it ignores many of its essential features. To it *the pure Lutheran doctrine* does not extend beyond the seventeenth century. With its "true, native, original and only sense" interpretation of the Symbols, the General Council cuts loose from the present conservative Lutheranism of the Fatherlands, and fosters separatistic narrowness.

5. The agreement of these noted Lutherans with the General Synod conception of confessional obligation is no less marked. In fact about the only difference between the two seems to be that they speak and live in Germany, while we speak and live in America. Not only their thought, but in many instances their language is identical with that of our formula. This means that the General Synod with its present form of subscription, as it has always been interpreted, plants itself squarely on the same basis with the confessional Lutheran Church of Germany. If we are not confessional Lutherans, they cannot be, for they and we regard the Confessions in the same light.

FINALLY.

The situation is simply this: We are invited to abandon nineteenth century confessional Lutheranism for sixteenth and seventeenth century theology, and are criticised for not doing so. Dr. Parson would turn the hands back on the confessional dial-plate to the first two centuries of our Church's history, and would declare that they point to the hour now striking. But the General Synod binds herself to the *faith*, not to the *theology*,

of the fathers, and thus fosters a spirit of progressive conservatism, which is an "excellent combination of confessional definiteness with broad liberality toward those who believe differently," and which exhibits "a reverential holding to the traditional spirit of evangelical liberty and a conscientious preservation of the inheritance of the fathers" (Zoeckler).

ARTICLE VII.

THE CHURCH AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF OUR DAY.

BY REV. EDGAR GRIM MILLER, A. M.

In both theological and social thought, the present is an age of reconstruction and readjustment. In theology, with us, the problem is not so much with respect to the system of doctrine, or any particular doctrines which have come down to us, as it is in the terminology which in some instances has become antiquated, and here and there liable to misunderstanding. Stripping it of its scholastic dress, and clothing it in modern garb, ordinarily is sufficient. The social readjustment, and the consequent readjustment of the methods of Christian work, are not so easily accomplished. Here it is not simply a matter of terminology, but of new conditions. Old problems come down to us, but so altered in form and relations, as to be practically new, while new ones confront us on every side.

The revolution wrought by the introduction of steam and electricity; the marvels of invention and machinery; the rapidity of transportation of persons and freight; the swift transmission of news; the consequent change in the manner of men's life and way of thinking; the bringing into close relations every type of man and life, putting them under new conditions with no time for adjustment or assimilation; the liberation of thought, the tremendous strides in science; all these have created problems which the Church has never had to meet before, and which require a large readjustment of the thinking, as well as of the methods inherited from the past. Old methods which served

their purpose a century or even a generation ago, utterly fail to meet the requirements of the present, and they impose grave and urgent social problems which the Church must meet and solve, if it is to do its work aright.

As Christians we can meet them with an unfaltering faith in the gospel as the key for the solution of them all. The Church is established on a rock against which the gates of hell shall not prevail. We accept all the truths and teachings of Jesus Christ as unfailingly and unalterably true. But we must remember that it is as easy now as it was in the days of the Master's ministry to teach for doctrines the traditions of men, and that, with respect to such traditions, whether they be human interpretations of Scripture, or long established, time-honored customs of the Church, they are proper subjects for rigid scrutiny and may be modified or changed for better adaptation to advancing conditions in the Church's mission. The revelation of God has been progressive—first the barest outlines of his character and of human duty, then, gradually, fuller and more spiritual, until the Law and the Prophets were completed by the teaching of Christ. On the night of the betrayal a promise was given, that the Spirit should lead the Apostles and their followers into all the truth, as they should "be able to bear it." It was that promise which made Christianity a living thing, adapted to all ages and all peoples. God's word, in the divine plan, was made to Christians what the world has been to the human race. The world was an unexplored field with mines covered, and nature, in her workings, one vast mystery. As men have been able to use them, her secrets have been revealed to the study and labor of man. Things that our forefathers passed by unnoticed have become our richest heritage, because we have read their meaning and value. The world has not changed, but knowledge of it has grown; the fear that came of ignorance has passed away, and our understanding of it, and methods of dealing with it have been adapted to the wider knowledge and new conditions. So the Scriptures have revealed richer and richer depths of truth as men have studied them, and the need for those truths has arisen. The wisdom of Christ has

been justified, and has shown itself more precious, as we have learned its fuller meaning and wider application, and read with modern eyes the message which it holds. The Reformation did not change God's word. No more will the sifting of the later statements of his truth. The essentials will stand, as they have stood, unshaken; and though some wood, hay and stubble of human interpretation be burned away in the testing by fire, the precious building material will be but the more firmly evident and assured.

With this understanding of the temper of our study, our next step is a clear conception of the sense in which we speak of the Church, and an inquiry into its proper function and limitations. There are a number of terms which need to be defined

The Church is the original body of believers, known by that name, possessing and using the Word and the Sacraments. *The Pulpit*, we will use generically for the clergy. *The Kingdom of God* is something wider than the Church, something which the Church is to be a factor in extending and developing, but not itself the Church. Dr Josiah Strong in his late monograph tersely defines it as "Christ's social ideal." Realized it will be the world when righteousness shall prevail, the gospel be law, Christ be King indeed, and all men live as brethren, organized for the common good. Even now we speak of it as existing in partial development, and embracing, as its agencies, all forces for good, whether Christian or simply moral, irrespective of their connection with the Church as an organization. *Christianity* is the religion, the vital truth, the faith, which furnishes motive for all. It is the spirit of the Church, of the pulpit and of the kingdom of God; the truth or doctrine by which the Church works, which the pulpit preaches, and through which the kingdom of God is established. *Social Problems* are all the questions which are involved in the social relations of life—the relations of man to man, and the conditions or things which effect him. *The Social Problem*, technically so known, is the adjustment of society so that all men shall have their proper place and rights among their fellows, the proper return for their labor, and fair opportunity for success and happiness.

With this understanding of terms we are prepared for the question: *What is the function of the Church?* The briefest answer, yet one which will itself require explanation and definition, is, that it is to extend the kingdom of Christ on earth, and win souls for heaven. Another answer and perhaps a better one, is that it is to carry on the work of Christ in its entirety, adopting and adapting his truth and methods. We must bear in mind that the Church as an organization is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. It is not an institution whose first and greatest aim is its own extension and glory. It is rather the organized army of the kingdom of God on earth, unique only in that every citizen of the kingdom should be enrolled in its active ranks in some capacity. Its service is to extend the borders of the kingdom, and carry its triumphant standard into all the earth, to repel attacks, to overthrow the strongholds of evil, and to make of each man who surrenders a loyal soldier in its own ranks.

Now a bit of ancient history. The Church was born, at the calling of the twelve. It received its baptism on the day of Pentecost. Its commission was partially given it when the twelve were first sent out: "As ye go, preach, saying, the kingdom of heaven is at hand. Heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, cast out devils; freely ye have received, freely give." The final commission added to the other the duty of making disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and teaching them to observe and do all things that he had commanded them.

Notice that, except for the form of the baptism, it was to do precisely what the Master had been doing through all his ministry. There was no limiting of the work to purely spiritual functions. There was no distinction ever made by Christ between "sacred" and "secular." He was to be the Saviour from all of the curse of the fall. According to his teaching, the entire life is to be considered holy, and the body the temple of the Holy Ghost. Physical wants and needs belong to life as ordered by God himself. The various relations of man to his fellows are all part of the divine plan of righteousness, order and love. It

includes good government for the nations, just rulers and magistrates, the well-being of the community, with its manifold civic duties and responsibilities, as truly as the purities of piety and the sanctities of the family. Weakness and want, pain and suffering, sickness, disease and death, all are treated as features of the confusion and ruin wrought by sin, and to be touched by the reign of divine grace and truth. Christ announced himself as the Saviour of the world, in the broadest sense. We limit his mission when we make him the Saviour only of the souls of men. And it is because it has been so limited, that the Church, in conducting its work, has failed in half of her mission, and developed a one-sidedness in religion which is responsible for much of the alienation from her which is found in so many quarters, particularly among the laboring classes. Wherever there was need the Master met it with help. He fed the hungry, healed the sick, gave sight to the blind, cleansed the lepers, as well as preached the Gospel. He went about doing good as well as speaking gracious words. Often the temporal need was provided for before the spiritual need was hinted at. The physical was made the gate to the spiritual, a means of attaining the higher end.

Another characteristic of Christ's work and teaching, one which seems startling, when first formulated in words, is its present-worldness, *i. e.*, it concerned itself directly with life, not with death or the future state, except as life is a preparation for what is to come. The future is spoken of as a reality. Definite promises are made concerning it, but it is kept comparatively in the background. Right living as the result of right faith, is the thing which is brought to the front. Christ's work and teaching are to bring to pass here, in the hearts and lives of men, a "kingdom of righteousness," a kingdom to "come on earth," and to rescue human life from the evil one, redeeming all our social relations as well as personal character.

A third distinctive feature, is the way in which the second table of the law is given equal emphasis with the first. A formal tendency gave direction to the religious thought of the Master's day. The temple service and obedience to the cere-

monial law, were the things emphasized as the greater part of of religion. The traditions of the elders and the hair-splitting distinctions of the Rabbis, made life a burden, while the second table of the Law, in any binding sense, beyond the letter of the commands, was practically ignored by all but the more spiritual few.

Christ did not abate one whit the obligation which man owes to God—rather emphasized it, and deepened the import of it. But he brought out of its oblivion, and gave its true place as a co-ordinate duty, the obligation to one's fellowmen, and the principle of brotherhood. He summed up duty to God and man by the one magic word "love," challenging the lawyers of the Jews to find one duty not included in that word.

Passing from Christ's ministry and work to that of the Apostles, we find the same characteristics. There is now a Church, organized, or in process of organization.

The Apostles considered their first duty to be the preaching of the gospel; yet they continued the miraculous healing of the sick and the giving of physical aid to the needy. Soon they found that the temporal needs of the people took too much of their time, and calling the brethren together on the ground that it "it was not meet that they should leave the word of God and serve tables," yet acknowledging that work as a part of the Church's duty, they instituted a new order in the Church for this specific purpose.* We cannot, at that early date, look for any regularly developed philanthropic system, planned for alleviating the suffering in the heathen world as such, but we do find help given, as it had been by the Master, without reference to faith or merit, simply on the ground of Christian love and charity; while the religion which was taught was to the last degree practical, instilling *great principles* which very soon began to show their results, not only in the lives of the converts, but in the moral tone of communities, and in the relations of man to man. Social problems as such, were not recognized, but the most glaring wrongs that existed in society, the most cruel features of slavery, the barbarous sports of the arena, the

*Acts 6 : 1-6.

exposure of infants, and the shameless immoralities which prevailed, slowly gave way before the influence of the cross, often, no doubt, without the part of the Church or Christianity being fully understood or recognized. It was bidden: "Go teach," and it went in the Spirit and power of the Master, taking up the whole work which he had been doing. Teaching was to lead to faith, faith to works, works to teaching again; and so on in an endless series of ameliorations, reproducing itself in geometrical progression. It was the natural working out of a law for the rectification of inter-human relations—a law not itself distinctly formulated—though really in force, as unquestionably accepted and acted upon. In so far as the Church had ability to do good and render aid, it was exercised. There was no stopping to ask whether this or that was a *churchly* function, but it was assumed that help, whether spiritual or physical, which was in its power to render, became duty, and was in line with it legitimate work. It alone could furnish the motives which would lead to such acts.

We have no concern with the intervening ages. We are seeking merely to find what was Christ's commission to the Church, and how his early followers understood it, in order to grasp the principles which must define the functions of that same Church today. We can be guided only by principles. The manner of their application must depend on the conditions existing where the work is to be done.

What then should be the function of the Church to-day? Precisely, in its essential principles, what it was in the days of Christ and the Apostles. It is to advance the kingdom of God by securing the ascendancy of all the regenerating truth and ethical teachings of the gospel, through education and example, helping the whole of man.

In our applications of these principles, we must remember the wonderfully changed conditions since the days of the Apostles. Then the Christian influence and every Christian movement could readily be traced to its source in the Church. Now Christianity is the norm of the thought and virtue of the civil-

ized world. Christian standards are universally accepted and Christian influences are operative where least expected. Men, in continually increasing numbers, act more or less under an indirect influence of Christ's teaching, who never enter a church. The Christian principles in our common atmosphere, life and conscience have moulded them, and they not only coöperate with Christians, but often take the initiative in work which in early days would have belonged to the Church itself. It is the gradual development of this condition, and the consequent taking up of so many phases of helpful activity by agencies outside of the Church, that is largely the cause of the prevalent narrow conception of the Church. We must cease to feel that great movements for the uplifting of humanity are not from the Church, because not directly by the Church, and that the Church may therefore hold aloof from them. These strivings after ameliorations, coming indirectly from Christianity, should suggest to the Church the need of grasping more fully the magnitude of its mission, and of freeing itself from every trace of the traditionalism which limits that mission to the immediate concerns of the soul, and looks with distrust on any reaching out to influence and help men directly in the affairs of their ordinary relations.

With this broad view of the Church's function we must compare the prevalent views of its proper activity and their practical results.

On the one hand, we have what may be called the traditional view within the Church. It accepts the Church, as it is, as doing practically all that can be expected of it. It conceives that all duty is done by a congregation, when provision is made, through a pastor, for regular Sabbath and mid-week services, and the visitation of the parish; when a Sunday School, catechetical class and Young People's Society are maintained, a few poor families, more or less nearly connected with it, provided for and kept from suffering, and some coöperative mission work is done. Through these channels it is expected to awaken sinners, win souls, build up character and carry on its charities. These are supposed to be its only functions and proper methods

of work. Anything outside of this time-honored rut, anything for the direct benefit of the community, or even for the elevation of individuals except along purely spiritual lines, is looked upon with distrust, if not with positive disfavor, as being an unjustifiable innovation, dangerous in its tendencies, threatening the dignity, if not the existence of the ancient order. A prominent representative of the older methods is quoted by Dr. Strong as saying: "The Church has no business with a man's dirty face, or with his naked back, or with his empty stomach. The Church has just one business with a man, and that is to save his soul."* And, after touching on the same false notion, Dr. Hall says: "It is pitiful to see how the churchly mind seems to regard the slightest social innovation, as a possible attack upon the institutions with which it is identified."† This is fairly representative of a large conservative class within the Church, who are as insistent for what they deem orthodoxy of method and expression (if the term may be used in that sense), as they are for orthodoxy of doctrine; and in the one, as in the other, "orthodoxy" means, principally, the traditional way or expression to which they have been accustomed. It is this that goes far toward accounting for the Church's loss of influence. The Church becomes something aloof from the general interests of mankind, fails to touch closely the general life of the people, and, consequently, fails in the purpose for which it exists. It accomplishes only in isolated cases, and in indirect ways, what it should be doing as a mighty force on a grand scale. Bishop Potter, in the preface to Judson's "Institutional Church," says: "I shall be recreant to my duty if I did not declare that the large remoteness of those who represent Christ and the Church from any intimate or frequent contact with those they serve, is one of the most grotesque incongruities, one of the most absolutely indefensible inconsistencies of our modern civilization. Do I hear some one say that this has been the method of the Church here and elsewhere from time immemorial? Then I say, so much the worse for the Church." But the difficulty is

*"Religious Movements for Social Betterment."

†"Social Meaning of Modern Religious Movements in England."

not only in remoteness of contact with those they serve, but remoteness of contact with the thoughts and interests of those they serve. There is too much dwelling on the mount, and in the clouds, instead of laboring down in the valleys, casting out demons by fasting, *i. e.*, self sacrifice and prayer. And, be it said to our shame, the acceptance of the standards and class distinctions of the world, adds to this remoteness, and places a gulf, real and difficult to bridge, between the Church and great masses of those whom it should win.

Here it becomes necessary to introduce an idea that has been repugnant to American sentiment, from the birth of the nation. The Declaration of Independence broadly declared it to be a self-evident truth that "all men are created equal." The statement has become a sort of national shibboleth, in spite of the manifest fact that the equality extends no further than that all "are endowed with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Theoretically we repudiate the idea of class distinctions. Practically they are recognized everywhere; and from a sociological standpoint we must deal with them as facts. The cleavage, with us, is along new lines. For an hereditary aristocracy, we have exchanged parallel aristocracies of wealth and culture; and while the gulf separating the various classes is not as difficult to cross as in monarchical countries, the lines of demarcation are growing more clearly defined and divisive each year. Class problems are here. Classes, with strong class feelings, have become realities of which account has to be taken. The conception of the Church which we have been criticising, is not, in this sense, a class conception, but the same conception, only slightly modified, is held as a class idea, by an increasing element of our population, though from a totally different standpoint; and it has resulted in the alienation of a large portion of the laboring classes, particularly in the great cities—an alienation which, in some quarters, has become positive antagonism. It is a remarkable fact, however, and full of food for thought, that not in one instance but in many, in meetings of these people, while the mention of the Church is met with hisses, the name of Christ

received with reverence or with cheers, and Christ himself is hailed as the friend of the laboring man. In the halls of the Paris Communists of 1850, pictures of the Master were found on the walls, inscribed: "The first Representative of the People." The Church, as an organization, is conceived by these men as a class institution, with which they have nothing in common; something whose interest in them is of the nature of a trap, which has been used in the past to make the laborer content with his condition while those over him exploited his rightful earnings—a thing whose function is purely spiritual, offering that for which they feel no need, and in which they do not believe. The men who hold this position believe that the Church cannot touch their lives without leaving its legitimate sphere and ceasing to be a Church. Nor can it be denied that their conception of the Church's functions, is accepted, almost in toto, from the Church's own conception of itself.

The fault rests back, as it has done a score of times before, on a false presentation of religion. The recoil from the Church in the French Revolution was a recoil from what the people had been taught was religion. Much of the atheism of Italy to-day is from a similar cause. Ingersol's quarrel with Christianity was largely a recoil from the harsh doctrines of Calvinism. So, now, this defection among certain classes is not so much from the essential truths of the Christian religion, as it is from the *Church*, as it is seen from their view-point. It is not from the Church according to the Christian ideal, but as it stands in our towns and cities, particularly in the great cities.

Prof. Wyckoff, now of Princeton University, gives the reply of a young mechanic, with whom he was associated in Chicago, to an invitation to attend Church. It shows the attitude of many of the working class toward the Church, and the distinction between town and city conditions in this respect. We will quote it in full: "Look here, John, it's all right, you asking me to go to church, but I ain't going. I used to go regular when I lived to home, altho I ain't no church member. It was different out there, for most everybody went to church, and chipped in what they could, and everybody sat where they liked, and it

wasn't one man's church more than another's. You go to church if you like. That's your own business. But I ain't going to no one-horse mission chapel that the rich has put so they won't be bothered with the poor in their own churches. You say they treat you well when you go to church on Michigan Avenue. I don't doubt it. What reason would they have for not treating you well? But all the same, they take you in for charity, for you couldn't pay for a seat in one of them churches. No sir, the rich folks build their churches for themselves, and I ain't never going to interfere with that arrangement. I don't mind going to the meetings of the Association, once in a while, for there's fellows of your own kind there, and you hear some good speaking and singing. I ain't got much use even for that, for it's only a side show, run mostly by the rich, but I ain't got no use at all for your churches."* This was given as typical of the feelings of a large class; a class not yet antagonistic, but only indifferent, resenting the attitude of the people of the Church, rather than opposing the Church as an organization. Taking the wealthy, fashionable churches as types of all, shows lack of discrimination, but it shows, too, that all of the churches had failed to present religion in such a way as to make this man or his class feel that it meant more to them than having "good singing and speaking." From this attitude, the next step is real and bitter antagonism, denouncing the work of the Church as priestcraft, and the Church itself as a tool of the rich used to keep the proletariat in subjection. As a rule it is in the immigrant from priest-ridden European countries, where the Church stands for oppression and repression, and, with the nobles, grinds the poor under foot, while doing nothing for their temporal uplift, that the apostle of such teaching is found. Nor is it to be wondered at, that when this is the only kind of Christianity known, it inspires hate, so soon as superstitious love is dead.

Between the conservative churchly conception, and this avowedly anti-churchly position, there is a trend from the one and from the other to a common mean, which looks forward to the better realization of the kingdom of God on earth, in which

*"The Workers—The West."

the church, modified in its working, but unchanged in its essential teaching, shall be the effective power. The true function of the Church is to bring the kingdom of God on earth, as truly as it is to win and save immortal souls. Philanthropy, instead of being something outside of religion, is an essential part of it. It has its dynamic in Christianity. It is Christianity in action. Pres. Ely declares that "Christianity is primarily concerned with this world and its mission is to redeem all our social relations."*

From the means by which the kingdom of God is to be realized, we turn to the material on which it must work—the world as it is to day. It is more than an aggregation of men of various degrees of intelligence and morality. It carries a seething mass of problems, now one question, now another pushing itself to the front. Some of the things are new, brought into existence by the changed conditions of modern life. Some are old as humanity itself. Others are old as facts, but new as problems, accepted heretofore as parts of life, unfortunate but real; now looked upon as diseases of the body politic, for which men are seeking the cause in order that they may find the remedy.

How much times and conditions of life have changed, we cannot realize until we begin to compare the opening of the nineteenth century with what we have to-day. Then, as means of locomotion, there was the horse and sailing vessel, now the bicycle, automobile, trolley and swift express, the ocean greyhound and the massive battleship. Then, irregular mails by courier and packet, now an international system, employing the swiftest transportation, while the telegraph and telephone bring all parts of the world into instant communication. Then the wind-mill, water-wheel, and a few rude engines furnished all the power for manufacture, not supplied by beasts and human brawn; now, steam and electricity multiply the possibilities of production beyond all calculation. Then each man could be an independent producer, owning all the implements of his trade, and doing every process of manufacture himself; now the machinery is in many cases so extensive and expensive, that many men must combine in its ownership, and the work-

*Social Aspects of Christianity.

men perform each but a simple step in the course of production. Then science was in its infancy. One man might be master of the whole realm of knowledge. Now he does well if he can recount its achievements, and becomes master of a single specialty. Then the barber was also surgeon and dentist, and the physician knew little beyond the simplest remedies. Now we have the triumphs of antiseptic surgery and the modern treatment of disease, and the eradication of the cause. Knowledge was confined to the few who thought for the many. It was learned from books expensively printed on hand presses. Now each man thinks for himself, and however crude his thought, stands ready to defend it against the world, while every new discovery is heralded abroad, printed on presses which make thousands of impressions in an hour. The cheapening of production by the introduction of machinery, and the ease of communication have changed the whole relation of men to the world about them and to their fellows. Capital and labor have taken on new meaning. Population has concentrated in the cities. Rural life has been revolutionized, until even the farm has ceased to be isolated. The daily paper brings the news of the world, and, with the mail, is carried to the farm-house door. The telephone, steam heat, electric light, and private water supply, are familiar conveniences, and machinery does the work of scythe and flail.

The Church itself has felt the change, and in place of the Puritan heritage of a religion of fear, in which the sovereignty of God and his just anger with sinners was the principle feature, now we have, even in Calvinistic circles, the Fatherhood of God and his great love as manifested in Christ, as the central thought. Men are won instead of driven, and the brotherhood of man is taught as never taught before. Practical Christianity is emphasized rather than the old doctrinal preaching, enforcing the essential truths of those doctrines and bringing into proper relation both the duty that is owed to God and that which is owed to man. The scope of religion has been widened marvelously. Our understanding of Christ's message has developed with our understanding of the world, and we do the bidding of

our Lord in striving to serve the whole of man, and to lift up humanity from the ruin of the fall.

If the mind is in a whirl from the mere recital of a few of the changes which have come in one short century, it but faintly figures the effect which the changes themselves have had on the people as a whole. A single one of the greater changes would have made necessary a readjustment of relations and of thought, which would of itself have been revolutionary. All coming together too rapidly for particular adjustments, have given us what we have to-day—humanity being rushed on, it knows not whither, seeking to find its bearings as it goes, and striving to settle into some relations that may enable it to live to the best advantage under the new conditions. No soldier sees more of the battle than that part engaged in which his own command is. That is his battle, and each movement follows the other in natural order. Victory or defeat is a question of his own special standpoint. It is when he detaches himself for a while, and, from a vantage point, look out over the whole field, that he realizes the tremendous struggle going on, and how much more than his own brigade is involved. Then, if he sees the key to the situation, and victory assured, he goes back to his command, to fight along the lines that his larger view has shown him, confident that even though he fall the victory is sure. That is precisely our attitude to-day. We have been with our own brigade in the army of humanity. Each change, whether personal or social, has come to us naturally, and after a little readjustment, we have gone on under the new conditions. Now we are striving to look out over the field, and learn more of the great struggle that is going on in the world about us, in which others have not fared as well as we; and, from our vantage point as Christians, we recognize that we, and we alone, hold the key to the way to victory. Our part is to apply the facts which we have learned, though it may mean a change of plan and tactics and method, and a readjustment of our thinking. And though it should lead through fierce struggle, in which we perchance may fall, we see the final victory and the establishment of

Christ's kingdom on the earth, through the Church which he has established, working as he would have it work. Perhaps our view will show us that in the past we have not only failed in, but ignored, duties which now seem most obvious, and have left to others what was part of our commission.

The Christian man to-day, and particularly the Christian minister, needs a broad view of the world as it is, a broad view of the Church and its mission, a strong faith in the gospel he professes, and in the Master whom he serves. He needs a brave heart and an unfaltering trust, if he would meet the demands of these times and rightly bear to doubting, struggling, needy humanity the message that salvation is for all of man, as well as for all men, and that men must live as brethren if they would worship God. The Master beckons onward, and still says: "Follow me."

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

ARTICLE VIII.

CURRENT THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

I.

ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

By REV. M. COOVER, A. M.

The Keswick idea of spiritual life, which arose a quarter of a century ago in England, is now making itself particularly felt in this country through the Moody School. The movement directly and indirectly has called forth numerous recent works on the subject of the Holy Spirit.

Among the most significant are: Kuyper's *Work of the Holy Spirit*; Adamson's *Spirit of Power*; Clark's *Paraclete*; and Walker's *Spirit and the Incarnation*.

In 1874 a conference was called at Oxford, England, for the promotion of scriptural holiness. Its sessions were attended by pastors not only from the British Isles, but also from several

continental countries. A second session was held the following year in Brighton. In this conference some diversities of opinion were expressed which led to a division. It was maintained by some that holiness was fully attainable in this life, that sin could be utterly eradicated, and the believer become completely perfect. Others asserted the inability of human nature to become free from the defects of sin and to attain complete holiness. The root of sin still remained, which must be guarded against, and which rendered human perfectionism impossible. This "Root Party" which renounced perfection in holiness withdrew under the leadership of Canon Battersby, an incumbent of Keswick, a district of Western England. Here conferences continue to be held for the promotion of spirituality and the attainment of the higher life and experience through special operations of the Holy Spirit. The infilling of the Spirit is the special teaching, the experience of which each believer in the Keswick idea seeks to attain.

There is nothing peculiar in the fact taught and sought for in experience, but the method of attainment has peculiarities which are awakening the interest of the Christian world.

The difference between what man is and what he ought to be is very great in Christian life. The justified man should be nearer in his experience and character to the condition of righteousness.

The great work of salvation is not completed by putting man judicially right before God, but must continue its operations so as to make the judicial practical. The aim of the Keswick movement is to shorten the road between what the Christian believer is and what he ought to be, to effect a swifter approach from the believer justified to the believer sanctified. The content of sanctification, and the method of reaching the sanctified state become the interesting features of the movement. Sanctification comes as a gift of God. What the believer has alone to do is to prepare himself to receive the gift. The principal elements of preparation are, a deep consciousness of sin, the purification of human motives, and complete consecration of life to God. Selfishness must be eradicated, human effort to ef-

fect holiness must be renounced, and the believer must cast himself completely in trust upon God. The crisis comes when the believer makes complete renunciation of self and casts himself upon God to do the work. This crisis may be called "the second conversion," "the second blessing," "perfect love," or "the entrance into fulness of blessing." This is the condition of sanctification which is to continue in plenitude of power. There is growth, growth in abundance, but this growth is not of human effort or coöperation with divine power. It is an irresistible advance. There is an inner freedom from the law of sin. No more struggle is experienced, the soul calmly grows in perfectness, and sanctification comes irresistibly.

Sanctification is thus taught as a purely divine act, while man's sole part is to yield, trust, and accept. It thus becomes the acceptance of God's righteousness. There is no human resistance, and no effort, only yielding. The only work of man is to try to cease resisting. Here is where theological contention arises. What makes up the content of this "irresistance"? The Keswick theology teaches that sanctification comes as a divine gift, as an infusion. This process does not imply that conduct is not to correspond to the experience of the inner life. But it implies no struggle, no consciousness of inner conflict. The progress of sanctification is assured by the believer just surrendering and accepting. Here then is the vital misconception, which consists in the confusion of sanctification with justification. The predicates of this sanctification are nearly the predicates of justification. In shortening the road between these conditions of salvation the Keswick movement has simply extended the platform of justification to bridge the chasm between what a man is through the relation of his faith, and what he ought to be of inherent character.

Christ is made the believer's sanctification in the same full and unrestricted sense in which he is made his justification. Holiness is no resultant of behavior under spiritual training, but a gift from God. And this gift comes at a certain crisis in the believer's experience, which crisis is reached swiftly and consecutively by a brief series of devotional services. After four or

five days of steps in confession, humiliation, surrender, and consecration, God imparts his gift. The experiences which make the believer receptive of this gift are special seasons of spiritual awakening. Spiritual infilling effects immediate relative holiness.

Another inconsistency manifests itself here in the Keswick teaching. While great stress is laid on the indwelling of Christ, yet when the indwelling Spirit is treated of it is not the spirit of Christ, but the Holy Spirit in his pure and absolute essence that is regarded as communicated to the believer. The believer becomes the incarnation of the divine Absolute. The view of Prof. Milligan expresses the more tenable teaching, that the Spirit that infills the believer is the Holy Spirit as he dwelt in the humanity of Christ. The indwelling Spirit is not the essence or partial infusion of the Absolute Spirit of God, but the Spirit as associated with human nature in the incarnate Christ, namely, the Spirit of Christ. God sends forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts. The Eastern Church rejected the procession of the Spirit from the Son, and separated herself from the rest of Christendom by the refusal to admit a double procession. The best biblical as well as psychological conception of the indwelling divine Spirit in man is the Holy Spirit as he abode in the humanity of Christ. The Spirit proceeding through Christ as the Spirit of Christ takes up his indwelling in man. The idea in its unguarded aspect, that God as a measure of his absolute Being as Spirit dwells in man borders on pantheism, and Hegelian mysticism. Thus the spiritual life which a man has is not really his own, but a derivative of the great All, a portion of the one sole world-consciousness, a conception which makes precarious man's personal consciousness after death. God will indeed be All in All, but not to the annihilation of personal consciousness in man. There is an indwelling divine Spirit, but Spirit adapted to our humanity, whose withdrawal does not deprive us of spiritual existence. You serve God; you serve the Lord Christ; but you do not serve the Holy Spirit. He does not ask our spiritual ministrations. He only asks indwelling.

Fellowship is his office, and that not an exterior relation of association, but an interior life, an indwelling presence. A

spiritual gift is not a something which the Spirit places in the human heart as a self-acting, sanctifying thing. But a spiritual gift is the spirit of Christ in us acting the thing which is called a gift. The fruits of the Spirit are not commodities placed in the believer. They are the product of the Spirit's activity personally in us. They are operations and effects of the *Spirit of Christ* dwelling in the believer.

Spiritual qualities are distinguishable from the Spirit, but are not independent of his personal indwelling. They are inseparable from the abiding Spirit. There is mystery here as elsewhere in divine operations, but nevertheless it is experienced as a fact. God is in us to will and to do, and that indwelling God is the Spirit of the incarnate Christ.

The Lutheran doctrine of the presence of Christ's humanity in the eucharist is frequently misconceived, scouted, and pushed by some to an improper extreme.

Luther did not intend to establish a doctrine of the omnipresence of a literally flesh and blood Christ in an absolute, corporeal sense, but the presence of the glorified humanity in the person of Jesus Christ. It was the tendency of teachers to separate Christ from the operation of the Spirit in the sacrament of the eucharist that stirred Luther's soul into opposition. It was the spiritual communion of an absent Christ that Luther most strenuously denied. The spirit of Christ in the humanity of Christ is present both as sacramental, and as daily operative in the life of the believer. Christ was, is, and ever shall be, the divine man, the God-man, and the Spirit that works in the life of the Christian is the Spirit of Christ, the God-man. From this position of Luther is deduced the true doctrine of the Spirit of God in his relation to the human soul and the vital spiritual life of the Christian. The Spirit present and operative in the believer is not the Holy Spirit apart from the omnipresent Christ, but is the Spirit of the Christ, the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father through the Son.

But the proper teaching of the Spirit's personal work in the believer fell into neglect and became less prominent than it should because of the misuse of the word *grace*. Scholasticism

following in the wake of Augustine applied the term grace to divine exercises and actions, to qualities of soul, and endowments in man. Luther gave the term its proper significance as the free favor of God. Melancthon deprecated the use of the term *grace* to express qualities or habits of the soul, and sought to make general the expression, "work of the Holy Spirit."

"Sacramental grace" is an unfortunate term. Lutheran divines subsequent to Luther failed to take cognizance of the right significance of the word. The Spirit's personal operations became lost to thought through the capable misconception of the "operations of grace" in the believer. But grace is not an operation. It is a disposition in the mind of God. It is not an action, but an attitude. It is God's regard toward the believer in Christ, his attitude of free favor.

The lack of proper prominence being given by the doctrinal leaders of our Church to spiritual indwelling and operation has caused severe criticisms of Lutheran teaching. Prof. Smeaton in his work, *The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*, p. 397, has arraigned our Church severely.

He says: "The Lutheran Church system is such that it does not require the Spirit's work for the application of redemption. What other churches ascribe to the Holy Spirit, the Lutheran Church ascribes to the sacraments and Church ordinances; and these opinions are so diffused through the community, and so dominate the minds of clergy and laity alike, that there remains in reality in the ecclesiastical or theological mind no place for the operations of the Spirit on the individual. Regeneration is identified with baptism. Prayer for the Spirit is deemed superfluous, because the sacraments are always equally replenished with blessings. A new supply or outpouring of the Spirit is, according to them, an English or American extravagance." This has some marked significance for the Church of the Fatherland, and some considerable significance for us. Though Prof. Smeaton misconceives the Lutheran sacramental position, which at bottom is the real question of spiritual operations at issue, yet the same misconception by Lutherans has caused part of the Church to fall into unspiritualness. Gross sacramentalism

on the one hand, and rationalism on the part of doctrinal leaders in Germany, on the other, have eliminated the doctrine of the Spirit's personal relations to the believer, and relegated his work to the realm of seemingly impersonal divine influences. The prominence given in this generation to spiritual baptisms and operations is useful, healthful, and corrective. The Keswick movement teaches us to seek greater spiritual power, though it err in the method of spiritual operations and attainments. Special spiritual baptisms are not operations solely of New Testament times. God is ever willing to grant greater measures of the Spirit to receptive believers, and to make great spiritual operations manifest in the Church through his appointed means.

There are very few biblical subjects concerning which so many divergent views have been held as the subject of the atonement.

In the April issue, 1900, of the *American Journal of Theology*, Professor Hermann Schultz discusses "The Significance of Sacrifice in the Old Testament." In the October number of the same quarterly "The Place of Expiation in Human Redemption" is treated by Dr. George B. Gow, who sets forth the Pauline teaching. In the current numbers of *The Biblical World*, January, February and March, Prof. George S. Goodspeed writes on the "Atonement in Non-Christian Religions."

The study of natural atonement in its historical aspects does not explain all the mind of God, nor all the needs of man. The last meaning of a religious rite may be far different from that involved in its historical antecedents, but a comprehensive knowledge of all that is involved in the last meaning is scarcely possible without a true conception of what those antecedents embodied. The evolution from the primitive type or ceremony, however, does not always show the ultimate meaning in the divine mind. What was adapted to man's religious apprehension in his early moral stages may not be suited to the religious consciousness of today. But the principle involved in atonement is everlasting, and in its disclosure by historical development there never will escape the essentialness of reconciliation

between God and man. What atonement meant to men of olden time did not exhaust God's meaning, nor always coincide with his.

It is only the self sophisticated that think they have no consciousness of sin. Such may excuse themselves and deem their defects the remaining elements of their brute inheritance. But the consciousness that they do inherit something that is not quite beautiful betrays their self-complacency. When Isaiah declared to king Hezekiah that he would surely die, he believed it at once. But when God heard his prayer and sent his prophet to announce to him that his life would be prolonged fifteen years, he could not believe it, and asked a sign of its certainty. He readily believed evil of himself because of the innate feeling of desert. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die" has man's irrepressible consent, while good things are hard to be believed, for they are undeserved. Sin separates from holiness; sin separates from God. It is a bad thing to be out of harmony with him who owns and controls life. Men did not feel the estrangement so sorely except when it affected their circumstances, and entailed trouble. But God felt it deeply because it affected human character. Can anything be done to bring amicably together the alienated parties? Can anything be devised to put them at one again? It is both a moral and a physical law that the wages of sin is death. This law could not be abrogated. Something must be done, and that some thing must not be merely a smooth over. It must be a vital and reciprocal satisfaction. It must satisfy God's nature and character, and man's condition and conscience. It must satisfy the cravings of the human heart, and not merely satisfy the curiosity of the intellect.

Man was worried about circumstances which sin had caused, but God was troubled about human character. Remedy, if there were any, must not simply satisfy divine claims. It must satisfy and cover man's needs.

The remedy must save from causes, and not merely from consequences, else man's character would be left untouched.

Whatever was devised to set the estranged characters at one, must result in atonement of character; anything short of that would not cover all the estrangement.

The natural order would be, first atonement, followed by the more immediate result, namely, reconciliation, and ending in the full effect, which is redemption. We rightly expect that God would inaugurate an atonement which would be a perfect atonement with a perfect end in view. But we may not rightly expect that the remedy would at once place imperfect man in full attainment of that perfect end. God's end in view must be perfection, but man's condition and nature made him a subject of growth toward that end. The remedy must at once save man from death, a death which would preclude progress, but it could not create ready-made character for the saved man. He must grow into that.

So the atonement must cover man from beginning to end of redemption. In one true sense then it is an ethical atonement at first physically presented, at first symbolically and ideally effected.

The work of Luther was the presentation of the first objective purpose of the atonement, what was effected by it, namely, justification of the believer through his faith. The Reformers divided on the subject of the extent, or reference of the atonement. Was it designed for certain elect, or for all? Subsequent to the Reformation, and especially in our day, is the debated theme of the nature of the atonement, what it is in itself. Upon the answer to this depend the integrity and substantialness of both the extent and the effects of the atonement.

Justification by faith alone is the initial and necessary effect for the believer in his stage of salvation, the only possible immediate effect until faith wins its substance, the thing itself hoped for. If this be true, the nature of the atonement must harmonize with it.

Any theory of atonement that sets aside this question, and does not satisfy its demand, renders impossible the real salvation of imperfect man. He cannot leap at once into a perfect moral and spiritual character. He must grow into it. But he

needs to be saved from the very beginning, if he is to be surely saved. Redemption must have its effects through the believer's faith until it can be secured in his character. Any atonement that cannot act on man as he is by nature constituted, cannot come into contact with nor reach its own design.

The atonement which God appointed as a covering for man's sin was a blood covering. The life of the sinner was forfeited as the result of sin by natural and moral law, but God by first appointment accepted the life of an unblemished beast in lieu of the life of man. The blood of beast was to cover, or atone.

How shall the active and passive work of Christ, his teaching and the declaration of his apostles be adjusted to the Old Testament ceremonial and type of atonement? How much is actual material fulfillment, and how much spiritual suggestiveness? Wide fields of speculation have been opened up which conduct the mind to no satisfactory goal, while legal fictions have narrowed the field and led to an earthly goal.

The rights of human government, and the possibilities of divine-human suffering have exaggerated the states of Christ to suit a man-made theory of what ought to be, and to satisfy a mathematical computation of sins and their adequate penalty. A legal fiction may logically satisfy the intellect, but the worst dilemmas men get into are those created by the logical intellect. Some of the hardest things we are asked to believe respecting the character of God are the logically framed creations of the human mind. Moral qualities are conjoined in the person of the divine being which are incompatible in the character of regenerated man.

Man creates them, and when they are repulsive to his highest ethical consciousness, they are called mysteries. God is made to be subject to a law of theological determinism in his own being, and then his redemptive plan is worked out in ways perfectly analogous to humanly framed government. Roman Law, *lex*, is a hard and fast thing. It is vigorous and unbending enactment, and must be complied with without molifications of sentiment or of human feeling. Greek *nomos* is law too, but it pays deference to humanistic sentiment. It is not stern, un-

bending *lex*. Hebrew *torah* is law softer than *lex* and more pliant than *nomos*, and pays true deference to moral and spiritual sentiment. It is not merely regulation and discipline, but instruction and moral suggestive. The justice of the God of revelation is not the product of logical *lex*, but is the conception of the *torah*, a moral quality in God which looks to spiritual ends. The Hebrew mind works figuratively, and is replete with imagery. The hard and fast realism of occidental conception is not the mind of the Master, nor the Hebrew's perception of fact. The Hebrew is more anthropomorphic in expression than he is in conception. Theologically we are more anthropomorphic in conception than in expression. Satisfaction and propitiation are true on the Godward side of atonement. But God was in Christ reconciling the world into himself. In our mind we scarcely escape the conception of tri-theism. The wrath of God is true, and yet we are scarcely free from the idea of pique and resentment in the divine mind.

The wrath of God is the energy of holiness against corrupting evil, not vindictive anger, not passion. When divine wrath is appeased corrupting evil has been conquered. Jesus voluntarily assumed the conditions of life in an evil world, and the wrath of God was not upon Christ's person, but upon the evil assumed in the condition of an humbled servant. It was God's holiness in contrast of energy against what was impure and unholy. The divine mind was not changed by the atonement, but the divine attitude was by the removal of the hindrances to salvation.

Man enters into the atonement when he enters into God's resentment against sin. God must condemn sin, and must show that he condemns it. "God made us to know sin by making him who knew no sin to be sin for us."

The divine conduct must not be vindictive, but it must be corrective, and that involves displeasure against sin. The Godward side is not without feeling, but the satisfactions of anthropomorphism, and the infinite sufferings of fiction imposed on a vicarious sacrificial victim do not show the real expression of that feeling. The moral influence theory which sets forth a

Jesus simply suffering sympathetically to awaken human feeling and break down distrust and opposition to the love of God manifested in Christ, is no atonement. It covers nothing.

God is not a Shylock demanding his pound of flesh, nor is he a being impassible to the guilt of sin. The atonement does not consist simply in Christ's living an exemplary and perfect life, growing daily in spiritual power, doing as well for himself all things that he does for men, and drawing men into fellowship of life with him. The theory of atonement by sample covers nothing. It is a type of modern evolution that does not see the sinfulness of sin. Nor can the idea satisfy which represents Christ presenting to God on man's behalf an adequate sorrow and repentance for sin. Jesus felt no repentance, and had no confession of sin to make. He felt an adequate sorrow for sin, but that was not the measure of the atonement. There is somewhat of truth in each of these theories presenting the manward side of the atonement.

But the essential relation which God must bear to sin and human guilt is lost to view. The representation on the Godward side, of Christ experiencing infinite sufferings of mathematical computation to cancel equivalent penalties accruing to a world of sin, savors of retaliation and emotionalism, though a refined soul of most exalted spiritual susceptibilities truly suffers more in the flesh in that unity of moral perfection than can the common human creature.

But the key to the atonement in its sacrificial element is not the sufferings rendered, but the *life* given. The principle of suffering is to be believed, but not the extreme superficial mode. Christ *for us*, and Christ *in us* must be coupled in the ultimate divine purpose of the atonement. The redemption of man means more than escape from the just penalty of sin. It comprises the ultimate restoration of the believer through Christ. The atonement in Christ was the greatest act in the history of the world, and has more relations, and more significance than the logical mind, or the intuitive believer can satisfactorily blend and compute. St. Paul in considering it, called it the "manifold," "many colored," "many sided," wisdom of God.

The true theory cannot be contradictory to the human intellect, but man is more than intellect. A satisfactory view of it must accord with the pure ethical consciousness of man, and should satisfy the cravings of the regenerated heart, and likewise sustain true relations to the inmost being of God. It were better to be at one with God, and conscious of the fact, than to vex the soul deftly to explain how it is that we are reconciled.

Dr. George Matheson writes in the March number of *The Expositor* on the "Modern Fight of Faith." The first influence of evolution upon religion and anthropology was the enlargement of the idea of nature and the minimizing of the idea of man. Man formerly occupying a central position in the universe was driven into a corner—"a very remote corner." His insignificance placed him outside the interest of God, while God himself was separated from man "by an iron chain called Evolution." Then was most applicable the saying of the Psalmist, "Thou hast beset me behind and before, and hast laid thy hand upon me." Dr. Matheson has no fear at all that modern scientific knowledge is unfavorable to faith. He regards evolution a happy incentive to it. The old conception of a vast, unoccupied immensity of silent space left room for God outside of nature, behind and before it. But now the vast tracts of physical infinitude are peopled by suns and world-systems without limit. If God be anywhere he must be in nature and not outside or apart from it. There is no space unoccupied as a place of isolation for God. There is no end of planets; no end of suns and systems. There is no unoccupied beyond. Infinity is "the home of multitudinous forces pulsating and vibrating with the promise and potency of life." No longer may we speak of "a God behind nature." God must now be conceived as in nature.

And this modern universe is found to be encircled by a chain. Every thing and every event is "linked to some foregoing object." And this chain is Evolution. And man once deemed the centre of the divine plan is now seen to be but a small link in the chain. But since there is found to be no space unoccupied, there is no centre and no circumference to anything, hence

there are no differences of value, such as great and small. All things are of equal importance. "We have no local surroundings." "The brain-wave which originated our temptation had its birth in a movement of the fire-cloud." The nebulous movements of matter before the mountains were born no more awe us. They are man's "home memories—remembrances of a life to which he is linked, and from which he has come out to seek a larger destiny." In this recognition of Evolution "the first doctrine of the creed of science will be the first doctrine of the old creed of Creation—that man is made in the image of the universe." Then will come the joyous faith "that to the heart of man there throbs a responsive pulse at the heart of the universe."

Dr. Matheson would not wish to be called an unlimited evolutionist, nor an avowed pantheist. His presentation, however, would not be safe as dogmatic theology, nor critical as science. And what shall we say? It is the poet's reconciliation of evolution and religion.

And in saying this we do not disavow the poet's conception. The poet may see farther than the careful scientist, and as well get a glimpse of something true around the corners of well-squared theology. Only let the vision be deemed that of the seer, the happy conception of the poetical prophet, and not the statements of the calm teacher.

Science and religion have some happy reconciliations, but there are bristling difficulties too in their inter-relations, and the boxer in the "modern fight of faith" must not beat the air.

II.

GERMAN.

BY REV. S. GRING HEFELBOWER, A. M.

For 32 years Prof. Luthardt has been the editor of the *Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung*. His name is still found on the title page, but he no longer bears the same official relation to it that he had borne from its founding in the fall of 1868. The increasing infirmities of age compelled him

to withdraw from the editorship, and Pastor Hoelscher of Leipzig has been chosen his successor. Luthardt is mentioned on the first page as the founder of the paper. Dr. Hoelscher is, of course, one of the very conservative leaders of the Saxon Church. He is recognized as a man of great influence. However, his activity thus far has been limited almost exclusively to the practical affairs of the Church. In No. 5 of this year he addresses an article to the *Readers and Fellow-Contributors* of the journal, in which he gives utterance to some things that are very significant, coming as they do from one who is in a position to know the condition of the religious thought-life in the Church of the Fatherland, and who regards matters from the conservative standpoint.

Though there is great interest shown in politics and social science, the religious questions are really all-absorbing. "The inquiry and seeking after God stands in the centre of every movement."

"'God gave man eternity in his heart.' This expression of the preacher is our guiding star when we take our stand against the irreligious materialism of our time. For the denial of the eternal, the denial of the supramundane and supernatural, is the leading thought in the prevailing intellectual life in wide circles today. It is found, not only in the crude form of the ordinary ideas in the lower and higher classes of society, but also in the more dangerous form of a thorough, clever, scientific investigation, or of an artistic aesthetic tendency. It is directed, only too often, against religion and Christianity."

There is no consistent system of the universe evolved by man. Haekel's "Riddle of the Universe" remains a riddle. It is the purpose of the journal to show that "our thought and life reach their goal only in God, and that religion and Christianity are the truth of our life in this world."

"But another field for our work and warfare appears here. It is the opposition to the rationalistic enlightenment of the present. It is true that the *Protestantenverein* [an extreme rationalistic religious association of 35 years ago] has come to an end outwardly, but its method of thought lives on in a broad,

and, if I do not deceive myself, growing undercurrent. The aversion to doctrine, the indifference to the Confessions, the given watch-word of 'an undogmatic Christianity'—what else is this than the renewal of the old rationalism? The real question is that of revelation, or more exactly; is Christianity a production of the natural religious spirit of the human race, an evolution of the natural consciousness, or a creative act of God for the redemption of sinful man, which, in the person of Christ, enters into relation to that which was already present, but did not spring from it? The spirits reveal themselves when they meet this question, and it is plain that Christ stands even to-day for a stumbling block, or the resurrection of humanity. The different tendencies of our time divide on the person of Christ. Even the much discussed question as to the essence and value and authority of Holy Scripture as of the Word of God, and in particular the Old Testament discussion, resolves itself to the question: What think ye of Christ, whose son is he?

"He who dispenses with Christianity in his own thoughts and does not correct his own consciousness and the sentiment of the age according to Christianity, will always belong to those of a negative tendency, who find the norm and limits of their thought in the natural world, and really deny the supramundane living God. Here is the battle-ground of the present and the future; and this struggle knows no compromise, for the question is whether this modern Protestantism shall rule in the Church, or the Church itself, which rests on the facts of Divine Revelation."

The journal also stands for opposition to the Union. There is a certain relationship between it and rationalism. It is an artificial affair, made from the outside. It is not a product of history, but a break with history. "Hence the uncertainty and restlessness that is in it and is caused by it." It has brought much harm to the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. Of course it has become an historical fact in many German states, and we dare not ignore it or attempt to produce in it a retrogressive movement. But Hoelscher is nevertheless convinced

that a Church without a fixed confessional position is sick at the root and gives up its special calling to be a leaven in the life of the people. "Therefore we hold faithfully to the entire Confession of our fathers, and wish to work to the end that it become ever more and more the Confession of heart and life."

In the same journal, No. 52 of last year, there was an article on "Reflections at the Close of the Year." During the year just closed there have been two phenomena in the Church, which, when judged from the outside, did not cause a bitter strife, yet acted as a ferment and must be regarded as "pointing to a dark future." They waked those who had fallen into a careless optimism from their dreams and confronted them with the deep seriousness of the present condition.

Early in the year the question concerning the resurrection was suddenly placed on the order of the day, and at once, from all sides, all the negative spirits rushed to the conflict with positive confessional Christianity. The question became a revealer of the true position of men.

Much worn-out talk about "faith of the letter," "confessional bondage," "slavery of the Spirit" and the like was revised. But this had little meaning, for it was nothing new. However, the marked indifference and the ambiguity with which this new problem was met on the positive side is most significant. Men want peace at any price. Instead of properly estimating the contradictions that exists between them and the enemies of Zion, they emphasize that which they have in common and effect compromises and refuse to know anything of a righteous warfare. "It is one of the most serious dangers of our day that men are crying peace, peace when there is no peace, and regard that as a pledge of peace which is really a daring challenge and a declaration of war."

Nowhere is this more apparent than the second event that characterized the closing year. Harnack's lectures on the essence of Christianity and the reception given them. Their content was nothing less than a renewal of the so called enlightenment. Christianity consisted in nothing more than the

exercise of love for neighbor and trust in God. Jesus' chief service consisted in the value he placed on man's soul. He was not the Gospel nor did he belong to its fundamental content. The book was received with unbounded enthusiasm and was heralded as something new and unheard of. The *Christliche Welt* (an organ of the very liberal party) at once elevated it to a sort of a normative dogmatik which should form a silent basis for all its future deductions and treatises. It made it a shibboleth of modern theology. It clothed it with the authority of a symbol. Doctrines have often prevailed by having been put into popular form and thus placed within reach of the masses. This may occur with Harnack's book. "It is to be feared that with Harnack's book a new phase of development begins for modern theology and its popularization."

"At any rate this is the case already with a great part of the student body. They have been charmed by Harnack's 'Christianity,' and we do not wonder at it. His great fame as a man of science, the praise of his name in all liberal circles and organs," his fresh style and fearlessness, account for this. "And then they do not judge objectively, and cannot separate person and thing," and hence the personal impression of the man "who grew up in a churchly atmosphere with his heart doubtless more deeply rooted in true Christianity than his understanding will acknowledge," leads them to entrust themselves confidently to his leadership without further proof of the correctness of his teaching.

But there are others who showed a readiness to receive Harnack's ideas; which was very surprising, because their position flatly contradicts that which he advocated. They seem to have been misled by his reverential way of speaking of Jesus, and his praise of Christianity, and they concluded that this was proof of a common position in matters of faith. The thought did not seem to occur to them that they were dealing here only with kindred moods and words that have an entirely different content. The circle of those who, consciously or unconsciously, increase his authority in the Church, is growing. The writer fears that the immediate future is not promising, that it is not

ebb but flow tide, and that modern theology will have some more marked victories before men will wake up from its intoxication and offer opposition.

Pastor Lasson's reply to Harnack's book is regarded as very strong. It shows that there are some who see the danger of the situation and are ready and capable of opposing this tendency. We will not cease to hope that the sweeping reaction against this modern theology will eventually come. It is high time that our Church be awakened to her responsibility.

Prof. Theo. Zahn's most recent work, which appeared last year, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons und der altchristlichen Literatur*, is divided into two sections, 1, Apostele-schueler in der Provinz Asien, and 2, Brueder und Vetter Jesu. The entire first section must be regarded as a reply to the corresponding parts of Harnack's *Chronologie*. As was to be expected, Zahn contradicts Harnack in a number of things. New Testament students can learn a great deal from this conflict of the two greatest living students of Patristics. Zahn's respect for tradition, combined with this mastery of detail, and his keen analytic powers, make the reader feel that Harnack progressed too rapidly in his investigations, and was too ready to reject things in coming to his conclusions.

In his introduction Zahn shows that at the close of the first century the Asiatic Church was regarded as a "true witness of the apostolic tradition (Irenaeus)." Hence the importance of this study of it. The teachers discussed are John, Philip, Aristion, Polykarp, Papias, several elders mentioned by Irenaeus and Quadratus. The third division discusses the sources, Justin, Lucius Carus, Acta Philippi, Evan. Philippi and Irenaeus. Acta Philippi belongs to the end of the fourth century. Evan. Philippi was known to Clemens Alexandrinus, hence is much older. Irenaeus was born 115, not 140 or 150, as Harnack claims. Quadratus was not a bishop, but a travelling missionary. He was the apologist who, in 123 or 129 sent Hadrian the apology. Harnack is not inclined to regard him as the author of the apology. Zahn concludes that Polykarp lived to

be about 100 years old and died a martyr. The passage from Papias of Hierapolis that speaks of the Presbyter John, refers to the Apostle, not written by the Presbyter John in Ephesus, who was a follower of the Apostle John, and not by the Apostle, is unconditionally rejected. Wohlenberg, in speaking of this notes the fact that on this point the critical school has been approaching nearer and nearer to the traditional view, and thinks that it will eventually accept it, and that Zahn will have the satisfaction of having been instrumental in bringing it about.

Wohlenberg sums up Zahn's teaching in the second section as follows: "Mary without the aid of a man bore Jesus and afterwards lived in a real marriage relation with Joseph, she herself probably of priestly family, and Joseph at all events of David. The brothers that came of this marriage were unbelievers until after the resurrection of the Lord, even James. The latter became the head of the congregation at Jerusalem at its reorganization about the year 35, which had become necessary after the close of the first persecution. The natural way of reading Gal. 1 : 19, dare not be forced. Cleopas, husband or father of a certain Mary, otherwise unknown, had nothing to do with Alpheus. He was the brother of Joseph and father of Simeon, the successor to James in the leadership of the congregation and died at an advanced age, a martyr under Trajan. Both father and son were probably the travelers to Emmaus."

From Schneider's *Kirchliches Jahrbuch* for 1901 we gather the following interesting information concerning the student world of Germany.

In Winter Semester 1898-9 there were in attendance at the Universities 32,597; in Summer Semester, 1899, 33,563; Winter Semester, 1899-1900, 33,465; and in Summer Semester, 1900, 33,985.

The attendance at the several Universities, Winter Semester, 1899-1900 and Summer Semester 1900 was as follows: Berlin, 6,478, 5105; Munich, 4,049, 4,391; Leipzig, 3,481, 3,269; Bonn, 1,908, 2,162; Halle, 1,636, 1,620; Breslau, 1,618, 1,662; Wuertzburg, 1,215, 1,126; Tuebingen, 1,361, 1,544; Goettin-

gen, 1,238, 1,344; Heidelberg, 1,250, 1,553; Freiburg, 1,235, 1,766; Erlangen, 974, 974; Strassburg, 1,105, 1,145; Marburg, 1,049, 1,184; Greifswald, 759, 808; Koenigsberg, 840, 881; Giesen, 802, 855; Jena, 655, 758; Kiel, 757, 1,056; Rostock, 464, 495; Muenster, 620, 691. It will be noted that in Winter the Universities in the larger cities have the preference, in the Summer those in the smaller places.

The attendance of the theological students at the several universities is as follows: Halle, 349; Tuebingen, 329; Catholic, 168; Leipzig, 296; Berlin, 282; Greifswald, 183; Erlangen, 178; Goettingen, 136; Bonn, 36; Cath., 298; Strassburg, 84; Breslau, 77; Cath., 322; Giesen, 68; Kiel, 63; Heidelberg, 52; Jena, 44; Rostock, 41; Muenster, Cath., 323; Freiburg, Cath., 257; Munich, Cath., 159.

The number of students studying Law, Mathematics, Natural Science, Philology and History, have increased during the last year. The number of the medical students has decreased. There are 1594 students of Theology registered under Catholic faculties, which is an increase of 50 over last year. There were 2472 students of Evangelical Theology, which is a decrease of 122. The number of students of Evan. Theol. in the Summer Semesters for the last ten years is as follows: 1890, 4527; 1891, 4233; 1892, 3856; 1892, 3565; 1894, 3227; 1895, 3122; 1896, 2956; 1897, 2798; 1898, 2682; 1899, 2594; 1900, 2472.

Comparing the attendance of students of theology at the several universities in the Summer Semesters of 1899 and 1900, we note the following changes: Berlin 324 to 282; Bonn, 101 to 86; Breslau, 86 to 77; Erlangen, 299 to 178; Giessen, 68 to 59; Goettingen, 136 to 143; Greifswald, 215 to 183; Halle, 365 to 346; Heidelberg, 69 to 52; Jena, 39 to 44; Kiel, 45 to 63; Koenigsburg 76 to 93; Leipzig, 301 to 296; Marburg, 124 to 113; Rostock, 39 to 41; Strassburg, 66 to 85; Tuebingen, 343 to 329.

The five most conservative universities, Rostock, Greifswald, Erlangen, Leipzig and Halle, have more than two-fifths of the evangelical students of Germany.

The number of women attending German universities decreased from 664 in Winter Semester of 1899-1900 to 618 in Summer Semester of 1900. This apparent decrease was due to stricter regulations governing admission at Berlin, where, until last Semester, more were to be found than at all the other universities.

Of the 2178 instructors in the philosophical, legal and medical faculties in the German universities only 277 are Catholics, that is only 13 per cent., while 35 per cent. of the population of the Empire is Catholic. Dr. Lossol (Catholic) of Koenigsberg attributes this to Catholic indifference to education, not to any effects of the Kultur Kampf, as most Catholics claim.

In 1891 the venerable Bern. Weiss began the publication of a New Testament text, accompanied by brief notes, which was not finished until 1900. There are two methods for judging the traditional variations, "an external, by testing the manuscripts in order to distinguish the more recent from the older, and an internal, determining by exegetical examination which variations sprung from others (by accident or purpose)." The methods are supplementary. Weiss acknowledges the value of the former, but thinks that all attempts by classification to arrive at an original text, have proven only that there is no pure text type, no neutral text. Therefore we should lay more emphasis on the other method, and test exegetically the chief different readings in order to determine the sources of mistakes that we may eliminate them. In this examination of the text, exegesis has the deciding voice. The work supplies a long felt want and is to a great extent *sui generis*.

ARTICLE IX.

REVIEW OF RECENT LITERATURE.

EATON AND MAINS, NEW YORK.

History of Babylonia and Assyria. By Robert William Rogers, Ph. D., (Leipzig), D. D., LL. D., F. R. G. S., Professor in Drew Theological Seminary, New Jersey. Two volumes, pp. XX. 429 and XV. 418. Price \$5.00.

In his preface the author informs us that he spent ten years in the preparation of these volumes, that he traveled extensively and made researches in the libraries and museums of Paris, Berlin, Cairo, and Constantinople. The work before us gives full evidence of this claim; it covers the entire subject, and is complete in every part. Every nook and corner has been ransacked, every tablet and monument and tomb has been laid under contribution, and every journal and book, from that of Odoric, the earliest known European traveler, to that of Hilprecht, the latest explorer, has been consulted. The result is the fullest, most thorough history of these countries that has ever been published. The chapters on Excavation and Decipherment are intensely interesting and prove how some of the greatest human triumphs have been won, not by a few brilliant dashes, but by a heroic grappling with apparent impossibilities and a spirit of painstaking that would die rather than surrender. Other chapters, such as the Lands of Babylonia and Assyria, the Peoples of these lands, the early Babylonian Dynasties, the Beginnings of Assyria, the Reigns of Tiglathpileser, the Sargons, Shalmaneser, Essarhaddon and Nebuchadrezzar, show the vast field traversed and the elaborate research made by our author. The discussion of the Babylonian Chronology and the vexed Sumero-Accadian question, problems which in the very nature of the case must await future discoveries for their solution, is characterized by a spirit of candor and conservatism.

We will venture upon one criticism. In his references to the Old Testament the author permits himself, in our judgment, to be too much controlled by the latest theories concerning the date and composition of this portion of the Bible, theories about which, as he well knows, the final word has not yet been spoken. A remarkable instance of this occurs on the last pages of the second volume. He there tells us that "the fall of Babylon in this fashion, (*i. e.*, without any resistance being offered), is one of the surprises of history. That a city, which had bred warriors enough to rule the whole civilized world, should at last lay down its arms and tamely submit—it is impossible, and yet it is true." In the absence of any other account why did the author not al-

low the prophet Daniel to speak? Daniel gives the explanation of how the impossible may become possible.

The work is written in a charming and popular style, and is fascinating from beginning to end. It is provided with an Appendix, an Index of Subjects, of Authors and Biblical passages quoted or discussed. We recommend these volumes most heartily to our readers.

T. C. BILLHIMER.

GENERAL COUNCIL BOARD OF PUBLICATION, PHILADELPHIA.

Dost Thou Believe? Or Candid Talks on Vital Themes. By Joseph A. Seiss, D. D., LL. D., Pastor of the Church of the Holy Communion, Philadelphia. pp. 382.

This book is a new edition, under this new title, of *Right Life*, published in 1886. The old name did not quite fit the subject matter, nor does the new. Neither indicates the real scope. Either points out a wider field than is traversed. It is a discussion of the fundamental beliefs in the Christian religion; the existence of God, the need of a personal faith in him, the nature of religion, reason and revelation, proofs of revelation through the Bible, the new ideas and influences brought into the world by Jesus Christ, Christ the only hope etc. It belongs to the department of Apologetics rather than that of practical religion. It is a volume of lectures delivered on Sunday evenings to those who were especially invited to hear them. The lectures were prepared for the benefit of young people, non-church goers and persons in doubt or indifference respecting religion. Though prepared for delivery from the pulpit they were written for publication. The style and method of treatment happily combine those of the preacher and the author. In this difficult task Dr. Seiss has had remarkable success. Few sermons and lectures can be heard and read with equal pleasure, but this volume is as interesting as if it had been primarily prepared for the press. Being popular in its purpose we do not look for the same exactness in statement that we demand in strictly scientific discussion. Some of the definitions are a little vague, as that of religion, some of the facts are not precisely correct, as that of the purpose of Dr. Carter's celebrated argument, and some philosophic expressions are rather strange, as that of being conscious of consciousness; but these things do not detract from the value of the book. It is the result of a wide range of reading extending through a number of years. We have in it the ripe fruit of a long professional life. The arguments are strong and clear, and are given in the best vein of the author's characteristic style. The reader finds no difficulty in following the discussion into the serious questions of philosophy. Young people if they are interested in such themes will be charmed, and older persons who have often gone over them will be delighted in going over them again. It is grati-

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fying that the demand for it justified a new edition. Since Christian evidences are being left out of the curriculum in so many colleges we need books like this to counteract the sceptical influence of such a large part of our secular and literary press. Pastors are compelled to give an increasing amount of attention to this part of their work. They will find very valuable help in this volume.

L. A. FOX.

LUTHERAN BOOK CONCERN, COLUMBUS, OHIO.

Around the Christmas Hearth. Eight Christmas stories by G. W. Lose. Cloth bound. 139 pages.

The Bells Call Me. Four stories from the German of Th. von Rothschild and M. Grabi; translated by W. A. Trapp. Board bound. 89 pages. With colored illustrations.

Der Weihnachtmorgen und andere Erzählungen. Five stories in simple German, by Antoine Moeller, Elizabeth Heidemann, and J. Westphal. 64 pages. Cloth bound. With colored illustrations.

These three books with bright pictures and stories of child-life, drawn mostly from Fatherland sources, will prove a delight to youthful readers. Each story is founded on some noble Christian ideal.

STANLEY BILLHEIMER.

The Teachers' Annual or Assistant to Understand The International Lessons 1900-1901. Edited by Rev. J. Sheatsley of Delaware, Ohio.

A very comprehensive and meritorious work which should be in the possession of every teacher using the International series of Sunday school lessons. The work, though confessedly composed in great haste shows no evidence of the same. It contains gospel lessons (Thomasius' Selection of Pericopes) thereby drawing the scholar's attention to the beautiful lessons of the Church Year. Each pericope is followed by a lengthy and able elucidation to which is added a series of well chosen lessons drawn from the Bible text itself, which are to be especially impressed upon the attention of the pupil. We would commend it, not only to the teacher, but also to the pastor as a ready reference volume and a suggestive little commentary.

M. H. STETTLER.

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY, BOSTON AND NEW YORK.

G. W. Anderson of the Boston School Committee opens the April *Atlantic Monthly* with a fearless exposure of "Politics and the Public Schools;" Dr. Talcott Williams discusses "The Anthracite Coal Crisis" and the coming wage adjustment in the mining industry; John Muir describes the "Fountains and Streams of the Yosemite;" W. D. Lyman exploits the "State of Washington;" C. A. Dinsmore treats "Dante's Quest of Liberty;" Martha A. Harris, "The Renaissance of the Tragic Stage;" and Edwin Burritt Smith, "The Next Step in Municipal Reform." "Penelope's Irish Experiences" end, but Miss

Jewett's "Tory Lover" goes on with increasing interest. F. J. Stimson, Jennette Lee, Roswell Field, and Miss Dunbar contribute stories or sketches. In addition to an April Symposium of poetry, Henry Van Dyke, John Burroughs, and M. A. De W. Howe furnish single poems, and the "Contributors" Club is bright as always. An excellent issue of the *Atlanti*.

ABBAY PRESS, 114 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK.

A Daughter of the Prophets. By Curtis Van Dyke. \$1.00.

This is a charming little story of a twentieth century woman. The author is a descendant of that Dr. Van Dyke who some years since carried on a spirited controversy with Frances Willard on the question of woman's position and rights.

The story develops slowly, almost tediously, at first, but when once the reader's attention is caught it never lags until the tale is told. Even to the modern reader, accustomed to all sorts of twentieth century "surprises," the boldness of its teaching comes with somewhat of a shock. The heroine of the story is first a lawyer, then a wife and mother, and finally an ordained minister of the gospel standing in the pulpit of a wretched frontier town, and delivering a message full of hope and life and power. These are surely not the ordinary materials of the writer of romance, yet the author has taken them and with great tact and skill has made of them a high toned and bewitching "love story."

The teaching of the book is essentially moral and religious, it is a sermon in the attractive garb of romance, and though it is not written in the spirit of carping criticism, it touches some points in modern church-life that are not invulnerable. Could our pulpits and pews be filled with men and women displaying the same apostolic courage and zeal and unselfishness that is depicted in the life of our hero, Roger Fenlow, and his beautiful young wife, much of the opposition and criticism now directed against the Christian Church would be speedily silenced.

It is a book that all classes can read with interest and profit, but we believe it will prove specially profitable and inspiring to young ministers.

C. H. HUBER.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, NEW YORK.

The Apostolic Age. By George T. Purves, D. D., LL. D., recently Professor of New Testament Literature and Exegesis in Princeton Theological Seminary. Being No. 8 of "The Historical Series for Bible Students," edited by Profs. Kent and Sanders. Cloth bound. pp. XX. and 343 \$1.25.

This volume deserves a prominent place among the many books that have been written concerning the apostolic age. It makes no pretense to originality of theories in order that it may differ from previous pub-

cations. Its purpose is rather to give the results of constructive scholarship "in concise and attractive form," emphasizing "assured and positive rather than transitional positions."

The result of Dr. Purves' examination "is to uphold in all essential points the traditional conception of Apostolic Christianity." And yet the book is not a mere copy of old authors and conceptions. The scholarly reputation of Dr. Purves, and a thorough reading of the volume, should remove every shadow of such a suspicion. The position of the author was taken "only after careful and candid investigation," and appeared to him "the inevitable issue of unprejudiced inquiry."

The plan of the volume is excellent. It is composed of five parts, each one a main division of the whole subject. These in turn are subdivided into varying numbers of chapters, according to their relative importance. This gives the book an air of simplicity and directness that is very helpful and attractive to the reader. There are no lengthy paragraphs and interminable chapters. The very division fixes the thought in the mind of the reader. Moreover, every division begins with a short chapter on historical sources and literature.

Among the other advantages to be mentioned are the five excellent maps—four of them tracing Paul's journeys—by which the geographical relation of apostolic activity can be better understood. Then there is an appendix, containing a discussion of the chronology of the apostolic age. A double index—of names and subjects, and of Biblical references, is also given; very thoroughly made, and giving easy reference to any subject desired. Finally, there is an extensive bibliography, giving the best books on the apostolic age from the various schools of thought. The more earnest student of this period will find this feature very helpful for further study.

Perhaps the part in the volume that is least satisfactory is the author's discussion of the Pentecostal "tongues." Dr. Purves, with his constant acknowledgement of the supernatural, sees no difficulty in accepting Luke's whole statement. But in his further discussion and comparison of the various manifestations of "tongues," he is not always consistent, and his argument is not conclusive. This much may be said, however: it is far more satisfactory than many of the theories advanced of late years.

The same may be said of the author's discussion of the North—and South—Galatian theories. Of course, by reason of the scarcity of fact, and the necessity of conjecture, the final word has not yet been uttered; but the superior proof would seem to be with the position Dr. Purves takes.

The description of Paul, the development of his work and his theology, is very sympathetic. His discussion of Paul's conversion is especially fine, and the explanations offered convincing.

The space devoted to the rest of the apostles is, for obvious reasons,

much less than that given to Paul; but there is nothing of any value that is omitted.

In fine, Dr. Purves has given us an admirable cook on a much discussed subject, and his effort is not in vain. Those who read the book will not regret it; while busy factors will find in its clear, concise statements much that is stimulating and helpful for their study of the Acts and the Epistles.

JULIUS F. SEEBACH.

LUTHERAN PUBLICATION SOCIETY.

The Church Seasons in Picture and Song. By Rev. F. H. Knubel, A. M. Paper, 20 pages quarto. Price 40 cents.

This booklet gives in a series of living pictures in gracefully designed tableaux the chief festivals of the Church.

Explanations accompany each tableau descriptive of the meaning and of the manner of presentation. The booklet will be helpful to young people's societies in devising entertainments.

M. COOVER.

THE BRYAN PRINTING CO. PRESS, COLUMBIA, S. C.

The Bible Student is a new theological magazine.

Is edited by an able corps of conservative Bible students whose aim is to set before its readers a careful process of Biblical exegesis and of theological thought, and a well-sifted result of modern historical research of the Holy Scriptures, as well as to combat the unscriptural conceptions arising from a too loose method of historical study.

Its motto is, "Prove all things: hold fast that which is good."

Textual exposition, trends of theological thought, and current literature are carefully presented. The subjects treated are timely and instructive, and the names of Warfield, Purves, and Davis assure conservative positions. \$2.00 a year.

M. COOVER.

CONCORDIA PUBLISHING HOUSE, ST. LOUIS, MO.

Dr. Martin Luther's Reformations Schriften. Erste Abtheilung. Zur Reformationshistorie Gehörige Documenta. A. Wider die Papisten. Aus den Jahren 1525 bis 1537. 4 to 2325 pp. (columns).

No other publication committed to this reviewer receives the welcome with which each new volume of this superb edition of Luther's works is greeted. Vol. XVI contains a continuance of the Documents relating to Reformation history begun with Vol. XV. It consists of six chapters. Chap. 10 treats of the Peasants' Insurrection and the death of Elector Frederick, including Spalatin's Tröstung an den Churfürsten, a priceless gem of consolatory reflections. Chap. 11, of the Diets held 1525-1529, giving the full text of the memorable protest at Spire, April 25, 1529. Chap. 12, of Sundry Leagues of the Papal Princes against the Confessors of Evangelical doctrine and of the conventions

of the Evangelical Princes and States at Torgau, Rodach, Schwabach, etc. Chap. 13, more than half of the volume—of the Diet at Augsburg, 1530, and of the Confession there presented, of Luther's sojourn at Coburg, his labors, conflicts and sicknesses there, his prayer and exultant faith. Chap. 14, of the Protestant Assemblies at Schmalkald, the Schmalkald League and the first Religious Peace. Chap. 15, of the negotiations between the Imperial and Papal Envoys and the Evangelical States concerning the Council to be called.

It is noteworthy that we have in this volume the full text of three of the Lutheran Confessions, the Augustana, the Apology and the Schmalkald Articles, revised according to Müller's "*Symbolische Buecher*." So we have also the Confutation, and Aurifaber's incomparable Report of the Diet, for these works of Luther are not strictly confined to what proceeded from his tireless pen.

Well may the editor say: "We learn from the writings herein contained how wonderfully God has protected and preserved his Church, which teaches and confesses his holy and pure word, against all the powers and assaults of the adversaries, mighty though they were and wicked their purposes."

A catalogue of Documents according to their dates, and a list of Luther's Letters according to their dates, are added—a feature which is sure to be appreciated by all students.

E. J. WOLF.

Johann Friedrich Starcks Täglichsches Handbuch in guten und bösen Tagen. * * * Neue Ausgabe, durchgesehen von F. Piefer.

No Church so abounds in devotional literature as the Lutheran, and no modern language is so well adapted to convey devotional thought as is the German language. The hymn-books, prayer-books, books of sermons and of pious meditation, that have proceeded from the Lutheran Church, and have appeared in German language, are not legion, but legions. In this class of literature Starck's *Handbuch*, commonly known as *Starcks Gebetbuch*, holds a high place. The author was born at Hildesheim in 1680, studied theology at Giessen, in 1715 became pastor at Frankfort on the Main, and died in 1756. The book in its original form was first published in 1727. It passed through many editions, and was circulated by the tens of thousands of copies. In the year 1855 it was published in an English translation by I. Kohler in Philadelphia.

We do not wonder that our Missouri brethren have brought out a new edition of this truly good book, that has quickened and comforted so many pious souls, and has brought light and joy to so many dying Christians. In its original form it is in every sense worthy of being placed in every family that uses the German language in its devotions.

The book contains exhortations, prayers and hymns for almost every possible occasion and experience in life. Usually a service begins with a passage of Scripture. This is briefly and edifyingly expounded. Then

follows a prayer, and then a hymn. On reading these prayers we readily agree with Prof. Piefer, in the Preface, that "on John Frederick Starck more than on others was poured out the gift of prayer." The exhortations are so rich as to reveal a soul that lived in the depths of the divine Word and had the gift of interpretation. These exhortations, or expositions as they may be called, have a homiletical value, and may be advantageously used by young ministers. The prayers also may be studied as models by those who have to lead the devotions of a congregation. The hymns represent the richness and fulness of the German hymnology. Taken as a whole there is no better book of its kind in any language than *Starcks Gebetbuch*.

But we regret to say that we do not have *Starcks Gebetbuch* in its original, in what we believe to be its best form. Starck was a Pietist to the very centre and soul of his Christian life. Had he been anything else he could never have produced his *Gebetbuch*. Professor Piefer has been careful to tell us in the Preface that certain features peculiar to Pietism have been set aside "by brief omissions and slight changes." We believe that this is taking unwarranted liberties with an old standard. The one-sided emphasis placed by the Missourians on "grace," and their fear lest "sanctification" be brought too near to "justification," have inspired these changes. It would be well for Missouri and equally well for all of us to lay more emphasis on sanctification.

This preface also accuses Starck of "a false Sunday doctrine." Starck held and taught that the third Commandment—"Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy,"—still has divine authority. This was the doctrine of the entire Lutheran Church for at least two hundred years or more after the Reformation. Modern German Lutheran theologians during the nineteenth century vied with each other in effort to show that the third Commandment was abrogated by Christianity. As a result a flood of Sabbath desecration has come upon Germany, until recently a Synod in Wuertemberg officially deplored the desecration and the secularization of the Sabbath, and the consequent slim attendance at divine worship. We are sorry to read in this book that "we Christians according to the New Testament have nothing to do with this (third) commandment." It is not what John Frederick Starck taught, but the very opposite of his teaching, and yet it is sent out under the *imprimatur* of his honored name!

We long for the time when the entire Lutheran Church shall return to her earlier teaching in regard to the third Commandment.

It only remains to be said that the large, clear print of this book is but a fair sample of the superior work done by the Concordia Publishing House.

J. W. RICHARD.

LEA BROTHERS AND COMPANY, PHILADELPHIA.

The Moriscos of Spain: their Conversion and Expulsion. By Henry Charles Lea, LL. D.

This book is not intended to be a complete history of the Moors in Spain, or even a complete account of their life at any particular period. It is limited to the sufferings of these people under the Inquisition and the ever-enlarging persecutions leading to their final expulsion from the country. It is a tragedy unrelieved by any cheerful scenes and increasing in ferocity to the end. The only relief is in the reflection that during the century with its cruelties and wrongs there must have been some brighter events though unrecorded here. But even if the perspective is defective, the picture drawn of the ecclesiasticism of the time is essentially true. No other kind of persecution is so revolting as that visited in the name of the Christian faith upon those outside who have never learned its true character.

The author is on familiar ground. In other volumes he has told the story of the Inquisition and presented kindred themes. He has a style generally clear and correct, making the reading easy. A number of foreign words might be clearer for a little explanation or definition; perhaps there are enough to justify a brief glossary. Statistics of trials and burnings for heresy, of slaughters, enslavements and transportations are freely given and abundant references to authorities and documents show that facts not fancies are the material dealt with.

Our interest in the Spanish people has lately been quickened; our necessity for knowing them well is increased, and whatever will conduce to this end, even though three or four centuries old, is likely to be welcome.

J. A. HIMES.